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 yasya kasya taror mūlaṃ yena kenāpi miśritam/ 
yasmai kasmai pradātavyaṃ yad vā tad vā bhavisyati// 
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It is to be given to somebody. Then something will happen. 
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Buddhist Critiques of the Veda and Vedic Sacrifice: 
Bhāviveka’s Mīmāṃsā Chapter of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and Tarkajvālā 
by 
Hyoung Seok Ham 
 
This dissertation examines two Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice that had long 
histories in Buddhist India, yet ended around the sixth century CE. The last document to inherit 
the critiques is the ninth Mīmāṃsā chapter of Bhāviveka’s (500-570 CE) 
Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and its commentary, the Tarkajvālā.  
 From the earliest texts of their tradition, Buddhists sought to undermine the authority of 
the canonical Brahmin texts by questioning the integrity of its putative authors and denouncing 
the immorality of animal sacrifice. These critiques consistently recur in the subsequent 
Abhidharma literature and provide the basis for Buddhist criticism of the Mīmāṃsakas beginning 
in the fifth century CE.  
 The dissertation includes an overview of Bhāviveka’s long chapter on Mīmāṃsā in his 
Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and reviews previous scholarly opinion on the identity of opponent of 
the chapter. It next examines how Bhāviveka employed each of the traditional critiques against 
the new opponent, demonstrating that he drew heavily on the Abhidharma and Sāṃkhya 
literature to counter the Mīmāṃsaka defense of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice, while adding new 
levels of specificity and sophistication. The dissertation goes on to explore how and why 
Buddhists such as Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita discarded the old strategies and adopted a new 
 xi 
one, declaring the authorless Veda to be unintelligible.  
 The dissertation concludes that Bhāviveka’s Mīmāṃsā chapter is a product of a 
transitional phase when Buddhists began to perceive the Mīmāṃsakas as a serious threat, 
resulting in a unique confrontation with Vedic orthodoxy and orthopraxy that drew on anti-Vedic 
sentiment across the boundaries of Buddhism and Brahmanism.
    1 
Introduction 
 
The Veda, the corpus of the earliest documents of Indian civilization, has always been the symbol 
for the orthodoxy and legitimacy of intellectual pursuits among South Asian religious and 
scholarly groups. It is in reference to the values for which the word the “Veda” (and “Vedic”) 
stands that one’s intellectual activity is socially recognized and positioned as demonstrably 
indicated by the two broad categories of Indian philosophical schools, the “affirmers” (āstika) 
and the “deniers” (nāstika). The deniers of the Vedic authority, or the “revilers of the Veda” 
(vedanindaka), Manu prescribes, should be ostracized.1 However nominal the affiliation that 
one’s tradition has with the Veda, or however scarce one’s thoughts are indebted to the Veda, 
Brahmins, upon whom intellectual labor is socially entrusted or imposed as the class duty, had to 
pursue their intellectual goals within the boundaries of and in the acknowledgement of the 
authority of the Veda.2 And they were constantly open to the critique that they are becoming 
“nāstika” by contradicting the Veda, as exemplified by the Mīmāṃsaka critic of the Sāṃkhyas in 
the Yuktidīpikā.3 
                                                 
1 Mānavadharmaśāstra 2.11, “If a twice-born disparages these two [i.e., śruti and smṛti] by relying on the 
science of logic, he ought to be ostracized by good people as an infidel and a denigrator of the Veda.” 
(yo ’vamanyeta te tūbhe hetuśāstrāśrayād dvijaḥ/ sa sādhubhir bahiṣkāryo nāstiko vedanindakaḥ//); Text 
and translation are from Olivelle (2005, 94 and 404). 
2 See Renou (1965)’s general remark on the “destiny of the Veda” in the post-Vedic period (1-2) and 
Halbfass (1991, Chapter 1)’s review of it.  
3 The Mīmāṃsaka opponent attempted to present the Veda as the common ground of authority 
(ubhayapakṣaprasiddho hetuḥ) between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Sāṃkhyas in the long pūrvapakṣa 
passage at the Yuktidīpikā (Wezler and Motegi 1998) 31:19-34:8. The Mīmāṃsaka arguments introduced 
therein made the author of the Yuktidīpikā explicitly confess (34:10-1): “We do not reject the authority of 
the Veda.” (na vayaṃ vedasya prāmāṇyaṃ [emended from vedasyaprāmāṇyaṃ] pratyācakṣmahe.) The 
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 Indian Buddhism was born within the Vedic milieu and died within it. Even though they 
employed the term “nāstika” in different meanings4 and abhorred being referred to with that 
appellation,5 the anti-Vedic sentiment is, with varying degrees, prevalent in any Buddhist 
treatise. From the earliest canonical literature in which the Buddha proclaims the ignorance of 
Vedic seers (such as the Tevijjasutta) to the tenth to eleventh century logical treatises that 
formulate a syllogism against the authorlessness of the Veda (such as the Tarkabhāṣā)6, 
                                                 
Mīmāṃsaka opponent appears to be Kumārila, as Halbfass (1991:93-4) observes, since the Yutidīpikā’s 
opponent advanced the opinions that “comes surprisingly close to Kumārila’s own argumentation” (ibid., 
93) contained in the Ślokavārttika, codanā, 231cd-265ab. It is also noteworthy that Kumārila in his 
Tantravārttika, as Nicholson (2010, 170) and Eltschinger (2014, 67-8) note, treated the Sāṃkhyas as 
those who are no less heterodox than Buddhists and the Jainas. The relevant passage is translated in 
Sanderson (2015, 160-1) with an emendation of the text (fn. 12). 
4 See Nicholson (2010, 172-176) and (2012) for different usages of the terms, āstika and nāstika, in the 
Jain, Buddhist, and Grammarian traditions. 
5 Bhāviveka violently reacts to the Yogācāra opponent’s accusation of being nāstika (translated as 
“nihilist” in the following quote) against the Mādhyamikas. MHK 5.82-3, “[Opponent:] If things have no 
inherent nature, conventional designations also will not exist. He [who propounds this] is a nihilist to 
whom one should not talk and with whom one should not dwell together (82). Not only is such a [nihilist] 
himself destined for an unhappy existence, but he also leads others to misery (83ab). [Bhāviveka 
answers:] Those words are the vomiting of the putrid meat of hatred. They betray your undigested pride. 
(83cd)” (prajñapter apy asadbhāvo vastvabhāve bhavet sati/ taddṛṣṭir nāstiko ’kathyaḥ sa hy asaṃvāsya 
eva ca// svayam āpāyikatve ’sau pareṣāṃ ca vipādakaḥ/ iti dveṣāmiṣodgāro ’bhimānājīrṇasūcakaḥ//); 
translation is from Hoornaert (2002, 131-2). See also Eckel (2008, 281-2). As Hoornaert (ibid., 131, fn. 2) 
and Eckel (ibid., 65-6) note, the Yogācāra opponent’s accusation is based on a passage from the 
Bodhisattvabhūmi which declares: “someone who denies designation and reality should be known as the 
worst kind of nihilist (nāstika).” (prajñaptitattvāpavādāc ca pradhāno nāstiko veditavyaḥ.); text is from 
Hoornaert (ibid.) and translation is by Janice Willis quoted in Eckel (ibid.). 
Candrakīrti’s response to the same accusation of “the foremost (or the worst kind of) nihilist” (pradhāno 
nāstikaḥ) against the Mādhyamikas is rather moderate. In the seventeenth chapter of the Prasannapadā, 
he just flatly denies the accusation. After having invited an opponent who argues that the Mādhyamikas 
deny action (karman), actor (kartṛ), and fruit (phala) by establishing the emptiness of everything, and 
therefore, are the foremost nihilists, Candrakīrti answers: “We are not nihilists, but we illuminate the non-
dual road leading to the city of nirvāṇa by means of refuting the two philosophical tendencies [rooted in 
the concepts] of non-existence and existence. Yet, we do not say that the action, the result, the doer and so 
forth do not exist. Rather, we establish that it is without own-being.” (na vayaṃ nāstikāḥ. 
nāstyastitvadvayavādanirāsena tu vayaṃ nirvāṇapuragāminam advayapatham abhidyotayāmaḥ. na ca 
vayaṅ karmakartṛphalādikaṃ nāstīti brūmaḥ. kin tarhi niḥsvabhāvam etad iti vyavasthāpayāmaḥ.); Text 
and translation are from Kragh (2003, 89 and 263). (The underlined phrase in the translation is missing in 
Kragh (ibid.), and thus, inserted.) cf. Prasannapadā (De la Vallée Poussin 1913, 329:13-5). Later in the 
same work (the eighteenth chapter), Candrakīrti discusses the similar accusation that the Mādhyamikas 
are infiltrated by nāstikas (nāstikāviśiṣṭā mādhyamikāḥ) more extensively. See Prasannapadā (ibid., 
368:4-369:7).   
6 See Kajiyama (1966, 90). Mokṣakaragupta’s Tarkabhāṣā is said to contain “the contents that the 
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Buddhists maintained a critical stance toward the Veda until their demise in the homeland India. 
Indian Buddhists had always been “revilers of the Veda” and, in this regard, Buddhists were 
representative nāstikas in the perception of orthodox Brahmins. Within the religiously plural 
society of the ancient and medieval India, this fact of being revilers of the Veda, therefore, 
constituted an essential social identity of Buddhists.    
 Although the anti-Vedic identity is the constant and essential feature that defined 
Buddhism throughout its career in India, its anti-Vedic tendency had not always been explicit and 
a systematic disputation against the orthodoxy and orthopraxy of Brahmins. In accordance with 
the historical vicissitudes of pro-/anti-Buddhist socio-political atmospheres in which Indian 
Buddhism was situated, its anti-Vedic identity was either emphasized or ignored in determining 
the validity and legitimacy of its teaching.7 The more harshly Indian Buddhists were condemned 
by Brahmins for their anti-Vedic heterodoxy, the clearer and sharper Buddhists revealed their 
animosity toward the Veda and its cultural norms. In the sixth century, the period marked by the 
fall of the Gupta empire (320-550 CE), the potential of anti-Vedic Buddhist sentiment finds the 
momentum to evolve into an organized challenge to Brahmin advocates of Vedic values. 
 In a series of pioneering and ambitious studies which culminated in Buddhist 
Epistemology as Apologetics (2014), Vincent Eltschinger correctly pinpoints the sixth century 
CE as the turning point in the history of Indian Buddhism and, focusing on the prominent figure 
of Dharmakīrti, attempts to reveal the historical background and the apologetic dimension of the 
seemingly “purely philosophical” project of Buddhist epistemological school that dominated 
Buddhist intellectuals until the last moment of Buddhism in India. Eltschinger demonstrates that 
                                                 
Buddhist philosophy, in its entirety, finally reached” (Tsukamoto, Matsunaga, and Isoda 1990, 480).  
7 Giovanni Verardi’s recent book, Hardships and Downfall of Buddhism in India (2011), skillfully traces 
the “ups and downs” of favorable socio-political circumstances for Buddhism throughout its history in 
India.  
    4 
Brahmin hostility toward Buddhism increased during the Gupta (and the immediately subsequent 
post-Gupta) era as exemplified by the sixth (or seventh) century Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila Bhaṭṭa 
and reads the two predominant post-sixth century Buddhist trends, namely, Buddhist Esoterism 
(Tantrism) and Epistemology, as the Buddhist responses to the ever-increasing Brahmin 
antagonism. In so doing, he makes an important observation on an aspect of the sixth century 
Indian Buddhism: “by the sixth century, certain segments of the Buddhist monastic elites shaped 
the modalities of their self-assertion by contrasting themselves no longer with dissenting 
coreligionists, but with non-Buddhist challengers.”8 In short, Indian Buddhists of the sixth 
century came to be more concerned with inter-religious conflicts rather than intra-religious 
contentions.  
 Eltschinger, however, curiously does not clearly thematize the prevalent themes that 
penetrate the materials that bear witness to the increasing Brahmin hostility and does not 
explicitly identify the major proponents who theorized the growing antagonistic emotion, thereby 
providing a philosophical foundation for Brahmin anti-Buddhism program. As he convincingly 
demonstrates, “apocalyptic” materials from the Brahmin side, towards the sixth century (or after 
250 CE)9, changed the direct cause for the advent of the degenerate Kaliyuga from the foreign 
rules to the heretical, especially Buddhist, teachings. This fact supports the thesis that Brahmin 
hostility toward Buddhism was heightened around the sixth century.  
Yet, there is a shared concern among the pre- and post-250 CE materials. Whomever 
should be blamed for the collapse of the universe, be it foreigners or heretical religious teachers, 
the result is the same: the collapse of the social order governed by Vedic values. They cause the 
neglect of the Veda, the disorder of the four castes, and the discontinuation of Vedic sacrifice. 
                                                 
8 Eltschinger (2014, 95); emphasis in the original. 
9 See ibid., 53. 
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The author who raised this perennial concern of Brahmins to the level of a philosophical critique 
at Buddhism with unprecedented severity was, as Eltschinger notes, Kumārila, the sixth-seventh 
century Mīmāṃsaka.10 Therefore, one important aspect about the “newness” of sixth-century 
Buddhism consists in the ascendancy of the Mīmāṃsā school, represented by Kumārila, which 
intensified and systematized the “old” anti-Buddhist feelings among Brahmins for being anti-
Vedic. 
 Reflecting the growing Brahmin hostility and the Mīmāṃsaka systematic articulation of 
anti-Buddhist animosity, Buddhist scholarly literature around the sixth century also bears witness 
to the ascendancy of the Mīmāṃsakas as the major adversary. In the fifth century, the 
Sarvāstivādin master Saṅghabhadra briefly examined the Mīmāṃsaka ideologies on the Veda for 
the first time in the history of Indian Buddhism. By the time of post-sixth-century works such as 
the Madhyamakahṛdaya of Bhāviveka (500-570)11, the Pramāṇavārttika 1 along with the 
Svavṛtti of Dharmakīrti (ca. sixth/seventh century)12, and the Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita 
(725-788)13, the Mīmāṃsakas have become by far the most conspicuous opponents of 
Buddhism. Buddhist intellectuals had come to perceive the Mīmāṃsakas as a serious threat to 
Buddhism from the fifth century on. That the recent increase of scholarship on the topic of the 
Buddhist-Mīmāṃsaka conflicts has mostly focused on the writings of Kumārila, Dharmakīrti and 
                                                 
10 The most recent proposal for the date of Kumārila is 560-620 CE by Yoshimizu (2015, 43, fn.1). 
11 Bhāviveka’s date is rather firm. Frauwallner (1961, 132-4), quoting Ui’s study which is based on 
Xuanzang’s travelogue (大唐西域記, T 2087), measures Dharmapāla’s date as 530-561 CE. Frauwallner, 
in the same article (ibid., 136-7), dates Sthiramati to 510-570 CE based on Lévi’s study which reports that 
“king Gunasena of Valabhī, who is known to have ruled from 558-566 A.D., has a monastery erected for 
him.” Kajiyama (1968-9), by pointing to Sthiramati’s critique of Bhāviveka in his commentary on 
Nagārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (大乘中觀釋論, T 1567), Dharmapāla’s critique of Bhāviveka in 
his commentary on Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka (大乘廣百論釋論, T 1571) and Bhāviveka’s indebtedness to 
Dignāga (480-540 CE), dates Bhāviveka to 500-570 CE.   
12 Frauwallner (1961, 137-9) dates Dharmakīrti to 600-660 CE. Krasser (2012) recently challenged this 
dates and argued that Dharmakīrti belongs to the sixth century based on his observation on the dialogic 
relationship between the works of Bhāviveka, Dharmakīrti, and Kumārila. 
13 See Frauwallner (1961, 141-4) for the date of Śāntarakṣita. 
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Śāntarakṣita also testifies to the significant role that the Mīmāṃsakas played in shaping the 
agendas for post-sixth-century Indian Buddhist intellectuals.14   
 This dissertation studies the “newness” of sixth-century Indian Buddhism by 
highlighting the “oldness” of the problem that the Mīmāṃsakas posed to Buddhists. That is to 
say, this dissertation does not simply read the sudden Buddhist notice of the Mīmāṃsakas as the 
emergence of a new threat.15 However, it also recognizes that the Mīmāṃsakas caused a change 
in traditional Buddhist strategies for dispelling the old threat.  
 The sixth century “Mīmāṃsaka threat,” in its nature, was as old as Buddhism. Despite 
the fact that the philosophical issues on which Kumārila disagrees with Buddhists in the 
Ślokavārttika mostly reflect the topics hotly debated across the boundaries of Indian 
philosophical circles at the sixth/seventh century, the Mīmāṃsaka unease with Buddhists 
fundamentally originates from their anti-Vedic identity. In this respect, the Mīmāṃsaka challenge 
was rather familiar to Buddhists. When the Mīmāṃsakas proclaimed the anti-Vedic identity of 
Buddhists and the latter responded to the attacks, Buddhists already had ready-made answers, 
inherited and developed from the earliest period of the tradition. Among traditional Buddhist 
strategies devised to vindicate Buddhists’ anti-Vedic identity, in this dissertation, I only examine 
two directed against the authority of the Veda and the legitimacy of its accompanying cult, Vedic 
sacrifice.  
 However, the post-sixth century Buddhist intellectuals who were confronted, not with 
Vedic ritualists in general, but with the specific group of the Mīmāṃsakas who armed Brahmin 
                                                 
14 To (chronologically) list only a few of them: Taber (2005), Arnold (2005), McClintock (2010), Kataoka 
(2011), Eltschinger, Krasser, and Taber (2012), and Eltschinger (2014). 
15 Even though Buddhists began to discuss the Mīmāṃsaka positions from the fifth century on, the school 
of Mīmāṃsā had existed for long before their first notice. See Clooney (1990, 52-3) for a discussion on 
the date of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (between the fourth and second centuries BCE), the foundational text of the 
school.    
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anti-Buddhist sentiment with highly theorized ideologies on the nature of the Veda, did not 
merely reiterate thousand-years-old answers. They revived the old answers and made them 
applicable to the new opponents, and, in so doing, brought them to another level of concreteness 
and sophistication. Yet, as their knowledge of the Mīmāṃsakas became more rich and accurate 
over time, Buddhists eventually dispensed with the traditional strategies for criticizing the Veda 
and Vedic sacrifice. And this abandonment of the old way of coping with Vedic ritualists, I 
believe, constitutes an important aspect of the “newness” of sixth-century Indian Buddhism. This 
dissertation attempts to illustrate the process of the abandonment.  
 To this end, I have chosen a relatively unstudied text, the ninth “Mīmāṃsā” chapter of 
the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā16 (MHK 9)17 together with the prose auto-commentary called the 
Tarkajvālā (TJ)18 written by, the sixth century Mādhyamika, Bhāviveka (also known as 
Bhāvaviveka and Bhavya)19 as the main text of the analysis. To be more precise, my thesis on 
                                                 
16 Note that this title (“Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā”) is only attested by the Tibetan translation. As to the 
problems regarding the title of this work, see Saito (2005). Saito demonstrates that three different 
names—namely, Tattvāmṛtāvatāra, Madhyamakahṛdaya, and Tarkajvālā—had been used to refer to this 
work. 
17 There are two modern Sanskrit editions for the Mīmāṃsā chapter of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā: 
Kawasaki (1992a) and Lindtner (2001a, 2001b). The former also includes the edition of the Tibetan text. I 
rely my reading on Kawasaki edition but I discuss discrepancies between the two editions if there are in 
the verses that I quote. For the information on the two extant Sanskrit manuscripts preserved in the 
Tibetan region and the list of the modern editions of each chapters of MHK, see Heitmann (1997, 106-9) 
and Ye (2009, 316-8).  
I use, in general, the abbreviation of “MHK 9” to collectively refer to both the root verses (MHK 
9) and the prose commentary (TJ 9) which make up the whole “Mīmāṃsā” chapter titled the 
“Introduction to the Determination of the Truth of Mīmāṃsā” (mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra). However, 
whenever it is necessary to be clear about whether the relevant material is found in the commentary, I 
differentiate TJ (or TJ 9) from MHK 9.  
18 For the Tibetan text of the Tarkajvālā, the commentary to MHK, I exclusively used the sDe dge 
edition: D 3856, Dza 40b7-329b4. Despite the fact that there is a controversy over the authorship of TJ, I 
see no definitive evidence against Bhāviveka’s authorship and, in this dissertation, I assume that the 
Tarkajvālā is a work of Bhāviveka as the Tibetan text suggests in the colophon. Cf. TJ D329b2, “dbu ma'i 
snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba slob dpon chen po bha byas mdzad pa rdzogs so.” For 
discussions on this topic, see Ejima (1980, 10ff.), Eckel (2008, 21ff.), Krasser (2011), and He and van der 
Kuijp (2014). 
19 As Ejima (1990) has persuasively shown, “Bhāviveka” is the more preferred form among the three in 
the light of extant Sanskrit manuscripts of Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā (either used or unused by the first 
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the “decline” of age-old Buddhist critiques of Vedic ritualists is based upon a small section of 
MHK 9 (MHK 9.1-4 and 18-42) which I organized under the heading of “the Veda is not moral” 
in Chapter Two and other texts that are directly involved in the composition of that section, or 
which produce, when read in juxtaposition with MHK 9, meaningful information from our 
retrospective position. Those texts either predate or postdate MHK 9 and are either of Buddhist 
or non-Buddhist provenance. Most significantly utilized are: Vasubandhu’s 
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra, the above-mentioned polemical treatises 
of Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, the Sāṃkhya commentaries on Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṃkhyakārikā 
verse 2, the Yogasūtra and its Bhāṣya (or, collectively, the Pātañjalayogaśāstra), Śabara’s 
Bhāṣya on Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtra (the Śābarabhāṣya), and Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika. By 
engaging these texts in the reading of MHK 9, I analyze the dynamic interplay between the 
groups of people affiliated with those texts—viz. Buddhists, the Sāṃkhyas, and the 
Mīmāṃsakas—explicitly or implicitly represented in the small section of MHK 9 and their 
different roles in terminating traditional Buddhist critiques of Vedic ritualists within and 
immediately after MHK 9.  
 The dissertation consists of four chapters. Chapter One (“Buddhist Forerunners to 
Bhāviveka’s Critique of Mīmāṃsā”) discerns two consistent Buddhist critiques of Vedic ritualists 
found in pre-Bhāviveka Buddhist scholastic literature. I first recognize two separately existent 
                                                 
editor, de la Vallée Poussin (1913)) and Chinese translations and transliterations of the name of the author 
of, at least, three works, viz. Prajñāpradīpa, *Karatalaratna (大乘掌珍論; T 1578), and 
Madhyamakahṛdaya. Watanabe (1998, 143-4, fn. 3) lucidly summarizes the entire findings of Ejima’s 
study. The reading of “Bhāviveka” has been further corroborated by an anonymous (or “Dharmakīrti or 
Dharma grags, the Tibetan scribe of the MS”; Yonezawa 2004, 118) commentary on the Prasannapadā, 
provisionally titled “*Lakṣaṇaṭīkā,” serially published by Yoshiyasu Yonezawa since the initial report of 
Yonezawa (1999). See Yonezawa (2004, 119, fn. 1) for the text places where the anonymous author 
employs the spelling of “Bhāviveka” (not “Bhāvaviveka” as used in de la Vallée Poussin’s edition). Anne 
MacDonald’s recent edition of the first chapter of the Prasannapadā also adopts the spelling of 
“Bhāviveka.” See MacDonald (2015, vol. 1, 192:9 and 195:8). For more information on the names of 
“Bhāviveka” and “Bhavya” in the Tibetan sources, see He and van der Kuijp (2014, 338-341). 
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arguments in the canonical literature from the earliest period of the tradition, which assert that 
the Veda is a work of ignorant beings and that Vedic sacrifice, which involves animal killings, is 
an immoral practice. I name them respectively the “critique of the Veda” and the “critique of 
Vedic sacrifice.” Then I trace the inheritance of these two claims by later Buddhist intellectuals, 
in the Mahāvibhāṣā (ca. 2nd cen. CE), the Tattvasiddhi by Harivarman (250-350), and the 
Nyāyānusāra by Saṅghabhadra (5th cen. CE) and observe that, in the latter two works, the two 
critiques are combined; the critique of the Veda came to be subordinated under the framework of 
the critique of Vedic sacrifice. I have not made an effort to exhaustively collect all textual 
sources before Bhāviveka that reproduce the two critiques. What I seek to demonstrate in this 
chapter is that Buddhists have maintained the same stances toward the Veda and Vedic sacrifice 
and have persistently repeated the same claims about them from about the fifth century BCE to 
the fifth century CE.  
 Chapter Two (“How Mīmāṃsaka is MHK 9?”) presents an overview of the entire 
chapter of MHK 9 and reviews scholars’ previous opinions on the identity of the opponent in 
MHK 9. MHK 9, unlike other chapters of MHK, has never been subjected to systematic analysis 
as a “unitary” chapter in its own right, and therefore, I think it is necessary to lay out, albeit in a 
preliminary way, all the contents of MHK 9 in an organized manner.20 Without a systematic 
analysis of its contents as a whole (i.e., as an organic entity of chapter), scholars, based on a part 
of the text, have expressed doubts about the Mīmāṃsaka identity of the opponent in MHK 9 or 
proposed some historical figure (Bhartṛhari or Kumārila) as a possible opponent of Bhāviveka in 
MHK 9. As I review their opinions, I propose at least three different groups as the opponents in 
MHK 9: the Mīmāṃsakas, theistic groups (especially, the Vaiṣṇavas and the Śaivas), and an 
                                                 
20 There are two modern translations of MHK 9 (the root verses only): Kawasaki (1992; in Japanese) and 
Lindtner (2001b; in English). 
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ascetic group who upholds Book 12 and 13 of the Mahābharata as its scripture. This does not 
mean that Bhāviveka lumps all those groups into one and sees no difference between them. 
Bhāviveka allots discrete sections to each of those three. Then, why does he criticize them all in 
the chapter devoted to the critique of the Mīmāṃsakas? It is because, for Bhāviveka, they all 
elevate their own scriptures—be it the Veda proper or not—to the absolute status traditionally 
attributed to the “Veda.” That is, Bhāviveka’s inclusion of the critiques on the theistic and ascetic 
groups in MHK 9 is closely related to the claim that the purāṇas or the Mahābhārata is the fifth 
“Veda.” Lastly, concerning the Mīmāṃsā proper section of MHK 9, I suggest that Bhāviveka’s 
opponent seems to be a Mīmāṃsaka, albeit unknown, who came between Śabara and Kumārila.  
 While the first two chapters provide the background knowledge for our investigation of 
the fates of the two traditional Buddhist critiques of Vedic ritualists, the remaining two chapters 
trace the reception of the two critiques in MHK 9 and subsequent Buddhist literature. Chapter 
Three (“Decline of the Critique of the Veda for its Evil Authorship”), by comparatively 
examining four Buddhist intellectuals’ responses to the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the 
authorlessness of the Veda (vedāpauruṣeyatva), demonstrates that Bhāviveka was the only one 
who continued the critique of the Veda that argues for the evilness of the Veda’s putative 
author(s). The other three, Saṅghabhadra, Dharmakīrti, and Śāntarakṣita, employed a different 
rhetoric that equates the “authorlessness” of the Veda with the “meaninglessness” of it, and 
thereby separated themselves from the traditional critique. Bhāviveka, though the sole proponent 
of the thesis on the evil authorship of the Veda after Buddhists’ encounter with the Mīmāṃsakas, 
by compiling rich corroborative materials from the Veda for his thesis, raised the critique of the 
Veda to another level of sophistication. This strategy of compiling Vedic materials to denounce 
the Veda was well developed in the Sāṃkhya commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā 2; I suggest a 
possible alliance between Bhāviveka and the Sāṃkhyas, which had its precedent in Āryadeva’s 
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Śataśāstra and Vasu’s commentary on it.  
 Chapter Four (“Decline of the Critique of Vedic Sacrifice”) shows that Bhāviveka was 
also the only post-sixth century (thus excluding Saṅghabhadra) figure who continued the critique 
of Vedic sacrifice. However, as the two post-Bhāviveka Buddhists did not even remark on the 
immorality of Vedic sacrifice, the critique of Vedic sacrifice, unlike the previous case of the 
critique of the Veda, ended without being replaced. The “future” discontinuance of the critique of 
Vedic sacrifice, moreover, was hinted at in MHK 9 itself. This becomes more apparent when we 
read the corresponding discussion in Bhāviveka’s other work, the Prajñāpradīpa, which contains 
a syllogism almost identical to the Sāṃkhyas’ thesis quoted in Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika. The 
syllogism in question does not appear in MHK 9 and, in its place, Bhāviveka introduces the 
Mīmāṃsaka defense of Vedic sacrifice that seems to summarize the key point of Kumārila’s 
critique of the Sāṃkhya thesis. By unravelling the complex dialogical relationship between 
Bhāviveka and Kumārila and tracing the long-held alliance between Buddhists and the Sāṃkhyas 
on killing and its karmic retribution, in this chapter, I try to locate the decline of the critique of 
Vedic sacrifice within MHK 9. 
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Chapter One: Buddhist Forerunners to Bhāviveka’s Critique of Mīmāṃsā 
  




Bhāviveka’s Mīmāṃsā chapter in the Madhyamakahṛdaya (MHK/TJ 9), like his critique of 
Vedānta (the eighth chapter),21 marks one of the earliest Buddhist critiques of the Mīmāṃsā 
school of Hindu philosophy.22 Despite its originality, it is much indebted to the preceding 
Buddhist critiques of Brahmanism. Therefore, in order to evaluate the significance of 
Bhāviveka’s critique of Mīmāṃsā—that is, to gauge his inheritance from earlier exegetes and his 
contribution to the Buddhist discourse against this school of Hindu philosophy—it is necessary 
to investigate the development of the direct Buddhist precursors of MHK 9. 
 This chapter does not aim to trace all the details of MHK 9 to their source or 
haphazardly present Bhāviveka’s Buddhist sources. Rather, I focus on two themes that directly 
influence a portion of MHK 9: the Veda and Vedic sacrifice. Bhāviveka characterizes his 
                                                 
21 The eighth chapter of MHK, titled Vedāntatattvaviniścaya (The Determination of Reality according to 
Vedānta), devoted to an examination of the doctrines held by the pre-Śaṅkara Vedāntavādins (rig byed kyi 
mtha' smra ba), is the earliest Buddhist source to recognize Vedānta as a school. See Nakamura (1955, 
31), Gokhale (1958, 165-6), Qvarnström (1989, 13-6); translation of the chapter title is from Qvarnström 
(1989, 15, fn.8). 
22 Another Buddhist text of the sixth century that takes note of the Mīmāṃsā school is the Maṇimēkalai 
composed in the Tamil language. See Eckel (2008, 15-7) and Nicholson (2010, 148-54). 
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opponents, the Mīmāṃsakas, in these terms in the opening verses of MHK 9.23 Criticisms of 
these two, each respectively representing Brahmin text and practice, appear in Buddhist literature 
starting from the earliest Buddhist sources: (Pāli) Nikāya or (Chinese) Āgama materials. As I 
trace their later developments, I have limited my research to Abhidharma literature and, in the 
following presentation, have selected only three texts belonging to that category for the analysis. 
They are the Mahāvibhāṣā (大毘婆沙論; ca. 2nd c. CE), the Tattvasiddhi (成實論) of 
Harivarman (訶梨跋摩, ca. 250-350 CE), and the Nyāyānusāra (順正理論) of Saṅghabhadra (衆
賢, ca. 420-480 CE) all available only in Chinese translations.24 
 Those three texts represent three qualitatively different stages in the history of Buddhist 
critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice. From the time that the Buddha problematized the Veda 
and Vedic sacrifice, Buddhist critiques of these two circulated separately without making 
reference to each other as can be seen in the Mahāvibhāṣā (Stage 1). But the critiques of the two 
came to be connected when the Brahmin opponent in the Tattvasiddhi puts forward an argument 
that defends Vedic sacrifice by resorting to the authority of the Veda acknowledged in the world 
(Stage 2). Connected in this way, these two critiques confront a new challenge in the 
Nyāyānusāra when the Veda’s authority is claimed not on the basis of external factors but of the 
authorless and eternal nature of the text itself (Stage 3). And what we see in this last stage is, to 
                                                 
23 Bhāviveka introduces the Mīmāṃsakas as “shameless people” (anapatrapa) who maintain that Vedic 
sacrifice (kriyā) is the sole means of achieving liberation (apavarga) in the introductory verse (MHK 9.1). 
TJ on the verse points to the Veda as the source of their reasoning by stating that the Mīmāṃsakas regard 
the Veda as “self-arisen” (rang byung), and therefore, “reality” (de kho na nyid). This is confirmed in the 
second verse (MHK 9.2) which explicitly describes Vedic sacrifice as what is prescribed in the Veda 
(śāstrokta) and in the commentary (TJ) which presents the Veda as the authorizer (tshad mar byed pa) of 
various ritual activities.  
24 They are contained in the Taishō edition of Chinese Buddhist Canon (dazangjing, 大藏經) respectively 
as T 1545, T 1646, and T 1562. A Sanskrit fragment is reported to exist in the case of the *Mahāvibhāṣā. 
Cf. Kragh (2002, 149), “A Sanskrit-fragment of a Vibhāṣā-compendium, found in Kučā, has been 
identified in the Pelliot collection, but it displays some variants, when it is compared to the Chinese texts 
of *Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra and *Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra.” (references are omitted) 
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my knowledge, the first appearance of the Mīmāṃsakas in Buddhist literature, embedded in 
existing Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice.  
 This presentation of a three-stage development of the two critiques, of course, is not 
meant to be viewed as reflecting the actual evolution of Mīmāṃsā as a school. However, it 
testifies to the growing presence of the Mīmāṃsakas in the contemporary philosophical circle, or 
at least as felt by Buddhists. What these materials show instead is that the evolution of Buddhist 
critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice was led by Brahmin opponents. The major 
developmental changes, rather than being initiated by Buddhists, were made to refute newly 
emerging arguments by ritualistically oriented Brahmins. Harivarman combined the two separate 
critiques, criticizing Brahmin text in order to criticize Brahmin practice; his opponent demanded 
that the two be connected. The more elaborate Mīmāṃsaka arguments on the Veda’s validity in 
the Nyāyānusāra made it impossible for Buddhists after Saṅghabhadra to criticize Brahmins’ act 
of killing in Vedic sacrifice without discussing the textual authority that sanctions the act. And, in 
MHK 9, this Mīmāṃsaka pressure finally reversed the structure of the combined critiques by 
having the criticism of Brahmin practice serve the purpose of criticizing their text.  
 Viewed from another perspective, however, this implies that Buddhists coped with 
newly imposed problems by locating and understanding them in the context of already existing 
discourses. Rather than starting a new discourse for a new problem, Buddhists chose to 
contextualize the new in the light of the old. And it is because of this aspect of incorporating the 
new into the old that the development of pre-Bhāviveka Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic 
sacrifice presented in this chapter should not be seen merely as the prehistory of MHK 9. They 
equip Bhāviveka with both tools and strategies to counter the Mīmāṃsaka arguments. That is, 
Buddhist critiques of Brahmin text and practice from the time of the Buddha constitute one of the 
foundations of MHK 9. 
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 In what follows, I trace pre-Bhāviveka Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic 
sacrifice. I first identify them in the Buddha’s sermons contained in the Nikāya/Āgama materials. 
Then I examine relevant passages culled from the above-mentioned three Abhidharma texts and 
lay out the three developmental stages of the critiques. As I close the chapter, I will evaluate the 
significance of the changes noticeable in the history of the two critiques, particularly focusing on 
the change made in the last stage.  
 
1.2 The Buddha: Problematizations of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice 
Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice began with works attributed to its founder. 
There are several suttas that directly take up the subject of Vedic sacrifice.25 However, in those 
suttas, the Buddha does not reject the notion of sacrifice itself. Following his trait of 
reinterpreting others’—mostly Brahmanical—concepts and thus assimilating them into Buddhist 
vocabulary,26 the Buddha, rather than advising his Brahmin interlocutors to dispense with Vedic 
sacrifice, proposes to perform "reinterpreted" sacrifices infused with Buddhist values.27 The 
proposal is, according to the Buddha, not only to perform sacrifice in a more perfect form; it is 
                                                 
25 Tan lists three suttas from the Pāli Sutta-piṭaka in which Vedic sacrifice is “demythologized” and 
“ethicized” (see his introductions to the translations of the following suttas available at dharmafarer.org). 
They are the Kūṭadantasutta (Dīgha Nikāya 5, vol.1, pp. 127-49), the (Pasenadi) Yañña Sutta (Saṃyutta 
Nikāya 3.2.9, pt. 1, pp. 75-6), and the (Uggatasarīra) Aggi Sutta (Aṅguttara Nikāya 4.44, vol.4, pp. 41-
46) (references are to the PTS edition of the texts). However, they are by no means the only suttas that 
discuss the topic. As Tan’s translation of the entire Tipiṭaka is still in progress, he might add more texts to 
the list in the future. I would like to add the Ujjaya Sutta (Aṅguttara Nikāya 4.39) to the list (see fn.11). 
For their corresponding sūtras in the Taishō canon, use the digital compilation of Anesaki (1908)’s and 
Akanuma (1929)’s catalogues by Bingenheimer (“A Digital Comparative Catalogue of Āgama Literature” 
ver. 3) available at http://mbingenheimer.net/tools/comcat/indexComcat.html.    
26 For a list of Brahmanical terms that the Buddha uses in his own senses, see Norman (1991), section “2. 
Terms taken over by the Buddha but used with new senses” (pp. 194-9). Norman also notes a possibility 
that “the use of Brahmanical terms in a non-Brahmanical sense was taken from the general fund of 
vocabulary of śramaṇical religions.” (p. 200) 
27 Or, as Gombrich (2006[1996], 42) puts it, “the Buddha regularly used the language of his opponents, 
but turned it into metaphor.” 
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also to avoid unwanted consequences that would befall the performer as the result of the 
sacrificial act. That is to say, the Buddha’s reinterpretation lies in showing that Brahmin sacrifice 
is not the path to the goal that it claims to be fulfilling and that it instead brings negative effects 
due to its immoral aspects.  
 Brahmin interlocutors, or, more accurately, questioners, on the other hand, show no 
attempt to resist the Buddha’s reinterpretation of sacrifice. Also, in those suttas on Vedic 
sacrifice, the Buddha generally does not comment on the Veda when he criticizes Vedic sacrifice. 
The presence of the Veda as the background of sacrificial practice is only alluded to when the 
Brahmin questioners’ qualities are listed.28 This is not to say, however, that the authority of the 
Veda is not assumed by the Buddha and the Brahmins who seek advice from him. Indeed, the 
Buddha’s “humorous and satirical” references to “Brahmins and Brahminism” (Gombrich 1990, 
12) undermine the authority of the Veda, but only in an indirect manner. The weight that the Veda 
carries in the mind of Brahmins is not recorded and the Buddha pays no attention to the high 
esteem invested in the Veda. As Gombrich notes on the Buddha’s attitude toward the Upaniṣadic 
notion of “Brahman” (cosmic principle), the authority that the Veda assumes in contemporary 
Indian society “is not directly mentioned, let alone argued against; the Buddha simply bypasses 
it.” (2006, 64) The Buddha’s criticism of Vedic ritual, on the surface, is made mainly ethical. It is 
the sacrificial act itself, rather than the scripture that enjoins such actions, that is at the center of 
the controversy around Vedic sacrificial practices.   
 In those sacrifice-related suttas, the element of killing29 is specifically identified as 
                                                 
28 For example, as in the Kūṭadanta sutta: “For the master Kūṭadanta is a mantra-reciter, a mantra-expert, 
a master of the Three Vedas, along with their invocations and rituals, phonology and etymology, and the 
Itihāsa Purāṇas as the fifth; learned in the Vedic padas, grammarian, and well versed in nature lore and the 
marks of the great man.” (Tan 2007, 61); According to Tan, this is a stock description of Brahmin 
questioners also used in several other suttas. See ibid., fn.50. 
29 The Buddha’s uneasiness with the act of “killing” among other features of Vedic sacrifice is most 
clearly seen in the Ujjaya Sutta (Aṅguttara Nikāya 4.39). In the Sutta, the Brahmin named Ujjaya asks the 
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causing karmically negative effects on its performer. However, these texts lack explanations of, 
for example, the principle behind the Buddha’s negative judgment of ritual killing or the 
necessary causal relation between killing and being born in the lower realms.30 When asked 
about the successful performance of sacrifice31 or the form of sacrifice that would result in 
happiness and welfare for a long time32, the Buddha, without unconditionally disregarding the 
performance of sacrifice, provides the questioners with better forms of sacrifice in which no 
actual sacrifice of animals occurs yet goal of sacrifice is accomplished.33 The disparity between 
the means and the goal of Vedic ritual perceived by the Buddha is aptly expressed in this phrase: 
“Even before the sacrifice, one thinks, ‘Let this many animals be slaughtered for sacrifice’. So 
while thinking one is doing something purifying one is doing something not purifying; while 
thinking one is doing right one is doing wrong; while thinking one is finding the way to a good 
                                                 
Buddha whether he praises sacrifice or not. In the reply, the Buddha makes the act of killing the sole 
criterion for not praising sacrifice. Cf. “I do not praise all sacrifice, Brahmin, nor do I withhold praise 
from all sacrifice. I do not praise a violent sacrifice at which cattle, goats, rams, chickens, and pigs are 
slain, at which various creatures are led to slaughter. For what reason? Because arahants and those who 
have entered the path to arahantship attend a non-violent sacrifice.” (Bhikkhu Bodhi tr. 2012, 429)  
30 Schmithausen (2000) identifies two strands of arguments for ahiṃsā (“abstention from killing/hurting 
living beings”) in the early Jaina and Buddhist sources. He shows those two strands in the latter source by 
dividing it into the discourse for lay people which dissuades them from killing living beings “by pointing 
out its evil consequences in the afterlife or even in this life” (268) and the discourse for those who seek 
liberation which formulates the “Golden Rule.” The following sutta passage that he quotes from the 
Saṃyutta Nikāya expressively lays out the rule: “I for one want to live and not to die, I want happiness 
and dislike pain. Since I want to live, etc., it would not be agreeable and pleasant to me if somebody were 
to take my life. Again, for another person, too, it would be disagreeable and unpleasant if I were to take 
his life, since he [too] wants to live, etc. Precisely that which is disagreeable and unpleasant to me is 
disagreeable and unpleasant also to the other. How then could I inflict upon the other that which is 
disagreeable and unpleasant to myself!” (272) I could not find such rationalizations for denouncing the 
act of killing in the suttas that explicitly deal with the problem of Vedic sacrifice.  
31 As in the Kūṭadanta Sutta (Dīgha Nikāya 5). See Tan (2007, 65). 
32 As in the Aggi Sutta (Aṅguttara Nikāya 4.44). See Gombrich (1990, 17), Tan (2003, 208). 
33 The Kūṭadanta Sutta lists diverse forms of such sacrifice. After having related the “mythological” 
sacrifice in which all four castes participated, no animal slaughter was involved, and no labor was 
imposed on people under the supervision of the Buddha himself as a Brahmin priest, the Buddha tells 
Kūṭadanta several other “less difficult” forms of sacrifice including “regular giving (dāna),” “donating a 
vihāra,” “going for refuge” and so forth.  
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rebirth one is finding the way to a bad.”34 Thus, according to the Buddha, the sacrifice conceived 
by those Brahmins who approached him betrays their own purposes and accomplishes their 
opposite, namely, impurity, demerit, and rebirth in lower realms.  
 The Buddha’s attack on the Veda, on the other hand, is recorded in another sutta that 
does not directly deal with Vedic sacrifice and its element of “killing.” In the Tevijja Sutta (Dīgha 
Nikāya 13), the Buddha is approached by two Brahmin boys, Vāseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja, who 
want to verify their own teachers’ teaching on the path to the state called “companionship with 
Brahmā” (brahmasahavyatā) at death. The Buddha ridicules the Brahmins’ practice using several 
similes and provides the Brahmin boys with his own answer. However, before he proceeds to the 
main sermon, he first questions Vāseṭṭha as to the qualification of the Brahmin teachers on the 
subject matter by asking: “Is there even a single one of these Brahmins learned in the Three 
Vedas who has himself seen Brahmā [God] face to face?”35 The Buddha continues to question 
the qualification of the teachers, the pupils, and the ancestors of those teachers by asking the 
same question. After hearing negative answers, the Buddha finally turns his criticism to the 
“authors” of the Veda (expressed as “mantra makers” (mantānaṃ kattāro)), that is, the ancient 
Vedic Ṛṣis (pubbakā isayo):  
“Well then, Vāseṭṭha, what about the ancient seers of the brahmins, mantra 
makers, mantra preachers—that is to say, Aṣṭaka, Vāmaka, Vāmadeva, 
Viśvamitra, Jamadagni, Aṅgirasa, Bhāradvāja, Vāsiṣṭha, Kaśyapa, and 
Bhṛgu36—whose ancient mantras and verses are chanted, uttered and collected 
by the brahmins of today, who sing them and recite them, and having sung 
them make others sing them, having recited them make others recite them—did 
they ever say: ‘We know and see when, how and where Brahmā appears?’” 
                                                 
34 This is a passage from Aṅguttara Nikāya, Sattaka Nipāta, Mahāyañña Vagga, Sutta no. 44 translated in 
Gombrich (1990, 17).  
35 Tan (2010, 121). 
36 Corrected from “Bhagu.” 
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“No, master Gotama.”37 
Thus, having disqualified the authors, preachers, and guardians of the Veda, the Buddha 
compares them to a series of blind men in which “the first one sees nothing, the middle one sees 
nothing, the last one sees nothing”38 and declares Brahmins’ teachings to be “only laughable, 
mere words, simply empty, utterly vain.”39 Their teachings are so laughable that they are like a 
man on the one side of the riverbank who calls out to the other shore (“Come over here, O farther 
bank, come over here!”40) in order to cross the river rather than gathering grass and wood to 
make a raft.41 It is because, in order to accompany the god Brahmā, rather than trying to 
resemble the purity of the god, Brahmins are just chanting mantras: “We call upon Indra, we call 
upon Soma, we call upon Varuṇa, we call upon Isāna, we call upon Pajāpatī, we call upon 
Brahmā, we call upon Mahiddhi, we call upon Yama.”42  
 The disparity between the means and the goal is once again observed here, but it is 
important to note that, this time, the disparity is not just implied by pointing out the discrepancy 
between the immorality of the means (killing) and the goodness of the goal (rebirth in heaven). 
The mismatch of chanting mantras (the means) and companionship with Brahmā (the goal) is 
                                                 
37 ibid.  
38 ibid., 122. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid. 124. 
41 This “gathering grass and wood to make a raft” part of the text is lacking in the Pāli version. See T 1 
106a16-24, “Vāseṭṭha! Brahmins well-versed in the Three Vedas are like this. It is non-sense for one to 
aspire to be born in the heaven of Brahmā who rather cultivates the impure practice of the heretics than 
practicing pure brahmacarya of the śramaṇas. Vāseṭṭha! Suppose that mountains and waters were 
violently uprisen and people were in flood. There was no boat or raft, nor was there a bridge. A traveler, 
desiring to cross to the other shore, saw that mountains and waters are violently uprisen, people are in 
flood, no boat or raft, nor a bridge. That man thought to himself: “I, now, will gather much grass and 
wood, bind tightly a raft. Am I able to cross to the other shore with my own power?” Then, he bound a 
raft and, with his own power, could cross the river safely.” (婆悉咤! 三明婆羅門亦復如是. 不修沙門清
淨梵行, 更修餘道不清淨行, 欲求生梵天者, 無有是處. 婆悉咤! 猶如山水暴起, 多漂人民, 亦無船
栰, 又無橋梁, 有行人來, 欲渡彼岸. 見山水暴起, 多漂人民, 亦無船栰, 又無橋梁, 彼人自念: “我
今寧可多集草木, 牢堅縛栰, 自以身力渡彼岸耶?” 即尋縛栰, 自以身力安隱得渡.) 
42 Tan (ibid., 124). 
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caused by the ignorance of Vedic Brahmins; not only those who are learned in the Three Vedas 
but also the very authors of those texts. They lack the direct experience/vision of Brahmā, whom 
they long to be with. On top of this, they make no effort to acquire the qualities they attribute to 
Brahmā: unlike Brahmā, they have wives, hate, ill will, defiled hearts, and no self-mastery.43 
Considering all these disqualifications of Brahmins, how should one judge the nature of the text 
that they authored and preached? The Buddha, before he commences the sermon on the proper 
way of reaching the world of Brahmā, expresses his disapproval of the Veda in the strongest 
terms: “Therefore, these Three Vedas are called the threefold desert, the threefold forest, the 
threefold misfortune of the brahmins learned in the Three Vedas!”44  
 We may summarize the above discussions from the canonical sources as follows: 1. 
Vedic sacrifice is criticized by the Buddha because of the immoral, thus karmically negative, act 
of killing animals. On account of this, though a Brahmin ritualist may perform a sacrificial act in 
hopes of gaining welfare in this life and beyond, the Buddha claims, they will ultimately fall to 
the evil path, that is, of being born either as hungry ghosts, animals, or hell beings. 2. The 
Buddha, in the Tevijja Sutta, reveals the absurdity of Brahmins’ project of attaining the world of 
Brahmā, and, in so doing, challenges the authority of the Veda as the religious text by showing 
its authors’ and preachers’ shortcomings. Given these observations, we may say that the major 
themes of Buddhist critique of Vedic ritualists (and later the Mīmāṃsakas) that continuously 
recur in later Buddhist literature are already present in the canonical sources. Those themes are: 
1. criticizing Vedic sacrifice by highlighting its immoral aspects and viewing it within the 
framework of karma and 2. criticizing the Veda by pointing out (or proving) the faults of its 
author(s).  
                                                 
43 See Tan (2010, 125-6) 
44 Ibid., 127.  
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 However, these two critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice are not yet presented in a 
combined form, as we would see from Harivarman’s time on. They are connected, somewhat 
tangentially, in the Tevijja Sutta as it refers to the practice of mantra recitation; the absurdity of 
ritual practice of chanting mantras indeed contributes to the Buddha’s denunciation of the Veda. 
But the Buddha’s evaluations of the ritual performance and the authority of the Veda are not 
directly linked. The focus of the Buddha’s critique is Brahmins’ qualification. It is only through 
Brahmins’ foolishness that the Veda, as their work, is disregarded. And Buddhists’ criticisms of 
the Veda and Vedic sacrifice, though they seem to be intrinsically related, continue to be made 
separately in the Mahāvibhāṣā.  
 
1.3 The Mahāvibhāṣā: Separate Circulations of the Two Critiques 
The Mahāvibhāṣā, extant in two Chinese translations45, is a work of enormous size46 that 
compiles both (primarily) Buddhist and (subsidiarily) non-Buddhist views on various issues47 
addressed mainly in its root text, the Jñānaprasthānaśāstra by Kātyāyanīputra.48 The 
                                                 
45 There are three texts in the Taishō Canon that bear the word “Vibhāṣā” in their title which gave the 
Sarvāstivādins another appellation namely the “Vaibhāṣika” (the followers of the Vibhāṣā) due to the 
importance of this text in their school. They are: *Vibhāṣāśāstra (鞞婆沙論, T 1547) translated by 
Saṅghabhadra (僧伽跋澄; different from the author of the Nyāyānusāra) in 383 CE, 
*Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra (阿毘曇毘婆沙論, T 1546) translated by Buddhavarman (浮陀跋摩) in 437-
439 CE, and *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, T 1545; briefly referred to as 
Mahāvibhāṣā) translated by Xuanzang (玄奘) in 656-659 CE. Among these three texts, while the latter 
two is the translation of the same work, the first one (*Vibhāṣāśāstra) is the translation of an independent 
work but on the same root text, the Jñānaprasthāna. The second text, of which only 60 fascicles out of 
100 are extant, is incomplete; the remaining portion of the text only covers only about a half of 
Xuanzang’s translation. Moreover, there are discrepancies between the contents of two works which may 
imply the development of the text. See Nakamura (1980, 107-8), Tsukamoto, Matsunaga, Isoda (1990, 
66), Buswell and Jaini (1996, 113), Kragh (2002, 149). 
46 It consists of 200 fascicles and occupies the whole Taishō volume 27. 
47 See Buswell and Jaini (1996, 110-9) for the text's wide-range coverage of topics. A summary of the 
entire text is available at the end of the same volume (Potter, Buswell, Jaini ed. 1996, 511-568) made 
collectively by Ichimura, Kawamura, Buswell, and Cox.  
48 The Sarvāstivādins regard the following seven treatises as the fundamental Abhidharma texts: 1. 
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Mahāvibhāṣā is an extensive collection of the doctrinal formulations of authoritative scholars 
and schools of Indian philosophies available until the period of its compilation (c. 2nd cen. CE)49 
from the then dominant Sarvāstivādin perspective; Buswell and Jaini (1996, 110) characterize it 
as “massive sourcebook of Sarvāstivādin doctrine.” It wielded a powerful influence on later 
Abhidharma literature, including the famous Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu, as a source of 
information. Therefore, it would be reasonable to consult the Mahāvibhāṣā for Buddhist opinions 
accumulated up to the time of its compilation.50    
 Not surprisingly, the Mahāvibhāṣā does not fail to comment on Brahmin text and 
practice, that is, the Veda and Vedic sacrifice, but, those critiques show no evolution from the 
time of the Buddha. It inherits the Buddha’s discourses, as far as those two topics are concerned, 
not only in terms of its points of criticism as well as materials. What we have observed in the 
Nikāya/Āgama literature is reaffirmed: the element of killing in Vedic sacrifice is specified as a 
problematic practice in light of karmic law and the authority of the Veda is attacked on the basis 
of the ignorance of its authors. These points are well expressed in the Mahāvibhāṣā when it 
discusses the ten unwholesome courses of action (akuśalakarmapatha).  
 Among those ten courses of action that lead the agent eventually to the non-salutary 
                                                 
Saṃgītiparyāya, 2. Dharmaskandha, 3. Prajñaptiśāstra, 4. Dhātukāya, 5. Vijñānakāya, 6. Prakaraṇa, 7. 
Jñānaprasthāna. (Listed in the chronological order suggested by Frauwallner 1995, Chap. 2) As the 
frequently quoted lines from Yaśomitra's Sphuṭārthā indicate, the Sarvāstivādins lay the central 
importance to the Jñānaprasthāna by calling it the “body” (śarīra) and the other six its “feet” (pāda). Cf. 
Sphuṭārthā on AK 1.2b (Shastri 1970-1973, vol. 1, p. 12), “anye vyācakṣate. śāstram iti 
jñānaprasthānam. tasya śarīrabhūtasya ṣaṭ pādāḥ. prakaraṇapādaḥ, vijñānakāyaḥ, dharmaskandhaḥ, 
prajñaptiśāstram, dhātukāyaḥ, saṅgītiparyāya iti. atas tad api śāstraṃ sānucaram eva.” The 
Mahāvibhāṣā is basically a commentary on this root text, the Jñānaprasthāna, although it obviously 
exceeds its role as a direct commentary.  
49 Traditionally, based on Xuanzang's note (consisting of two verses) attached at the end of his translation 
(T 1545, 1004a5-8), the Mahāvibhāṣā is considered to be compiled during the reign of the king Kaniṣka 
(reigned ca. 132-152). See Hirakawa (1990, 135).  
50 This approach obviously does not comprehensively capture the Buddhist view of the period. It omits 
various literary genres (jātaka, avadāna, etc.) of Nikāya Buddhism and early Mahāyāna literature from its 
purview. 
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rebirths, most relevant here51 are the first and seventh items, viz. killing living beings 
(prāṇātipāta) and frivolous prattle (saṃbhinnapralāpa).52 Examples of each evil behavior are 
classified according to the causes of such actions, which are the three poisons, viz. desire (rāga), 
hatred (dveṣa), and delusion (moha). Both killing and prattle of Brahmins are noted as 
originating from the third poison, delusion. They originate from delusion because they blatantly 
rationalize their practices without correctly understanding the principle of karma.53 Thus killing 
and Vedic recitation in a ritual setting are rationalized by Brahmins as follows: 
What is the [killing] originated from delusion? For example, there is a group 
[of people] who raise the following view and present the following thesis: All 
[animals] such as camels, horses, cattle, sheep, chickens, pigs, and deer are to 
be eaten by the sacrificer. Therefore, killing them is no sin.54 
 
What is the [frivolous prattle] originated from delusion? For example, there is a 
group of Brahmins who raise the following view and present the following 
thesis: All these [practices] such as worshipping fire, worshiping diverse gods, 
or reciting the Veda and various mantras [cause the practitioners] to attain pure 
liberation.55 
As clearly seen in these passages, Brahmin acts of killing and mantra chanting are again recorded 
                                                 
51 Among the ten evil conducts in the list, Brahmins are accused of for committing five: killing, theft 
(adattādāna), sexual misconduct (kāmamithyācāra), malicious speech (paiśunyavāda), and frivolous 
prattle. Only killing and frivolous prattle, in the Mahāvibhāṣā, are directly related to the Veda and Vedic 
sacrifice though others can be said have the Veda as their background. See the next footnote.  
52 In the same list appearing in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, the third item, i.e., sexual misconduct also 
deals with a specific Vedic ritual called “Gosava.” 
53 After listing the examples of killing motivated by delusion, the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MV (T 1545) 605c21-
2) comments: “Such killings are called [killing] originated from delusion because they are confused about 
[the principle of] karma and its fruit, and raise malicious slander [regarding karmic principle].” (如是等
殺名從癡生. 以迷業果起邪謗故.) 
54 MV 605c12-4: “云何從癡生? 如有一類起如是見立如是論: 駝馬牛羊雞豬鹿等, 皆爲祠祀人所食
用. 是以殺之無罪.” 
55 MV 606c11-4: “云何從癡生? 如有一類婆羅門起如是見立如是論: 諸有祀火, 或  
餘神, 或誦吠陀諸咒術等. 一切皆得淸淨解脫.”; the underlined character ( ) is, following the 
footnote in the Taishō text, taken as “祀.” 
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and problematized separately. In the Buddhist presentation of the Brahmin argument, ritual 
killing is justified in terms of the sacrificer’s purpose of eating, not in relation to the authority of 
the Veda. The recitation of the Veda is absurd because of the presumed goal: pure liberation. 
However, unlike the suttas discussed in the previous section, the Mahāvibhāṣā lacks any 
deliberate criticism or reinterpretation of those practices from a Buddhist point of view. 
Nonetheless, the negative evaluations of the practices are evident from their immediate context. 
Both the killing and frivolous prattle of Brahmins are, at any rate, listed as examples of 
unwholesome courses of action that cause evil rebirth in the future. The low esteem in which 
Buddhists held Brahmin practices is also suggested by their juxtaposition to the practices of a 
foreign barbarian group called “Maga”56 who serve as the example in Bhāviveka’s syllogism of 
proving evil authorship of the Veda (MHK 9.31) and are invoked over and over in later Buddhist 
literature that is closely related to Buddhist disputation against the authority of the Veda.57  
 Apart from the above passages on the ten unwholesome courses of action, I cannot 
locate any other passage that presents explicit criticism of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice in the 
                                                 
56 For the general information on and textual references to the Magas in the Buddhist literature, see Silk 
(2008). In the Mahāvibhāṣā, the Magas are accused of for committing patri-/matricide (605c16-21) and 
incest (606a16-21; see Silk (438-9) for the translation). 
57 For the reference to the Magas in MHK 9, see Kawasaki (1992, 509-16), Halbfass (1991, 107-8), van 
der Kuijp (2006, 196-9), Silk (2008, 439). Halbfass has collected post-Bhāviveka Maga (also referred to 
as “Persians” (pārasīka)) references (see pp. 126-7, fn. 101). What I would like to add to the observations 
made by those scholars is that, first of all, Bhāviveka's information on the Magas is, as acknowledged by 
Bhāviveka himself, second-hand knowledge. Bhāviveka says in TJ on MHK9.31, “The Magas and so 
forth refer to perverse ascetics. They are Persians and so forth who reside in foreign (mleccha) countries 
and their position is known as follows.” (ma ga la sogs pa phyin ci log gi brtul zhugs can. par sig la sogs 
kla klo'i gnas na gnas pa de dag gi grub pa'i mtha' ni 'di ltar grags te.) (emphasis added) Secondly, from 
Bhāviveka’s time on, Buddhist authors’ purpose in referring to the Maga case changes from criticizing 
Brahmin practice (as in the Mahāvibhāṣā, by juxtaposing their cases with Brahmins’) to refuting the 
authority of their text, i.e., the Veda. A separate study is needed to fully show this change of the purposes 
of references to the Magas’ “murderous and lustful” practices by Buddhist authors. See 3.3.2 Bhāviveka’s 
Reading of Abhidharma Discussions over Ten Unwholesome Courses of Action (akuśalakarmapatha) in 
MHK 9.31. 
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Mahāvibhāṣā. Other passing references are made simply to neutrally record Vedic practices58 
and to criticize the Upaṇisadic idea of self (ātman).59 There is even a passage that uses the 
authority of the Veda assumed on the part of the Brahmins to refute the authority of the Brahmin 
caste.60 61 There is one passage, however, that is strongly reminiscent of the Tevijja Sutta. As the 
Mahāvibhāṣā comments on a line of its root text, the Jñānaprasthāna, it quotes a sūtra that 
disregards the authority of Vedic seers more explicitly, though not in as dramatic a manner as the 
Tevijja Sutta. 
[In the Jñānaprasthāna, Kātyāyanīputra says:] “If a doubt arises regarding 
suffering, is this suffering? Is this non-suffering?”62   
Q. Why does [Kātyāyanīputra] undertake this discussion?  
A. It is because he wants to discern the meaning of a sūtra. It is said in the 
sūtra. “A Brāhmaṇa, as there was something to discuss,63 visited the Buddha’s 
                                                 
58 For example, MV 57c28-58a12 (on the Brahmin boys' memorization of the four Vedas (四吠陀書) 
with the aid of a rope (繩) in a hand).  
59 For example, MV 999b15-27. This passage introduces the opinion of “those who assert that ātman is 
without limitation and will survive death” (執我無邊死後有想論者). It speaks of the Upaṇisadic concept 
of ātman and there are two forms of the assertion. The first form of it, in which they argue ātman is a 
physical entity, they cite a sentence from the Veda (明論): “There is puruṣa of self. Its size is vast and its 
boundary is hard to measure. Its luminosity is like the sun. All ignorant beings, though they are residing in 
front of it, are not able to see it. Once one comes to know this self, he or she is able to overcome birth, old 
age, sickness, and death. If not, there is no overcoming the [already] determined destination.” (有我士夫, 
其量廣大, 邊際難測, 光色如日. 諸冥闇者, 雖住其前, 而不能見. 要知此我, 方能越度生老病死. 
異此更無越度理趣.) It is clear from this passage that the word “minglun” (明論; the Veda) is used in its 
broad sense that includes the Upaṇisads. The second form of the argument, which takes non-physical 
thing as self, does not mention the Veda.  
60 MV 523c02-28. A Jātaka story is quoted in which the Buddha was a caṇḍāla king named “Three 
Hooks” (三鉤), Ānanda his son named the “Ears of a Lion” (師子耳), and Śāriputra a Brahmin priest 
named “Chijian” (池堅). When the king asked the Brahmin to marry his son to the Brahmin’s daughter, 
the Brahmin was infuriated since the king’s caste was the lowest and his was the highest. To show that 
one’s caste status is not a fixed one, the king demonstrated that he was the Brahmin creators of the 
Brahmī script (梵書字), the Kharoṣṭī script (佉盧瑟吒書字), and finally, the Veda and its auxiliaries (吠
陀論及彼眷屬) along with other mundane treaties. The Brahmin, having verified the king’s statements, 
consented to the marriage.  
61 There are more passages that comment on or just mention the Veda and Vedic sacrifice in passing. I do 
not deal with them since they offer little information regarding the inquiry of this chapter.  
62 This is direct quotation from the Jñānaprasthāna. T 1544, 920b08, “若於苦生疑, 此是苦耶? 此非苦
耶?” 
63 This is a translation of “有因論” in the phrase “有因論, 婆羅門.” I am not sure about its meaning. The 
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place and asked him as follows: ‘Śramaṇa, Gotama! Doubt is extremely unusal; 
it is difficult to overcome and not easy to overcome.’ The Bhagavat said: ‘Yes, 
it is just so. Brāhmaṇa! Doubt is extremely unusal; it is difficult to overcome 
and not easy to overcome. Why is it so? In ancient times, there were 
Brāhmaṇas who made the Veda and made mantras. The most important (or 
famous) among them are ten: (1) Aṣṭaka, (2) Vāmaka, (3) Vāmadeva, (4) 
Viśvāmitra, (5) Jamadagni, (6) Aṅgiras, (7) Bhāradvāja, (8) Vaśiṣṭha, (9) 
Kaśyapa, and (10) Bhṛgu. All those brāhmaṇas, though respected by the world, 
could not overcome doubt and ended their lives. Therefore, know that doubt is 
indeed difficult to overcome.’” 
The sūtra, though it says this [about “doubt”]64, does not analyze it in detail. 
That sūtra is the fundamental source for this discussion. What has not been 
said by it must be explained here. Therefore, [Kātyāyanīputra] undertakes this 
discussion.65  
The sūtra quoted in this passage reminds one of the Tevijja Sutta, most notably, because it has 
the same list of the ten Vedic seers in the same sequence. It also characterizes them as the 
“makers of mantra” (造咒術者) and it adds that they are the “makers of the Veda” (造明論者). It 
only differs in that, while the Tevijja Sutta rhetorically asks the Brahmin interlocutor Vāseṭṭha to 
confirm that those seers are also ignorant of the object of their pursuit, Brahmā, the sūtra in the 
quotation conclusively states that they have ended their lives without having resolved their 
doubts. And both sūtras, in so doing, characterize the Veda as the work of ignorant people.  
 Given its vast size, the above materials gleaned from the Mahāvibhāṣā indeed can only 
                                                 
corresponding part in the older version of the text (T 1546, 55c04) has it as “有事論, 婆羅門,” thus 
rendering “cause/reason” (因) as “thing/matter” (事). 
64 ‘The older version of the text explicitly says the bracketed part. T 1546, 55c13-4, “佛經說疑, 不廣分
別.” 
65 MV 68b16-29, “‘若於苦生疑, 此是苦耶? 此非苦耶?’ 乃至廣說. 問. 何故作此論? 答. 爲欲分別
契經義故. 如契經說. “有因論, 婆羅門, 來詣佛所, 作如是問: ‘沙門, 喬答摩! 疑甚爲希, 有難度非
易度.’ 世尊告言: ‘如是如是. 婆羅門! 疑甚爲希有, 難度非易度. 所以者何? 有古昔婆羅門造明論
者, 造咒術者, 上首有十. 一頞瑟搩迦, 二婆莫迦, 三婆莫提婆, 四毘濕縛蜜多羅, 五闍莫鐸耆尼, 
六鴦耆羅, 七跋羅墮闍, 八婆死瑟搋, 九迦葉波, 十勃栗瞿. 如是等諸婆羅門, 世雖尊敬, 皆不度疑
而命終. 是故知疑甚爲難度.’” 契經雖作是說而不廣分別. 彼經是此論所依根本. 彼所不說者, 今應
說之. 故作斯論.” 
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be viewed as meager. Since the Mahāvibhāṣā, along with other Abhidharma texts, have not yet 
been approached for a systematic retrieval of Buddhist attitudes toward Brahmanical cultures and 
ideas, any conclusion that could be drawn from the materials collected here may need to be 
revised with a more comprehensive outlook. Notwithstanding this limitation of the present 
investigation, it seems plausible to assume that the Buddhists represented in the text were not 
greatly concerned with their Brahmanical surroundings. Or, at least as far as the Veda and Vedic 
sacrifice are concerned, it seems that there was no novel development (or direct engagement with 
the Buddhist critiques) from the Brahmin side in the defense of the text and the practice that 
early Buddhists perceived as offensive. This can be seen from the fact that there is no discernible 
development of the arguments, from the Nikāya/Āgama materials, in the Mahāvibhāṣā. Although 
ritual killing and recitation of the Veda are systematically categorized as the representative forms 
of unwholesome conduct originating from delusion, what they are accused of remains essentially 
the same: Killing animals in a ritual setting is karmically negative and chanting the Veda is 
ineffectual for the ultimate goal of liberation. Regarding the latter, it is again noted in the passage 
above, though as a quotation, that the Veda is the work of ignorant people whose doubt had not 
been resolved before their death. These two critiques of Brahmin text and practice are still 
presented as unconnected to each other. 
 
1.4 Harivarman’s Tattvasiddhi: Connecting the Two 
An advance in the discussion on the Veda and Vedic sacrifice is recorded in another Abhidharma 
text, the Tattvasiddhi of Harivarman (ca. 250-350 CE), which deals extensively with 
controversial issues among various early Buddhist schools.66 The advance, as it appears in the 
                                                 
66 For the most updated information on modern scholarship as well as traditional accounts of 
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text, is initiated by Brahmin opponents. However, as we will see in this section, Harivarman adds 
little to Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice. He does not take the evolution of 
Brahmins’ arguments seriously and, when the occasion requires, he repeats the same critique that 
appears in previous sources. Still, his document ushers in a new stage in the history of Buddhist 
propaganda against Brahmanism because Brahmins in the Tattvasiddhi justify their sacrificial 
practice in the name of the Veda.  
 According to his biography,67 Harivarman was born into a Brahmin family of Central 
India and was educated in diverse disciplines, which included the study of the Veda. As Katsura 
(1974, 16-22) notes, Harivarman’s Brahmanical background is somewhat attested by his rather 
frequent—compared to other Abhidharma texts—references to Brahmanical literature, including 
the Veda, its six auxiliary sciences (Vedaṅga), epics, and philosophical treatises of Brahmanism, 
especially those belonging to the Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, and Nyāya schools. In this section, 
however, I will not consider all of those references.68 I will concentrate on the relevant passages 
contained in the hundredth chapter titled “Chapter on Three Karmas” (三業品), as they are the 
most illuminating with regard to the topic of Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice. 
                                                 
Harivarman’s Tattvasiddhi, see Lin (2015, 1-37). For a discussion on Harivarman’s possible affiliation 
with the Dārṣṭāntikas recorded in traditional Chinese sources especially through his studentship under 
Kumāralāta and modern scholars’ reviews of the sources in the context of discussing Vasubandhu’s 
connection with the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas headed by Śrīlāta, see Park (2014, 1-45). Although Lin 
(2015, 5 and 30-1) reports that no commentaries—both Indic and East Asian—are extant, according to 
Ikeda (2014b), there are eight Chinese commentaries on the Tattvasiddhi all excavated in 
Dunhuang/Turfan and survived in fragments. Ikeda (2014a) transcribes one of them, Chengshilunyiji (成
實論義記), preserved in the National Taiwan Library (國立臺灣圖書館), Taipei. For textual information 
and a study of characteristic features of this work, see Ikeda (2014b) and (2015). Unfortunately, this 
work’s comment on the Tattvasiddhi’s hundredth chapter, which is the main object of analysis in this 
section, is lost.  
67 This work, Biography of Harivarman (訶梨跋摩傳), written by Xuanchang (玄暢; 416-484) is quoted 
in Compilation of Notices on the Translation of the Tripiṭaka (出三藏記集; T 2145) 78b28-79b25. The 
major events of Harivarman’s life recorded in this work is concisely summarized in Katsura (1974, 14). 
68 Six references to the Veda found in the Tattvasiddhi are collected in Katsura (1974, 16 and fn. 26). 
Katsura gives translations of four passages among them.  
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 The chapter, as its title indicates, is about three types of karma, namely, wholesome 
(kuśala), unwholesome (akuśala), and indeterminate (avyākṛta) karmas. It begins with the 
opponent’s question on the definition of wholesome karma. A preliminary answer is given that 
wholesome karma is something by which, when it is complete, one can “grant good things to 
others” (與他好事), and the word “good” (好) is further defined as “pleasurable” (樂; *sukha), 
“wholesome” (善; *kuśala), and “meritorious” (福; *puṇya). The Brahmin identity of the 
opponent is hinted at from the very beginning. When the author defines wholesome karma, he 
states that it comes from the act of giving (布施), observing the precepts (持戒), or compassion 
(慈), but not from such acts as bathing (洗浴).69  
 But this basic definition soon reveals its weakness as the opponent cites several 
examples that seem to contradict general karmic principle if we follow the definition. Those 
examples include the cases of a skillful physician and an adulterer. The opponent argues that, 
according to Harivarman’s definition, the former would gain demerit while treating patients with 
acupuncture and moxibustion because they cause suffering, whereas the latter would obtain merit 
because he brings pleasure to other people’s wives by having sex with them.70 Confronted with 
                                                 
69 Tattvasiddhi (T 1646) 292a1-5.  
70 These counter-examples are initially introduced in the form of the opponent’s objection at Tattvasiddhi, 
292a5-7 and 292a8-9. Interestingly, Kumārila puts forward a similar argument in the Ślokavārttika. See 
ŚV co. 235cd-237ab and 244cd-245ab translated in Kataoka (2010, pt. 2, 487-8 and 494). Halbfass (1991, 
90) aptly summarizes the issue: “If reciprocity were indeed the foundation of dharma and adharma, of 
reward and punishment, how could this apply to such obvious, though “victimless,” violations of the 
norm as illicit drinking? And if benevolence and the production of well-being or pleasure were dharma, 
would a sexual act with the wife of one’s guru, a mortal sin (mahāpātaka) according to the dharmaśāstra 
rules, not be an act of dharma? One should leave aside the criteria of pleasure and pain in trying to 
determine what is right and wrong in the sense of dharma and adharma.” Kumārila, unlike Harivarman’s 
opponent, lists the examples of drinking instead of a good physician and specifies the object of sexual 
intercourse to the wife of one’s own guru. However, the purpose of listing those examples is the same: he 
cannot accept “pleasure and pain” as the criteria for the matter of dharma, that is, the principle of the 
world. The fact that Harivarman (c. 250-350 CE) records an objection similar to Kumārila’s as a 
pūrvapakṣa implies that Kumārila’s argument may be a reiteration of an old theme that was current 
among generic Vedic ritualists even in the third (or fourth) century. Kumārila does not seem to consider 
Harivarman’s reply (see below) that it is the actor’s own intention rather than the sensual reception of the 
act’s recipient that would determine the nature of karma. This neglect of Buddhist theory of karma is 
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those obvious counter-examples, Harivarman immediately discloses the fundamental principle of 
the Buddhist theory of karma. Just as the Buddha declared “by karma, I mean intention,”71 in 
Buddhism, it is ultimately the actor’s intention that determines the action’s karmic value rather 
than the resultant pleasure or suffering that another might receive from the action. Accordingly, 
the physician would obtain merit and the adulterer demerit since their actions are based on good 
will (善心) and sexual desire (婬欲) respectively.72   
 Then, in the subsequent objection, the opponent approaches the issue in several different 
ways. One of the themes that he brings to the controversy is the authority of certain books, 
among which is the Veda. After quoting a mundane law-book (世法經; *dharmasūtra?) that 
prescribes the duties (dharma) of the four castes (varṇa) to absolve the warrior caste (kṣatriya) 
of any sin accrued from killing, the opponent cites the Veda.  
Also, the Veda says: “When one kills, he obtains merit.” In other words, when 
one kills a sheep with Vedic mantras, that sheep will be born in heaven.73 The 
Veda is what the world believes in.74 Also, [the Veda] says: “If the victim 
really deserves to die, killing him or her is not sinful just as the seers of five 
                                                 
because Kumārila takes the Sāṃkhyas, rather than Buddhists, as his opponent in his defense of ritual 
killing in the Ślokavārttika. See 4.2 Once Again on Bhāviveka-Sāṃkhya Alliance. 
71 Aṅguttara Nikāya vol. 3, p. 415, “cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi.”; this sentence is quoted and 
emphasized for its importance for understanding the Buddha’s doctrines by Gombrich (1990, 16) and 
(2006 [1996], 51).  
72 Tattvasiddhi 292a5-292b1.  
73 Cf. Ṛg Veda 1.162.21, “Truly in this way you do not die nor are you harmed: you go to the gods by 
paths easy to travel.” (translated in Jamison and Brereton 2014, 346) Alsdorf (2010, 37) reports a similar 
view from the Mahābhārata: “The same conclusion, in spite of its somewhat different course, has the 
concern of a conversation between a sacrificing priest (adhvaryu) and an ascetic (yati), who accuses him 
of hiṃsā in the sacrifice of a ram (MBh. XIV 28, Deussen 1922:927ff.). The adhvaryu retorts promptly 
that the ram is not ruined but, according to the Veda, participates in heavenly bliss; its component parts 
will enter into the corresponding elements, the sun, etc., its life into heaven.” 
74 Katsura (1974, 16) translates this passage as follows: “Moreover, it is said in the Veda: ‘One can obtain 
merits even by killing a living being, as e.g., when one kills a goat while reciting a mantra of the Veda, the 
goat will be born in Heaven after death.’ The Vedas are believed (only) by ordinary people.” Among other 
differences between his and my translation, I would note one. The entire passage is the words of the 
opponent. Therefore, the word “(only)” that Katsura inserted in his translation should be deleted; the 
sentence in question is meant to give credibility to the Veda by showing the general opinion of the world, 
not to discredit the quoted Vedic sentence.  
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supernatural powers were able to kill people by means of mantra.” It is not 
possible to say that those seers are sinful. How can sinners conduct such a 
[supernatural] act? Therefore, know that by killing one obtains merit.75  
This objection by Harivarman’s opponent is indeed an epoch-opening statement and its 
significance needs to be examined in some detail.  
 First, the Brahmin opponent, as depicted by Harivarman, now draws upon the Veda to 
prove that Vedic sacrifice is karmically not negative but positive. As we have seen in the 
previous sections, the Brahmin opponents represented in the (pre-Harivarman) Buddhist 
literature do not mention the Veda when their practice of ritual killing is criticized. There, the 
critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice remained unconnected. The opponent in the 
Tattvasiddhi, however, does not simply name the Veda as the authority of his action. He directly 
quotes the Veda as the rationale behind the practice. In this way, the Veda is now explicitly 
marked as the background behind Vedic sacrifice.  
 Second, the opponent makes a conscious allusion to the authority of the Veda when he 
says “the Veda is what the world believes in” (違馱經是世間所信). And, by saying so, he 
reminds the Buddhist opponents of the weight of authority invested in the Veda by the general 
public. And, lastly, this Brahmin opponent further tries to establish the authority of the seers (神
仙; *ṛṣi) of the Veda by referring to their supernatural capability, maintaining that their act of 
killing is karmically positive, that is, a meritorious action.  
 However, Harivarman pays little attention to this novel move of the opponent to 
demonstrate the karmic merit of killing through recourse to such authorities as the Veda and 
Vedic Ṛṣis. He does not comment on the authority of the Veda at all. To him, it is as if the world’s 
                                                 
75 Tattvasiddhi 292b19-24, “又違馱經說: ‘殺生得福.’ 所謂以違馱語咒殺羊, 羊死生天. 違馱經是世
間所信. 又說: ‘若實應死者, 殺之則無罪. 如五通仙能咒殺人.’ 不可言神仙有罪. 罪人云何能成此
事? 故知殺生得福.” 
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belief in the Veda is completely irrelevant: “I have already replied to what you said, that is, ‘the 
Veda says that by killing living beings one obtains merit.’ That is to say, there is no merit in 
killing.”76 The authority of Vedic seers, on the other hand, though not extensively discussed, is at 
least actively challenged: “[Even people down to] the Caṇḍālas can also kill people by means of 
mantra. The sages are the same. They are able to commit [killing] by following the words [of 
mantra]77 because of their evil mind. Also, this [killing by means of mantra] is accomplished 
based on their powers of merit [accumulated in the past]. [However,] as they deprive [others’] 
lives, they obtain demerit [which will bear a fruit in the future].”78 In short, Harivarman’s points 
are: (1) the authority of the Veda and Vedic seers cannot be indiscriminately accepted and (2) the 
karmic value of an action should be determined based on the moral nature of the intention that 
motivated the action.  
 The significance of this first debate on the karmic value of ritual killing in this chapter of 
the Tattvasiddhi lies in the introduction of the theme of the authority of the Veda and Vedic seers 
in relation to Vedic sacrifice, though it is simply overlooked by Harivarman. In the middle of the 
chapter, the opponent launches the second attack, again taking recourse to the authority of the 
Veda and Vedic seers, but, this time, the debate is invoked by Harivarman’s argument. 
Harivarman argues that killing is to be abandoned because it is abandoned by all the “good 
people” (善人) such as the Buddha, bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, and śrāvakas. His listing of 
“good people” seems to elicit an objection from the opponent; with this word the opponent finds 
an opportunity to assert the opposite. 
Question. Acts such as killing are what good people also follow. As the Veda 
orders them to perform a ritual to [be born in] heaven they, following the order, 
                                                 
76 Tattvasiddhi 293a9-10, “汝言‘違馱經說殺生得福.’ 是語先答. 謂殺無福.” 
77 The meaning of the phrase “by following the words [of mantra]” (隨語) is not entirely clear to me.  
78 Tattvasiddhi 293a26-8, “栴陀羅等亦能以咒術殺人. 仙人亦爾. 以惡心故, 隨語能成. 又此人福力
故能成. 以奪命故得罪.” 
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kill sheep.79 
“Good people,” to this Brahmin opponent, are not the Buddha and bodhisattvas; it is Vedic 
ritualists who are deemed “good people.” At first glance, this objection seems similar to the 
objection in the first debate in that it points to the Veda as the source for the practice of ritual 
killing. However, the relationship of the Veda to the act of killing differs in the two passages. In 
the first, the role of the Veda in the opponent’s argument is to rationalize Vedic sacrifice. The 
Vedic sentence “when one kills, he obtains merit” (殺生得福) was quoted to karmically justify 
the act of killing; thus, it can be said, in the first case, the Veda provides a “theoretical” 
background to Vedic sacrifice. In the second, however, the Veda’s more direct engagement in the 
sacrifice is noted. The opponent says that there is the Vedic sentence “perform a sacrifice for the 
sake of heaven” (爲天祠)80 and good people “obey the command” (聽令) and “kill sheep” (殺
羊). In other words, Vedic sacrifice is shown as the actualization of a prescription in the Veda. 
Here we see an inkling of Mīmāṃsā; their idea of the absolute authority of the Veda to command 
what is to be done (dharma) is reflected in the opponent’s argument, but without the 
characteristic Mīmāṃsaka doctrines.  
 To meet this objection, Harivarman resorts to the old Buddhist strategy of denouncing 
the authors of the Veda, but not without an original element. 
Answer. They are not good people. Good people always seek to benefit others 
and cultivate compassionate mind equally toward enemies and friends.81 How 
can such good people obey [the Vedic command] to kill living beings?! Those 
people made this scripture [that is, the Veda] with the mind of passion, hatred, 
and delusion. With the desire to be born in heaven, they enchant other sentient 
                                                 
79 Tattvasiddhi 293b27-8, “問曰. 是殺生等, 善人亦聽. 違馱經中, 爲天祠故, 聽令殺羊.” 
80 This may be the translation of the stock sentence “svargakāmo yajeta” (One, desirous of heaven, must 
sacrifice). 
81 This refers to the practice of loving-kindness (maitrī; Pāli mettā) one of the four items of the apramāṇa 
(immeasurable) or brahmavihāra (divine abiding). The sermon on those four was preached to the 
Brahmin interlocutors by the Buddha at the end of the Tevijja Sutta after the denunciation of Brahmins 
including the authors of the Veda.  
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beings. Because of the power of [previous] merit, they are able to perform this 
act. Also, such [evil acts] as killing is what an enlightened being cannot 
conduct. Therefore, know that they are not meritorious.82  
This is familiar Buddhist rhetoric, repeated from the time of the Tevijja Sutta. The makers of the 
Veda are ignorant, and, due to their ignorance, their work, the Veda, should not be trusted. 
However, something more is attributed to them in the quotation. In the Tevijja Sutta and the sūtra 
quoted in the Mahāvibhāṣā, only their intellectual (or spiritual) ignorance was noted; Brahmins 
were ignorant of the god Brahmā in the former and they remained doubtful even up to their death 
in the latter. In this passage, Harivarman extends the range of their deficiencies to cover, not only 
delusion, but all three poisons. The Veda is defined as the work of authors trapped in passion, 
hatred, and delusion. Hence, in Harivarman’s presentation, the Veda is not merely a collection of 
foolish talk, completely irrelevant to the ultimate goal. It is also morally problematic since it is 
authored with the specific intention to deceive and kill in order to accomplish the authors’ own 
goal of reaching heaven. The good people, reminiscent of Vedic seers, may magically enchant 
other beings because of the merit they accumulated in the past, but regardless of such capability, 
they earn demerit for ritual killing.  
 Harivarman’s contribution to the development of Buddhist critiques of Vedic ritualists 
can be found here. He introduces the standard of morality in the Buddhist assessment of the 
authors of the Veda, Vedic seers or “good people” as expressed in the quote. His contribution 
seems to be forced, however, at least in his presentation: it is not Harivarman but his opponent 
who first connects the problem of sacrificial killing to the authority of the Veda. Harivarman thus 
had to ascribe immorality to Vedic seers in his objection to the opponent’s characterization of 
                                                 
82 Tattvasiddhi 293b28-293c4, “答曰. 此非善人. 善人者常求利他, 修慈悲心怨親同等. 如是人者, 
豈當聽殺生也! 是人貪恚濁心故造此經. 求生天上, 咒他衆生. 以福力故, 能成是事. 又此殺等, 得
解脫者之所不爲. 故知不善.” 
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“killers of animals” as “good people.” Harivarman, it seems, following his opponent’s lead, 
simply defines them as bad people, and, in so doing, adds a moral dimension to the Buddhist 
evaluation of Vedic seers.83 
 
1.5 Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra: Emergence of the Mīmāṃsakas 
Harivarman’s Brahmin opponent is an orthodox Vedic ritualist who regards Vedic commands as 
compulsory mandates and who rationalizes Vedic sacrifice by citing from the Veda. It is in the 
voice of this Brahmin, recorded in the Tattvasiddhi, that we know that Brahmins were aware of 
Buddhist criticism of Vedic sacrifice and that they developed a defense against it: an appeal to 
the authority attributed to the Veda by the public at large and by its leaders called “good people.” 
Backed by the authority of the Veda, the opponent attempts to absolve Vedic sacrifice of any 
negative karmic effect.  
 The task of Harivarman, in accordance with the opponent’s argument, was, first, to 
shatter the authority of the Veda, rather than to expose the immorality of Vedic sacrifice, in order 
to show that Vedic sacrifice is a groundless act of killing. He does this by simply ignoring the 
                                                 
83 This chapter “On Three Karmas” has one more reference to Vedic sacrifice towards the end. 
Harivarman, in the effort to establish “karma” as “intention,” refers to one Brahmin argument that was 
briefly introduced as the words of the opponent in the first quotation in this section. Therein, the opponent 
vindicates Brahmin ritual killing by asserting that the victim will be reborn in heaven when the killing is 
accompanied by the recitation of Vedic mantras. Harivarman introduces a variety of this argument and 
uses it to support his own argument: “Also, [even according to your position,] in the rituals to heaven, [a 
priest] intentionally kills a sheep with the meritorious mind, and thus, makes the sheep be reborn in 
heaven. Since [the priest] kills [the sheep] with meritorious mind, he would have merit. If it is not the 
case, all killings [in a ritual] would obtain either merit or demerit [without a fixed rule as prescribed in the 
Veda].” (Tattvasiddhi 294b27-9: 又於天祠中, 以福心故殺羊, 令羊生天. 以福心殺故, 則有福德. 若
不爾者, 一切殺生皆得福得罪.) It is hard to evaluate the significance of this passage, as it is Brahmins’ 
argument employed to support Buddhists’ thesis. If it reflects the Brahmin position without a refraction, it 
is important in that it shows Brahmin self-consciousness of moral issues involved in the practice of ritual 
killing. And, more importantly, it implies that Brahmins subjected their ritual practices to the law of 
karma according to which, in its most basic form, moral action begets pleasurable experience and 
immoral action suffering. 
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world’s respect for the Veda and then by questioning the qualification of the authors of the Veda. 
In so doing, the traditional critiques of the immorality of Vedic sacrifice and of the ignorance of 
Vedic seers come to be connected. They are not combined in order to be merely juxtaposed, 
however. Reflecting the structure of the opponent’s argument, Harivarman addresses the 
disqualifications of the authors of the Veda in the context of his critique of Vedic sacrifice. Thus, 
the critique of the Veda comes to be completely subsumed under the framework of the critique of 
Vedic sacrifice.  
 This structure of Harivarman’s argumentation in which the authority of the Veda and 
Vedic seers is discussed within the framework of the critique of Vedic sacrifice continues in the 
next work of our inquiry, Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra. Toward the end of his commentary on 
the first verse of the fourth chapter in the Abhidharmakośa by Vasubandhu,84 Saṅghabhadra 
engages in a debate with a certain Brahmin opponent who asserts that ritual killing brings about a 
favorable result to the performer.85 This fourth chapter is the chapter on karma, titled 
“Karmanirdeśa.” The first verse lays out the basic schema of the Abhidharma theory of karma by 
stating that all the varieties found in the world are caused by karma and karma is of two kinds, 
viz. intention and actions motivated by intention. Given this context, what Saṅghabhadra’s 
opponent argues, or what Saṅghabhadra takes to be the argument, is that the act of killing in 
                                                 
84 Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra is a critical commentary on the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu. 
His critical stance toward Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika-inclined interpretation of the Vaibhāṣikas’ 
Abhidharma system and his strategy of revealing the unorthodox nature of Vasubandhu’s thoughts are 
studied in Park (2014, 47-132). Park (51) summarily observes as follows: “In sum, Saṅghabhadra’s 
exegetical focus in the Nyāyānusāra is to trace, if possible but not always, Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika 
biases back to their origins, namely the positions of Śrīlāta and his Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika school, and 
then to demolish all of them by the root. This approach presupposes that Saṅghabhadra viewed 
Vasubandhu as belonging to—or at least as falling under the sway of—this heterodox Buddhist faction, 
namely the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntikas.” 
85 This debate with a Brahmin opponent over the karmic status of Vedic sacrifice does not appear in the 
corresponding sections of Vasubandhu’s own commentary, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, and that of the 
Abhidharmadīpa, which is the last extant work of the Vaibhāṣikas. 
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Vedic sacrifice overrides the law of karma, or, understood in a less strong form, constitutes an 
exception to the law.  
 This short section is exclusively devoted to the topic of Vedic sacrifice, unlike 
Harivarman’s sporadic discussion. It covers one page in the Taishō edition of the text86 and can 
be divided into three parts. These parts as a whole reiterate the structure observed in the 
Tattvasiddhi. Saṅghabhadra begins the section by introducing the argument of a Vedic ritualist on 
the positive karmic effect of ritual killing87 and ends it by confirming that Vedic sacrifice is not 
the means of attaining favorable results.88 Under this framework, Saṅghabhadra deals with the 
arguments that (1) ritual killings preceded by Vedic mantras do not cause unfavorable results in 
the future (Part 1),89 (2) the Veda is a definitive means of knowledge (pramāṇa)90 because its 
sound is eternal and its author is non-existent (Part 2),91 and (3) the Veda is a definitive means of 
knowledge because its words are the transmission of what Vedic seers directly experienced (Part 
3).92  
 Parts 1 and 3 are, to varying degrees, direct evolutions of the previous critiques. Part 1 
presents more elaborate arguments of both Brahmin and Buddhist positions on the killing 
accompanied with mantra-chanting first observed in the Tattvasiddhi. In part 3, on the other 
hand, Saṅghabhadra inherits the attack on the qualifications of Vedic seers; however, it is done in 
an entirely novel fashion. The authority of the seers is invoked by the opponent in order to prove 
                                                 
86 Nyāyānusāra (T 1562; hereafter, NA) 530b14-531b16. 
87 NA 530b14-5. 
88 NA 531b13-5 
89 NA 530b14-530c4.  
90 Usually the word “pramāṇa” (valid means of knowledge) is translated into one Chinese character 
“liang” (量). But, in the Nyāyānusāra in Xuanzang’s translation, the word “量” is often accompanied with 
another word “定” which I take to mean “definitive” in the compound. Therefore, “definitive means of 
knowledge” is the translation of the compound “定量” not of the Sanskrit word “pramāṇa.”  
91 NA 530c4-531a10. 
92 NA 531a10-531b16. 
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the pramāṇa-status of the Veda. Saṅghabhadra, in the course of the refutation, adds something 
new: a discussion of the Buddha’s qualification. Thus, these two parts evolved from, or at least 
were thematically inherited from, the previous literature. They encompass part 2, which records 
arguments that bear a strong imprint of the Mīmāṃsakas for the first time in Buddhist literature. 
This Brahmin in the Nyāyānusāra argues in favor of Vedic sacrifice in the name of the Veda 
whose authority is founded on its being a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa). It is proven to 
be so on the basis of the Mīmāṃsā doctrines such as Śabdanityatva (Eternality of Vedic Sound) 
and Vedāpauruṣeyatva (Authorlessness of the Veda). Although an appeal to the authority of the 
Veda has been already made by Harivarman’s opponent, it is indeed a fresh argument since now 
the authority is not based on external factors (for example, the opinions of the general public and 
good people) but solely on the Veda itself. And this fresh argument from the Brahmin side is 
woven into the two previous Buddhist critiques.  
 Saṅghabhadra’s opponent seems to be well aware of Harivarman’s discussion. It is not 
only because he maintains the same thesis that “injury to sentient beings in a ritual setting, when 
preceded by Vedic mantras, brings about favorable results.”93 He also seems to have learned a 
lesson from the previous encounter with Buddhists. Harivarman’s Brahmin, as we have seen, 
refers to the case of a good physician as a counter-example to the Buddhist theory of karma; that 
is, if Buddhists hold that one gains karmic merit when one give pleasure to others, a good 
physician would obtain demerit since he imposes pain on his patients. Harivarman refutes this by 
saying that the physician will not gain demerit since his action is motivated by good will. 
Saṅghabhadra’s Brahmin, as if he has absorbed Harivarman’s point of critique, reformulates the 
argumentation and identifies Vedic ritualists with good physicians. Like good physicians, when 
                                                 
93 NA 530b14-5, “祠祀明咒爲先, 害諸有情, 能招愛果.” 
    39 
Vedic priests kill sheep and so forth, they intentionally seek to benefit the victims.94 He even 
adduces, but this time self-defeatingly, the case of the notorious Saṃsāramocakas (脫生死者) 
who kill insects and worms in order to free them from the round of saṃsāra, that is, out of good 
intention.95 
                                                 
94 This is not entirely a novel argument. Though it does not make use of analogy of “physician” and is not 
put in the mouth of opponent, Harivarman also takes advantage of this argument that Vedic ritualists kill 
the victims with good will to send them to heaven in order to support his own thesis that the karmic value 
of an action is determined by the intention of the actor. See above fn. 65. 
95 For extensive research and references to the Saṃsāramocakas (“liberators from saṃsāra”), see Halbfass 
(1991, 97-111). Kataoka (2012) adds this reference by Saṅghabhadra to Halbfass’ list of references. 
However, as he introduces Saṅghabhadra’s argument, Kataoka confuses the words of the opponent with 
that of the author; in short, the Saṃsāramocaka case is initially introduced by the opponent, not by 
Saṅghabhadra. Kataoka (356-7) writes and translates: “Refuting the opponent, Saṅghabhadra mentions 
the problematic case of the saṁsāramocakas (脫生死者), who claim that they kill worms, ants, etc. (by 
using swords and sticks) for the benefit of these creatures: (1) The liberators from saṁsāra, who injure 
worms, ants, etc. with the thought of benefiting worms, ants, etc., too, would bring about desirable fruits. 
(2) [But] it is not the case that fruits [of ritual killing and killing by the liberators from saṁsāra] can be 
different [when] both kill creatures similarly for the benefit [of the victims], whether by means of mantras 
or swords and sticks.” In his translation, consisting of two sentences, Kataoka considers both to be the 
words of Saṅghabhadra. However, when we take both (1) and (2) to be the words of one and the same 
person, we get a strange argument that may be attributed to the opponent not to the author. What (2) is 
saying is that there is no difference in terms of the karmic result between the ritual killing and the killing 
by the Saṃsāramocakas. And what (1) is saying is that the killing by the latter “would bring about 
desirable fruits.” When we combine two sentences, what the translated passage is saying is that both 
Vedic ritualists and the Saṃsāramocakas would gain desirable fruits by performing their acts of killing. 
This cannot possibly be Saṅghabhadra's argument against the Mīmāṃsakas. In fact, Saṅghabhadra’s 
comment on the case of the Saṃsāramocakas appears later (see below). To clarify the context of the 
whole passage that Kataoka paraphrases following the above translation on p. 357, I translate them all 
here.  
“[Question:] In a ritual setting, [the priest] intentionally seeks to bring benefit and pleasure to the victims 
such as sheep by means of [reciting] Vedic mantras. Therefore, the killer, though he injures sentient 
beings, just like a good physician, does not invite painful results. [It is like] the Saṃsāramocakas, who 
injure worms and ants with the mind to bring benefit and pleasure, definitely invite favorable results 
[from their practice]. 
[Answer:] Even though [the killer], by means of either Vedic mantras or knife and club, kills sentient 
being for the sake of the benefit and pleasure [of the victims], they are not different in terms of the result 
[from other cases of killing]. The killer obtains merit or demerit essentially based on the difference of 
good and evil nature of one’s own mind. Likewise, the victimized sheep or ant must obtain merit or 
demerit based on [the moral state of] its own mind. It is not that one can generate merit in the victim by 
forcibly killing it and that [the victim,] having it as the cause, invites a favorable result in the future. The 
Saṃsāramocakas’ injury of other sentient beings does not constitute the cause of good results; it only 
invites bad results. Likewise, [even though] one recites Vedic mantras before [killing animals] in the ritual 
setting, it will only invite unfavorable results.” NA 530b18-27, ([pūrvapakṣa:] 祠祀明咒意欲利樂所害
羊等. 故能害者, 雖害有情, 猶如良醫, 不招苦果. 脫生死者, 亦以利樂蟲蟻等心, 害蟲蟻等, 應招
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 Saṅghabhadra’s reply consists of two points. First, the intention of the killer is irrelevant 
for the victim’s karmic fruit; one receives one’s own karmic merit/demerit solely based on one’s 
own intention. Simply speaking, one cannot generate others’ merit on behalf of them as Vedic 
ritualists and the Saṃsāramocakas purport to do.96 Secondly, Vedic ritualists cannot prove 
“objectively” their own good intentions, unlike good physicians. In the latter’s case, both the 
physician himself and the attendants witness the recovery of the patients; they impose pain to 
give the patients comfort in this life, not the next. However, what both Vedic ritualists themselves 
and the attendants witness at the sacrificial site is the victimized animals’ expression of 
unbearable pain. They do not directly witness the effect of the priests’ good intention, and 
furthermore, they lack any rational explanation for how it benefits the victims.97 Though not 
entirely expressed in the language of pramāṇa-discourse that would later prevail in Indian 
Buddhist philosophical works, the second point amounts to saying that there is no “direct 
perception” (pratyakṣa) and “inference” (anumāna) to prove the necessary relationship between 
the priests’ good intention and its effects, such as the victim’s birth in heaven. And it gives the 
opponent a good opportunity to introduce the third means of knowledge, scripture (śabda), to 
justify Vedic sacrifice: “Even if the killer and the attendants do not directly witness it, since the 
Veda is the definite means of knowledge, we know that killing living beings in a ritual setting 
                                                 
愛果. [uttarapakṣa:] 非以明咒或以刀杖, 同爲利樂殺害有情, 果容有異. 如能殺者, 要依自心善惡
有殊, 得福非福. 如是所殺羊等蟻等, 應由自心得福非福. 非由强殺令彼福生, 以之爲因當招愛果. 
如脫生死者, 害他有情, 不爲善果因, 但招惡果. 如是祠祀明咒爲先, 亦應唯招非所愛果.) For more 
materials on the Saṃsāramocakas in the Jaina literature, see Granoff (1992), Dundas (1995). 
96 NA 530b21-7, “非以明咒或以刀杖, 同爲利樂殺害有情, 果容有異. 如能殺者, 要依自心善惡有
殊, 得福非福. 如是所殺羊等蟻等, 應由自心得福非福. 非由强殺令彼福生, 以之爲因當招愛果. 如
脫生死者, 害他有情, 不爲善果因, 但招惡果. 如是祠祀明咒爲先, 亦應唯招非所愛果.” 
97 NA 530b27-530c04, “良醫於彼, 非同法喩. 以諸良醫爲欲利樂諸有病者, 勤加救療令他安樂現非
後生, 醫及傍人知功驗果. 雖令病者暫苦觸身, 而彼良醫不生非福. 然彼自許‘羊等愚癡, 不能了知
福與非福.’ 旣被殺害現苦難任, 雖說未來當招愛果, 而能殺者及彼傍人俱不現知. 亦無理證. 故所
引喩非與法同.” 
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does not generate demerit.”98 
 Then, why should the Veda be considered to be a pramāṇa? In the answer to this 
question, we see the debut of Mīmāṃsaka reasoning on the stage of Buddhist literature.  
It is because the substratum of the sound of Vedic mantras is eternal. In other 
words, since there is no author of the Veda as a whole and the words of mantras 
therein exist spontaneously, it is qualified to be the definitive means of 
knowledge. Only this (i.e., the Veda) [is the definitive means], not others.99 
Two characteristic Mīmāṃsā doctrines on the Veda are present, viz. śabdanityatva and 
vedāpauruṣeyatva.100 The latter supports the former while the former forms the main reason for 
the Veda’s being a pramāṇa. Two propositions express the doctrine of the authorlessness of the 
Veda: (1) There is no author of the Veda in its entirety (諸明論無製作者) and (2) The mantra 
portion, among others, of the Veda (於中咒詞) exists spontaneously (自然有). What the 
opponent intends to prove with these two propositions is the doctrine of the eternality of sound: 
the substratum or essence (體) of the sound of Vedic mantras (明咒聲) is eternal (常). 
 Despite the clear and succinct articulations of the two major Mīmāṃsaka doctrines in the 
quotation, the opponent’s argument as a whole seems to be slightly askew from the standard 
Mīmāṃsā position. What he asserts is not the eternality of the entire Veda but only the mantra 
portion. Although he denies authorship for the entire Veda, he then unnecessarily confines 
spontaneous existence to the mantra portion. This emphasis on the mantra portion is at odds with 
our understanding of the Mīmāṃsakas’ position, which prioritizes the vidhi (command) portion 
over the other two—the arthavāda (complimentary expressions) and mantra—treating them only 
                                                 
98 NA 530c4-6, “殺者傍人雖不現證, 而由明論定量故知, 祠祀害生不生非福.” 
99 NA 530c6-8, “以明咒聲體是常故. 謂諸明論無製作者, 於中咒詞自然有故, 能爲定量. 唯此非
餘.” 
100 I analyze Saṅghabhadra’s critique of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda in 3.2 
Is the Veda Intelligible? Saṅghabhadra’s and Bhāviveka’s Divergent Reactions to the Authorless Veda.  
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subsidiarily.101 
 Thus, the thesis expected from a stereotypical Mīmāṃsaka, in the most general terms, 
would be that the authorless Veda is the authoritative means of knowledge because it teaches us 
the duty (dharma) of Vedic sacrifice with its unconditional commands (vidhi); the thesis would 
not be that mantras used in sacrifice are authorless and eternal, and therefore, a means of 
knowledge. By focusing on the mantra portion, Saṅghabhadra’s opponent gives the impression 
that he is carrying the agenda of Part 1 (i.e., ritual killing preceded by mantra recitation) over to 
Part 2 instead of presenting himself with the new vision of the Mīmāṃsakas. In the course of 
doing so, the prescriptive dimension of Vedic authority, observed in Harivarman’s text, is 
completely lost in the quoted passage. 
 The suspicion becomes stronger with the opponent’s argument in Part 3. After 
                                                 
101 For a concise presentation of the Mīmāṃsakas’ understanding of the hierarchical relationship between 
the three parts of the Veda, see Śaṅkara’s “admirable summary” of their position as a pūrvapakṣa in his 
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya: “[1. On Arthavāda:] Alternatively, they (=the Upaniṣads, i.e., arthavāda passages) 
are adjunct to injunctions [that prescribe ritual] activities in order to make known their agent, deity, etc.; 
or they are meant to enjoin other activities such as adoration. For it is not possible that they provide 
information about an existing thing, because an existing thing is the object of [other means of knowledge] 
such as perception, and because no human purpose (puruṣārtha) is served in providing information about 
[an existing thing], by which nothing is to be gained or lost. It is for this reason that, in order to avoid that 
[Vedic statements] like ‘He wept’ be without purpose, [such statements] are stated to serve a purpose in 
that they eulogise pan injunction] in (MS 1.2.7:) ‘Because they form one sentence with an injunction, they 
[serve a purpose] by eulogizing injunctions.’ [2. On Mantra:] Mantras such as iṣe tvā (TaitS 1.1.1) have 
been stated to be connected with ritual acts as being expressive of [ritual] activity and the means thereto. 
[3. On the supremacy of Vidhi over the two:] For this reason Vedic sentences are nowhere seen to have 
purpose except in connection with injunctions, nor would this be possible. Nor is an injunction possible 
that pertains to the existing aspect of a thing, because an injunction concerns an activity. It follows that 
the Upaniṣads are adjuncts of injunctions [that prescribe ritual] activities by making known the own forms 
of the agent, deity etc. required by the ritual act.” ([1] kartṛdevatādiprakāśanārthatvena vā 
kriyāvidhiśeṣatvam, upāsanādikriyāntaravidhānārthatvaṃ vā/ na hi pariniṣṭhitavastupratipādanaṃ 
saṃbhavati, pratyakṣādiviṣayatvāt pariniṣṭhitavastunaḥ, tatpratipādane ca heyopādeyarahite 
puruṣārthābhāvāt/ ata eva so ’rodīt ity evamādīnām ānarthakyaṃ mā bhūd iti vidhinā tv ekavākyatvāt 
stutyarthena vidhīnāṃ syuḥ iti stāvakatvenārthavattvam uktam/ [2] mantrāṇāṃ ca iṣe tvā ityādīnāṃ 
kriyātatsādhanābhidhāyakatvena karmasamavāyitvam uktam/ [3] ato na kvacid api vedavākyānāṃ 
vidhisaṃsparśam antareṇārthavattā dṛṣṭopapannā vā/ na ca pariniṣṭhite vastusvarūpe vidhiḥ saṃbhavati, 
kriyāviṣayatvād vidheḥ/ tasmāt karmāpekṣitakartṛdevatādisvarūpaprakāśanena kriyāvidhiśeṣatvaṃ 
vedāntānām/); Text and Translation (with the numbered (1-3) headings added) are from Bronkhorst 
(2007, 35-6).  
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Saṅghabhadra’s refutations on the eternality and authorlessness of the Veda, the opponent falls 
back on the authority of Vedic seers in order to argue once again for the pramāṇa-status of the 
Veda.  
If then, one should argue: all the sounds of the Veda are the definitive means of 
knowledge because they are subsumed under the ultimate teaching. In other 
words, those enjoyable fruits that the Veda speaks of are what have been 
[directly] seen by great seers (*maharṣi) with their utmost holiness. Since [the 
Veda] is the transmission [of those fruits seen by ṛṣis], it is subsumed under the 
ultimate teaching. If one follows [the words of the Veda], he will obtain all 
manners of favorable results, but, if one violates them, he would encounter 
unfavorable results.102 
Reference to the category of scripture, the third means of knowledge, is more explicitly made 
here. The opponent tries to prove the validity of the Veda by showing that the Veda is included in 
the category of scripture expressed as “ultimate teaching” (至敎). And he seems to prove that the 
Veda is included in that category by making use of another term for the category itself. Since this 
category of scripture is also called the “words of trustworthy people” (āptavacana), if one can 
demonstrate that Vedic seers are “trustworthy” (āpta), then the Veda that records Vedic seers’ 
vision, as the words of the āptas, comes to belong in the category of scripture. Hence, in this 
argument, the āpta-status of Vedic seers is the most crucial factor in proving the Veda to be a 
scripture, thus granting pramāṇa-status to it. The opponent, however, does not make any effort to 
prove the trustworthiness of Vedic seers; it is simply declared, rather than argued for, when he 
says that they have “utmost holiness” (至聖). 
 This gesture of relying on Vedic seers, who have no role in Mīmāṃsā, is enough to make 
one suspicious of the Mīmāṃsaka identity of this opponent. What is more strange is that it seems 
that the opponent is trying to establish the Veda as a pramāṇa based on the complimentary 
                                                 
102 NA 531a10-3, “若爾應說, 諸明論聲, 至敎所收, 故爲定量. 謂明論說可愛果等, 是諸大仙至聖所
見. 彼傳說故, 至敎所攝. 若順便獲諸可愛果, 違便現遭不可愛報.” 
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portion (arthavāda) of the text. This portion is strongly suggested when the opponent says “those 
enjoyable fruits that the Veda speaks of” (明論說可愛果). In Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics , those 
Vedic sentences that praise the fruit of the rituals (arthavāda) are only given a secondary role of 
orientating people to do what is to be done (i.e., Vedic sacrifice) as indicated by Vedic commands 
(vidhi). Given this, the opponent’s effort to establish the authority of the complimentary section 
by recourse to the “holiness of Vedic seers” appears all the more unusual if we consider him to 
be a Mīmāṃsaka. 
 However strange a Mīmāṃsaka the opponent is, it is his argument that provokes 
Saṅghabhadra to renew the old Buddhist critique of Vedic seers. This old but rather 
uncomplicated critique is focused on exposing their disqualification regarding the ultimate goal 
they propose to achieve through Vedic practices. But Saṅghabhadra shifts the focus to the 
validity of seers’ qualifications by introducing pramāṇic language into the discourse, with the 
same goal of revealing the disqualifications of Vedic seers and their work, the Veda. The reasons 
why he rejects the Veda are simple but systematic: 
It is not so. The utmost holiness realized by those seers venerated by you 
cannot be confirmed by direct perception (現量; pratyakṣa); nor is it inferable 
by means of inference (比量; anumāna). Therefore, those transmitted words 
are not included in the ultimate teaching.103    
The argumentation is very straightforward. As the seers’ qualification is neither perceived nor 
inferred, the record of their experience cannot be considered as scripture. In short, the seers’ state 
of holiness is beyond the human range of investigation. But the idea behind this argumentation is 
revolutionary. Saṅghabhadra investigates the scriptural status of the Veda by means of direct 
perception and inference. That is to say, the validity of scripture as a means of knowledge should 
                                                 
103 NA 531a13-5, “不爾. 汝等所敬諸仙所證至聖, 非現量得, 亦不可以比量准知. 故彼傳說非至敎
攝.” 
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be checked by the means that are available to humans. The supra-human domain comes under 
human control in this schema.  
 Thus, to prove that the Veda is scripture, one is required to directly perceive at least “a 
small bit of the favorable results” mentioned in the Veda. And then, based on this observation, 
one can confirm the proposition that the words of the Veda are not empty. This, in turn, 
inferentially proves the scriptural status of the Veda. Without satisfying these steps to prove the 
scriptural status of the Veda, the opponent’s defensive arguments would be no more than “foolish 
words of respect.”104 This challenge to the opponent is almost like a demand to express one’s 
position in the format of the “three part syllogism” later formalized by Dignāga. We can thus 
reconstruct the following syllogism with the words that Saṅghabhadra requires the opponent to 
state: 
  
[thesis (pratijñā):] The transmitted teaching of the utmost holy experience realized by them is 
included in the ultimate teaching (彼證至聖驗所傳敎是至敎攝). 
[reason (hetu):] [It is because] what is said [in the Veda] is not empty (所說非虛). 
[example (dṛṣṭānta):] [Just like such and such] favorable fruits seen by great seers and mentioned 
in the Veda (大仙所見明論所說可愛果等). 
 
Saṅghabhadra’s opponent, thus criticized, quite naturally requires the same for the Buddha's 
teaching.105 This questioning of the Buddha’s qualification as the teacher of the ultimate 
                                                 
104 This is a paraphrase of the following paragraph. NA 531a15-9, “謂汝所敬大仙所見明論所說可愛果
等, 汝等曾無能少現見, 可以准驗‘所說非虛,’ 由此比知‘彼證至聖驗所傳敎是至敎攝.’ 故汝所說是
愚敬言, 詎能了知眞至敎相?” 
105 NA 531a19-21, “But the utmost holiness realized by the great master venerated by you is not 
confirmed by you through direct perception either. However, you admit the utmost holiness [of the 
Buddha], and thus, what has been said by him comes to be included in the ultimate teaching. Then, the 
rest [including the teaching of Vedic seers] should be thus. Why don't you admit their (=the seers’) 
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teaching may indicate the opponent’s Mīmāṃsaka identity, although it is not an explicit 
questioning of the specific quality of the Buddha's omniscience (sarvajñatva), which the 
Mīmāṃsakas like Kumārila would later address. 
 Saṅghabhadra meets this challenge by proving the Buddha’s qualification, using the 
standard he himself set for the opponent. The gist of his argument is that the elimination of the 
three poisons can be realized if one follows the Buddha’s teaching.106 The evidence of this 
elimination is one’s gradual but fundamental dissolution of the attachment to self (我執; 
ātmagrāha), which can only be achieved by the Buddha’s teaching on “no self” (無我; anātman). 
It is this doctrine that essentially distinguishes Buddhist from non-Buddhist teachings. The lack 
of the teaching of no self demonstrates Vedic seers’ attachment to self, proving that they are still 
bound by passion, hatred, and delusion. Therefore, the Veda, the work of those seers, is not 
authoritative and Vedic sacrifice, like all deeds, is subject to the universal law of karma.107   
 
1.6 Conclusion 
Saṅghabhadra takes a detour to arrive at the same conclusion already made by Harivarman: 
Vedic seers are not free from the three poisons and Vedic sacrifice that their literary work 
espouses is a karmically negative action. These two ideas have been there from the earliest 
Buddhist literature. We have seen that these two critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice, which 
circulated independently in the Nikāya/Āgama literature and the Mahāvibhāṣā, came to be 
connected in the Tattvasiddhi. We also observed that the connection is not a combination of the 
                                                 
teaching alone?” (且如仁等所敬大師所證至聖, 亦非仁等現量所得. 而許至聖, 彼所說敎是至敎攝. 
餘亦應然. 何獨不許?) 
106 This is amount to the establishment of the reason (hetu) part of the above syllogism, that is, “what has 
been said is not empty.”  
107 This is a summary of NA 531a21-531b16.  
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two but rather the inclusion of the critique of the Veda within the framework of the critique of 
Vedic sacrifice. This latter theme of killing also frames Saṅghabhadra’s section; he opens and 
closes it by making references to Vedic sacrifice. Within this framework, he discusses the 
problems of ritual killing accompanied by mantra recitation (Part 1), the eternal and authorless 
Veda that legitimizes Vedic sacrifice (Part 2), and the validity of the Veda as the transmission of 
Vedic seers’ vision (Part 3). What he does with this three-part argumentation is to confirm the 
same familiar two conclusions.  
 However, Saṅghabhadra’s presentation of these two ideas is more complex. It is not the 
length of the discussion. It is the style of his argumentation, especially in terms of the 
sophisticated philosophical terms that he uses and the systematic approach that he takes. What, 
then, makes his discussion different from those of his predecessors? 
 First, it is the increased specificity of the opponent’s identity. In earlier sources, the 
opponents’ arguments are not introduced and, even if they are represented, their assertions are so 
general as to be attributed to any generic, or more precisely, orthopraxic Vedic ritualist regardless 
of his philosophical affiliation. In contrast, Saṅghabhadra’s anonymous opponent puts forward 
specific arguments strongly reminiscent of Mīmāṃsā. Indeed, the assertions that the sound of the 
Veda is eternal and the Veda is without an author are the hallmarks of the Mīmāṃsakas. We have 
also seen, however, that those arguments do not fit squarely into the standard positions of the 
Mīmāṃsakas. Nonetheless, I would tentatively posit him as a Mīmāṃsaka until an attempt to 
more accurately identify this opponent can be made in a separate study.  
 The immediate change caused by the emergence of this Mīmāmsaka opponent in the 
context of Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice, most evident in Part 2, is that 
Saṅghabhadra, unlike his predecessors, had to devote more space to the discussion of the Veda in 
order to criticize Vedic sacrifice. It was necessitated by the opponent, whose the defense of Vedic 
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sacrifice was based on the ideologies formed around the nature of the Veda. Accordingly, the 
focus of Saṅghabhadra’s refutation shifted from the act of killing to the eternal and authorless 
Veda. And this movement of the critique from the practice to the text seems to be confusion 
caused by the Mīmāṃsaka arguments. From Part 1 to Part 2, the opponent changes the focus 
from the efficacy of Vedic mantras to the authority of the Veda. Saṅghabhadra refutes these one 
by one. Yet, what Saṅghabhadra misses is the unseen but powerful idea behind the opponent’s 
thinking: that text can legitimate practice.  
 This unnoticed idea continues to characterize, albeit beneath the surface, the discussion 
in Part 3 where Saṅghabhadra explicitly speaks the language of pramāṇic discourse. This is 
another feature that adds complexity as well as sophistication to his argumentation. 
Saṅghabhadra even appears to agree with the idea, when he actively argues for the validity of the 
Buddha’s words upon the opponent’s request. However, this was not total submission to 
Mīmāṃsaka reasoning. Just before he argues in this way, he resets the relationship between text 
and practice. Saṅghabhadra argues that, insofar as a text can be verified by means available to a 
human, that is, by perception and inference, the text is considered to be a scripture that can have 
authority over human practice. The approach of Saṅghabhadra to this problem is well-reasoned. 
Yet, however rational it might seem, one cannot avoid the impression that the discussion over 
scriptural authority could be unnecessary, since the topic at hand is Brahmin ritual killing, not the 
authority of the Veda.  
 Just as Harivarman connected the two disparate critiques following his opponent’s lead, 
Saṅghabhadra came to discuss the relationship between text and practice as the Mīmāṃsaka 
arguments pushed him in that direction. He could have questioned the innate relationship 
between the Veda and Vedic sacrifice presupposed in the Mīmāṃsaka arguments. In doing so, he 
would have pointed out the irrelevance of textual authority over an action and reemphasized the 
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old Buddhist argument that the act of killing is karmically negative under any circumstance. 
Instead, Saṅghabhadra follows the opponent’s argument as he refutes it, and, by doing so, he lets 
the Mīmāṃsaka set the agenda for the whole discussion. This deference to the Mīmāṃsaka 
structure of argumentation made it difficult for him to directly make reference to Brahmins’ 
actual act of killing. With Saṅghabhadra’s willingness to discuss practice in relation to text, 
Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice became a critique of text rather than of practice. The textual 
tone of the critique grows thicker after Saṅghabhadra. From Saṅghabhadra’s time on, the 
Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice cannot be made without reference to the authority of the 
Veda, as molded by the Mīmaṃsāka project of viewing Vedic sacrifice, not as a mere act of 
killing, but as a textually sanctioned activity. The Mīmāṃsaka schema captured Buddhist critique 
of Vedic sacrifice. 
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Chapter Two: How Mīmāṃsaka is MHK 9? 
 
An Overview of MHK 9 and a Review of Opinions on the Identity of the Opponent in MHK 9 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Bhāviveka’s MHK 9 is the first extensive Buddhist confrontation with the Mīmāṃsakas, 
although it was not the first mention and critique of them in a Buddhist text. MHK 9 is the ninth 
chapter of Bhāviveka’s independent magnum opus, the Madhyamakahṛdaya consisting of the 
root verses (kārikā; MHK) and the prose commentary titled Tarkajvālā (TJ) divided into eleven 
chapters. Six chapters (chapters 4-9) are designed to refute the doctrines of other schools, two of 
which are Buddhist and four of which are non-Buddhist. MHK 9 is devoted to a review of the 
doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā school and has the largest number (167) of verses among such 
polemical chapters. Yet, although MHK 9 is extensive and rich, a number of scholars have 
denied that Bhāviveka’s opponent in MHK 9 is the Mīmāṃsakas. As a consequence, the 
significance of MHK 9 in the history of Buddhist-Mīmāṃsaka polemics has not received 
sufficient attention.  
 The major problem in identifying Bhāviveka’s opponent in MHK 9 with the 
Mīmāṃsakas is that Bhāviveka often seems to introduce and refute claims that are not associated 
with the Mīmāṃsā school or individual Mīmāṃsakas known from extant sources, a problem 
noted in Chapter One as we review Saṅghabhadra’s section on the Mīmāṃsakas. Saṅghabhadra’s 
opponent puts forward two hallmark Mīmāṃsaka doctrines—the authorlessness of the Veda 
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(vedāpauruṣeyatva) and the eternality of the words of the Veda (śabdanityatva)—which enabled 
us to characterize the section as the first Buddhist encounter with the Mīmāṃsakas. The position 
of the opponent, however, fluctuates. As we have seen, Saṅghabhadra’s opponent first attempts 
to defend animal sacrifice by presenting the Veda as an authorless text. Then, in response to 
Saṅghabhadra’s critique, he presents the Veda as the record of the ancient seers’ vision. 
Moreover, the opponent’s prioritization of the mantra portion over other sections of the Veda 
does not correspond to our knowledge of the Mīmāṃsakas, who invest absolute authority in 
Vedic injunctions (vidhi)—often found in the Brāhmaṇas—and subordinate other elements of the 
Veda, including mantras. 
 If we expect Bhāviveka to exclusively discuss the Mīmāṃsaka doctrines in MHK 9, we 
encounter a similar problem, despite its title, “Introduction to the Determination of the Truth of 
Mīmāṃsā” (mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra). But the potential for confusion is greater here than in 
Saṅghabhadra’s section since Bhāviveka introduces more opinions foreign to Mīmāṃsā as we 
know it and discusses them more extensively than Saṅghabhadra. Those seemingly non-
Mīmāṃsaka elements prompted scholars to doubt the Mīmāṃsaka identity of the opponent and 
to discredit Bhāviveka for not faithfully representing the views of the Mīmāṃsakas as attested in 
the Mīmāṃsaka sources.   
 The questionable portions of MHK 9 do not overlap with the portion where Bhāviveka 
presents his versions of the two traditional Buddhist anti-Vedic critiques. Thus, it is not my 
primary aim to analyze those “heterogeneously non-Mīmāṃsaka” portions of MHK 9. However, 
scholars who doubt the identity of Bhaviveka’s opponent in MHK 9 do so as if their views relate 
to the chapter as a whole, despite being based on a small portion of the text. It is thus necessary 
to review them to see if MHK 9 is really not about the Mīmāṃsakas.  
 Before undertaking this task, however, I will present an overview of the structure and 
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contents of MHK 9 as a “chapter” (pariccheda; le’u) as it presents itself.  
 
2.2 A Brief Note on the Structure of MHK 9 
MHK 9, on the most basic level, consists of two parts: the official pūrvapakṣas (the Opponent’s 
Arguments; MHK 9.1-17) and the official uttarapakṣas (the Refutation of the Opponent’s 
Arguments; MHK 9.18-167). That is to say, Bhāviveka first reports and summarizes the 
arguments of the opponent, in this case, the Mīmāṃsakas, in the first seventeen verses of the 
chapter and then proceeds to refute those arguments in the remainder of the chapter. This is the 
common framework of all the polemical chapters (4-9) in the Madhyamakahṛdaya. The 
representative work to adopt this structure in the Madhyamaka school is Nāgārjuna’s 
Vigrahavyāvartanī, where Nāgārjuna introduces the opponent’s objections in the first part and 
then answers them in the latter part. In MHK 9, Bhāviveka first has the Mīmāṃsakas advance 
their arguments and then refutes them in sequence.  
 The official pūrvapakṣas are marked by Bhāviveka’s short introductory remark at the 
beginning of the chapter and by their initial location in the chapter. Bhāviveka indicates the 
beginning of a new chapter by introducing “some shameless people” (eke ... anapatrapāḥ) in the 
first verse of MHK 9108 and outlines their doctrines in the next sixteen verses. The first 
seventeen verses (MHK 9.1-17), therefore, constitute the section of the official pūrvapakṣas. At 
the eighteenth verse, Bhāviveka notes that, from that verse (MHK 9.18) on, he will examine 
(parīkṣante) the doctrines introduced thus far equitably, without falling into partiality 
                                                 
108 MHK 9.1, “There are some shameless people who revile the right paths leading to liberation 
(apavarga), viz., meditation and wisdom, arguing that the attainment of it [is possible] by means of 
[performing] rituals (kriyā) alone.” (eke ’pavargasanmārgadhyānajñānāpavādinaḥ/ kriyāmātrena 
tatprāptiṃ pratipādyānapatrapāḥ//) 
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(pakṣapātaviṣaṃ hitvā).109  
 Although the subsequent verses of MHK 9 can be termed, as a whole, simply the 
“uttarapakṣas,” I distinguish three different types among them: the official uttarapakṣas, the 
independent discussions on MHK 9.11, and the contextual pūrva-uttarapakṣas.  
 The official uttarapakṣas directly discuss and refute the Mīmāṃsakas’ claims addressed 
in the official pūrvapakṣas. Bhāviveka marks them in his critique by reiterating the keyword or 
paraphrasing the key point of the pūrvapakṣa verses. Such marker words or phrases resemble the 
use of pratīka by a commentator, which has the function of indexing the author’s comments to 
the relevant place of the root text. It should be noted, however, that Bhāviveka’s markers cannot 
be reduced merely to pratīkas, as they often, especially when he paraphrases, reveal Bhāviveka’s 
understanding of the opponent’s argument; in those cases, they are not simply pointers embedded 
only for referential purposes. TJ, as a commentary on MHK, also usually indicates the 
pūrvapakṣa verse that the reader needs to refer to when Bhāviveka changes his object of critique.  
 The second type of text in MHK 9 is the independent discussions. Strictly speaking, 
these do belong to the “official uttarapakṣa” type, since they are Bhāviveka’s responses to one 
verse, MHK 9.11, located in the official pūrvapakṣas. However, I distinguish them from other 
uttarapakṣas because of their length and contents. They constitute more than half of the verses of 
MHK 9 (93 out of 167 verses; MHK 9.59-151) and their contents are most “problematic” in the 
sense that it seems unlikely that they are directed against the Mīmāṃsakas. They are subdivided 
into five sections. Each of the independent discussions is marked by the fixed phrase 
“[therefore,] it is reasonable that the Three (that is, the Veda) is rejected” (yuktaṃ yat tyajyate 
                                                 
109 MHK 9.18, “The truth-seekers, who are specialized in words’ meaning (śabdārtha) and reasoning 
(nyāya), having abandoned the poison of falling into partiality, will examine it [that is, the Mīmāṃsaka 
positions propounded so far] here [in the following].” (tad atrāpi parīkṣante yathābhūtagaveṣiṇaḥ/ 
pakṣapātaviṣaṃ hitvā śabdārthanyāyakovidāḥ//) 
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trayī), constituting the fourth quarter (i.e., pāda d) of the five verses at which new independent 
discussions begin.110 This marker phrase is taken from the pūrvapakṣa verse, MHK 9.11d, which 
all five discussions seek to refute.111  
 In addition to these, the official pūrva-uttarapakṣas and the independent discussions, 
there is a third category of text in MHK 9. It may be called “contextual” pūrva-uttarapakṣas, 
since these texts treat topics derived from the main discussions. They appear intermittently to 
invite further rejoinders from various opponents on a given topic, like Q&A in which Bhāviveka 
responds to expected counter-arguments to his theses. The best example of this kind is MHK 
9.32-42 in which Bhāviveka introduces a series of rejoinders to his thesis on the evil authorship 
of the Veda and then rebuts them.112 Such Q&A occurs throughout the chapter (except for the 
first seventeen official pūrvapakṣa verses) and they are clearly marked as such by words such as, 
cet, yadi, and atha, all of which can be understood to mean “against my thesis that has just been 
put forward, if you further argue that...”113 It is important to note that we cannot automatically 
assume that the opponent who challenges Bhāviveka in this type of contextual pūrvapakṣa is a 
Mīmāṃsaka. Bhāviveka sometimes provides a note on the identity of the opponent in the TJ 
                                                 
110 They are: MHK 9.59, 9.94, 9.120, 9.127, and 9.139. 
111 Krasser (2012, 561, fn. 65) notes that this marker phrase is repeated in MHK 9 but mistakenly 
correlates the five independent discussions with the pūrvapakṣa verse MHK 9.17.  
112 This part will be analyzed in Chapter Four Decline of the Buddhist Critique of Vedic Sacrifice. 
113 This is not always the case in the present Sanskrit edition of MHK 9. For example, MHK 9.130ab 
(abhojanādau puṇyaṃ ca tyāgāt pāpanivṛttivat/; “It is meritorious to fast, as it is a form of renunciation, 
just as ceasing to perform evil actions.”), though being an opponent’s “contextual” objection to 
Bhāviveka’s thesis advanced in MHK 9.129ab (nānnapānaparityāgaḥ svargaprāpaka iṣyate/; “abstaining 
from food and drink is not a means to attain heaven”), does not contain any of those markers. However, 
this reading of MHK 9.130ab common to both the Kawasaki and Lindtner editions might need an 
emendation. As Kawasaki notes, the underlined part of MHK 9.130ab is transcribed as “cetyāśāt” in 
Saṃkṛtyāyana’s copy (Gokhale 1994, 48) and Kawasaki changes it to “ca tyāgāt” based on Tucci’s 
photocopies of the manuscript and Tibetan translation of the passage. However, the Tibetan translation of 
the second quarter (pāda b) of MHK 9.130 does not only suggest “-tyāśāt” would change into “-tyāgāt” 
but also that the word “cet” is also a part of the verse by containing its Tibetan equivalent “zhe na” 
(spangs phyir sdig spangs bzhin zhe na). Therefore, it may need to be emended as “cet tyāgāt.” 
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commentary. 
 To summarize, MHK 9 is basically consists of three different types of text. The official 
pūrva-uttarapakṣas form the core of the chapter. In it, Bhāviveka first lays out the Mīmāṃsaka 
doctrines and criticizes them one by one in sequence. In the middle of official uttarapakṣas, we 
find a series of five independent discussions that occupy more than a half of MHK 9 and that are 
solely devoted to the refutation of one pūrvapakṣa verse. Lastly, throughout the chapter, 
Bhāviveka, whenever the occasion arises, considers expected rejoinders to his arguments from 
various opponents. In the subsequent two sections, I will outline the contents of MHK 9 by 
dividing it into two parts, viz. the official pūrva-uttarapakṣas and the independent discussions. 
The contextual pūrva-uttarapakṣas, as they do not discuss independent but derivative topics, and 
thus, do not form independent sections, will not be discussed separately. However, important 
ones among them will be referred to in the following summaries.  
 
2.3 An Overview of the Official Pūrva-Uttarapakṣas 
The official pūrva-uttarapakṣas, to my understanding, can be divided into three sections. Each of 
those sections advances a reason to reject the scriptural status of the Veda against the 
Mīmāṃsakas’ apologetics of the Vedic authority. Thus, those three sections collectively adduce 
three reasons to deny that the Veda can be a religious scripture. The three reasons are: 1. the Veda 
is not moral, 2. the Veda is not rational, and 3. the Veda is not omniscient. 
 This threefold division of the official pūrva-uttarapakṣas is not a “natural” division of 
the text. A more natural manner of dividing it would be to divide the text in accordance with the 
separation-lines in the text itself. This would result in discrete Mīmāṃsaka arguments presented 
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in the official pūrvapakṣas, paired with Bhāviveka’s examination of each of them.114 However, I 
think those separate discussions of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrines can be grouped into three larger 
sections. In other words, Bhāviveka, although his main objective is to refute the Mīmāṃsaka 
claims, seems to posit three independent theses against Vedic authority as he refutes them, by 
arranging the opponent’s arguments and his counter-arguments in a specific sequence.  
 The following summaries are mainly based on the root verses (MHK) as they are 
understood in the commentary (TJ) and, as noted, the contextual pūrva-uttarapakṣas are often 
disregarded.  
 
2.3.1 The Veda is not moral (MHK 9.1-4, 18-42) 
Bhāviveka, as he opens the chapter, characterizes the Mīmāṃsakas as “shameless people” who 
argue that liberation (apavarga) can only be achieved through ritualistic means (kriyā). The 
rituals that they uphold based on their scripture (āgama) involve grains, animals, ghee and 
copulation with a partner (1-2). The Veda, which prescribes such ritualistic actions, is the Āgama 
in the true sense of the term as its lineage of recitation has never been broken. This is a valid 
means of obtaining knowledge (pramāṇa) since, unlike scriptures of human origin, it is 
authorless in that there is no memory of its author (3-4). 
  As he commences his criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrines, Bhāviveka contrasts 
himself and his fellow Buddhists (or only the Mādhyamikas?) with the shameless Mīmāṃsakas 
                                                 
114 The official pūrva-uttarapakṣas may be divided into nine sections according to this scheme. They are: 
1. On the authorlessness and immorality of the Veda (1-4, 18-42), 2. On the Veda as a sole source for 
imperceptible things (5, 43), 3. On the eternality of words (6-7, 44-49), 4. On the pramāṇa-status of 
verbal knowledge (8-9, 50-54), 5. On the notion of apūrva (10, 55-58), 6. On the social acceptance of the 
Veda (11, 59-151), 7. On the universalistic understanding of the Veda (12, 152-154), 8. On the role of 
inference vis-à-vis scripture (13-14, 155-158), and 9. On the omniscience of the Buddha and the 
authoritativeness of his words (15-17, 159-167). 
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by defining the former as the “truth-seekers” (yathābhūtagaveṣin) (18). The quality of being 
“uninterrupted” (anupaccheda) cannot be the standard for determining something as a scripture, 
for, if it were, all scriptures would qualify. The important thing is whether they are true (tattva) 
and, in this regard, the rituals that the Veda suggests for the goal of liberation must be irrational 
(19-22).  
 The Mīmāṃsaka assumption that, among scriptures, the Veda alone is truthful because it 
is authorless is unfounded: Human utterances can also be truthful and there is no similar example 
of an authorless text that would support the case of the Veda. Or, in a certain sense, Buddhist 
scripture is also authorless, and therefore, the quality of being authorless cannot be the standard 
of the Veda being the scripture in the true sense of the term (23-5). Contrary to the their 
assumption, however, the authorship of the Veda must be assumed, since counter-arguments to 
the Mīmāṃsakas’ claim for the authorlessness of the Veda can be put forward (26) and the Veda, 
as linguistic material, conforms to human understanding (29-30). Moreover, we may infer that 
the putative author of the Veda is an evil being based on the immoral practices that the Veda 
prescribes (31).  
 This section ends with the opponent’s vindication of killing animals and drinking liquor 
in Vedic sacrifice and Bhāviveka’s refutation of each of those rejoinders (32-42). 
 Thus, this section deals with two major Mīmāṃsaka doctrines: their promotion of Vedic 
sacrifice as an exclusive means to attain the ultimate religious goal and their justification of the 
authority of the Veda by positing it as an authorless text. This section, as the main object of 
analysis of this dissertation, will be studied in depth in Chapters Three and Four.  
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2.3.2 The Veda is not rational (MHK 9.5-10, 43-58) 
In a series of six verses, the Mīmāṃsakas advance three arguments to establish the authority of 
the Veda and reconfirm that the rituals prescribed in the Veda is the means to achieve the ultimate 
goal. The three arguments are: 1. Without the Veda there can be no understanding of things that 
have no visible evidence (5), 2. The relationship between words and their meanings is eternal (6-
7), 3. Verbal knowledge from the Veda is a separate category of pramāṇa (valid means of 
knowledge), different especially from inference (anumāna) (8-9). In verse 10, the notion of 
apūrva (lit. “unprecedented”) is introduced.115 By arguing that this force of making the desired 
result happen is manifested only by ritual actions, the Mīmāṃsakas again state that the goal of 
liberation (mokṣa) can be realized through ritual means alone. 
 Bhāviveka dismisses the first argument by briefly affirming that those things declared to 
have no visible sign to infer their existence are in fact knowable through inference, that is, 
without the help of the Veda. Moreover, he adds in TJ, the veracity of knowledge from a 
scripture (e.g., the Veda) whose truth cannot be inferred cannot be ascertained (43). He then 
reviews the Mīmāṃsakas’ arguments for the eternality of words and their relationships with 
meanings, and points out the logical fallacies (44-48ab). This process of negating the 
Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of words’ eternality (śabdanityatva) seems to have been undertaken in 
order to assert that verbal knowledge is contingent upon linguistic convention (saṃketa) (48cd).  
 This is a necessary step for his next argument: that scripture does not constitute a 
                                                 
115 Kataoka (2000) considers this verse, MHK 9.10, as he attempts to reconstruct the pre-Śabara 
Mīmāṃsaka theory of ritual action (termed “Dharma-abhivyakti-vāda”). It was, according to his study, 
predominant until the time of Kumārila but was not inherited by Śabara and Kumārila. Kataoka comments 
that the Mīmāṃsaka opponent’s use of the term “apūrva” instead of “dharma” (as recorded in 
Bhartṛhari’s works) in MHK 9.10 is characteristic (169). It is to be noted, however, that TJ glosses on the 
word “apūrva” as follows: “The word ‘apūrva’ is the synonym of the word ‘dharma’” (sngon med pa zhes 
bya ba ni chos zhes bya ba’i tha tshig go; TJ D276a7). In TJ on MHK 9.5, Bhāviveka’s opponent also 
uses the expression “sngon med pa’i chos” which can be rendered as “*apūrvadharma” (TJ D275a3). 
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separate category of pramāṇa. Knowledge from scripture is instead a sub-category of inference 
because there is no difference between them. One similarity between them, among many, is that 
both inference and scriptural knowledge depend on the memory of relationship; just as inferring 
fire from smoke requires prior knowledge of their relationship, knowledge from the Veda is 
dependent upon linguistic convention (50-54).  
 Bhāviveka passes over the Mīmāṃsaka argument that apūrva is manifested by ritual 
actions. Rather, he attempts to prove that apūrva, as a result of an action, is a non-eternal entity 
because ritual actions are not different from ordinary actions. Insofar as they are actions, their 
fruits are impermanent. Thus, it is not reasonable to assume that ritual actions bring about 
liberation; they are nothing more than actions. Therefore, one cannot conquer death by ritual 
means, as the Mīmāṃsakas assume. This path is extolled only by those incapable of intellectual 
investigation (55-58). 
 These discussions contribute to the theme “the Veda is not rational.” Bhāviveka’s 
refutation of the three Mīmāṃsaka arguments focuses on demonstrating that the Veda must be 
subject to examination by human reasoning. First, by showing that there is no unique object to 
which the Veda has exclusive access, he denies that the Veda offers access to a realm of 
knowledge that human perception and inference cannot reach. Then, by arguing that words are 
not eternal entities that have an eternal connection with their meanings, and therefore, that 
understanding of them is dependent upon the previous linguistic norms, Bhāviveka tries to 
equate verbal communication with inference. When the process of obtaining knowledge from 
scripture is thus equated with that of inference, scriptural knowledge comes to be subject to the 
rules of inference. Having divested the Veda of the Mīmāṃsaka ideologies that make the Veda 
immune to any reasoned critique of its contents, Bhāviveka is enabled to criticize the Vedic 
means for liberation, that is, Vedic sacrifice, with a reasoned argument: Vedic sacrifice cannot be 
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a means to achieve liberation because it is not different from ordinary action; as action, its result 
must be impermanent.  
 
2.3.3. The Veda is not omniscient (MHK 9.12-17, 152-167) 
There are three more Mīmāṃsaka agendas that Bhāviveka considers in the official pūrvapakṣas. 
Unlike the formers arguments, they contain specific Mīmāṃsaka critiques against Buddhists. 
They begin by proclaiming the Veda to be the ultimate root of all knowledge because it contains 
all (12). Then they proceed to denounce Buddhists for reviling such scripture with reasoning (13-
14) and criticize the quality of omniscience attributed to the Buddha and the authority of his 
words (15-17). 
 To the claim that the Veda is the source of all knowledge, Bhāviveka, while 
acknowledging the existence of some good teachings in the Veda, defines the Veda as a “pile of 
shit” (mi gtsang phung po). Any good teachings in it were unwittingly included or stolen from 
others’, for example, Buddhists’ scripture (152-154).   
 With this insult, Bhāviveka seems to argue that a scripture should contain truth rather 
than all knowledge. To correctly evaluate a given scripture, one needs to use inference to 
investigate whether it is rational or irrational. But, in doing so, he also observes that the tool of 
inference, ultimately, should be abandoned when one crosses the river of the knowable (155-
156). He warns that those fools who follow the words of a scripture composed by the ignorant 
will never escape the pit of saṃsāra. They are like blind men, devoid of “the eyes of inference” 
(rjes su dpag pa’i mig) (157-158).  
 Finally, Bhāviveka defends the omniscience of the Buddha and the authoritativeness of 
his words against the Mīmāṃsakas’ critique. Although omniscient beings are not observed in the 
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present, as the Mīmāṃsakas argue, the word “omniscience” is still applied to foundational 
masters of heretic traditions such as Jaimini of Mīmāṃsā, Kapila of Sāṃkhya, and Kaṇāda of 
Vaiśeṣika in the figurative sense of the term. The figurative usage of a word presupposes a real 
object of denotation, and therefore, an omniscient being must exist (159). Also, the Mīmāṃsaka 
claim that the Buddha is not omniscient because he is a human being is wrong since Bhāviveka 
does not admit the “humanness” of all three bodies of the Buddha (viz., dharmakāya, 
saṃbhogakāya, nirmāṇakāya) (160). After having discussed the omniscience of the three gods—
Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva—who create, maintain, and destroy the world (161-163), he answers 
the opponent’s further questions about the scope and veracity of the Buddha’s teaching (164-
165). The authority of the words of such an omniscient Buddha cannot be repudiated simply 
because they are composed or they revile the Veda, as does an unauthoritative Jain scripture, 
since the treatises of the Mīmāṃsakas are also composed and the authority of Jain scripture is not 
denied because it opposes the Veda (166-167). 
 The discussions in this section as a whole seem to refute the idea that the Veda is an all-
inclusive scripture that encompasses all objects of knowledge, and thus, that it is the fountain of 
all other texts. To counter this claim, Bhāviveka first describes most teachings of the Veda as 
trash. As the next discussion implies, what matters in determining the value of a scripture is that 
its veracity is verifiable by means of inference. In light of this background, the final discussions 
on the Buddha’s omniscience, though mainly a defense of it, appear to be an attempt to contrast 
the “omniscience” of the Veda, the all-inclusiveness of knowledge, with the authentic 
“omniscience” embodied in the Buddha, that is, the rational or logically correct form of 
omniscience. 
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2.4 An Overview of the Independent Discussions on MHK 9.11 
The five independent discussions (MHK 9.59-151) are commentaries on one official pūrvapakṣa 
verse, MHK 9.11. Therefore, we need to first look at the opponent’s verse in order to outline the 
structure of those five sections.  
[pāda ab:] This is the ancient splendid path that gods (such as Brahmā) and 
seers (such as Garga and Vasiṣṭha) rejoice in and learned people desire.  
[pāda cd:] It is reasonable that the Three is rejected by those people outside the 
Vedic fold, for example, women and Śudras (along with Buddhists).116  
According to TJ, the first two discussions are directed against the first line of the pūrvapakṣa 
verse (pāda ab),117 and the other three are against the second (pāda cd).118 And, although it is 
not marked as such in TJ, I further speculate that the first discussion is a response to the word 
“gods” (deva) and the second to the word “learned people” (śiṣṭa).119 This division of the first 
two discussions is based on their content; the purpose of the first is to discredit, morally and 
intellectually, the three gods, namely, Brahmā, Śiva, and Viṣṇu, while the purpose of the second 
is to ridicule the illogic of presupposing the existence of a Creator God. This may be taken as 
mockery of “learned people” for having such a ridiculous idea. Viewed in this way, the first two 
independent discussions are to deny the prestige of the celebrated beings of Hindu tradition (gods 
and orthodox Brahmins) by revealing their moral and intellectual defects. 
                                                 
116 MHK 9,11, “devarṣijuṣṭaśiṣṭeṣṭaṃ purāṇaṃ vartma śobhanam/ vedārthabāhyaiḥ strīśūdrair yuktaṃ 
yat tyajyate trayī//”; additions in parentheses are based on the TJ commentary on the verse. See TJ 
D276b3-5. 
117 As he introduces the first verse of the first independent discussion (MHK 9.59) in TJ, Bhāviveka 
quotes the first quarter (pāda a) of MHK 9.11 and says that he will first focus his criticism on that part of 
the verse. TJ D290b3, “drang srong lhas bsten dam pas 'dod/ (9.11a) ces bya ba la sogs pa'i phyogs snga 
ma'i lan brjod par bya ba'i phyir smras pa.” 
118 As he introduces the first verse of the third independent discussion (MHK 9.120) in TJ, Bhāviveka 
quotes the last two quarters (pāda cd) of MHK 9.11 and says that from that point on he will direct his 
critique to that second half of the verse. TJ D305b2-3, “phyi rol dmangs rigs bud med gzugs/ 'dzin pas 
rigs ldan gsum 'di spangs// (9.11cd) zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras pa de yang skyon dang bcas pa nyid yin 
pas, spong pa nyid yin gyi ma brtags pa ni ma yin no zhes bstan pa'i phyir.” 
119 See Deshpande (1993a) and (2009) for an analysis of the term “śiṣṭa” as understood in the tradition of 
Sanskrit Grammarians.  
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 The other three discussions, on the other hand, seek to demonstrate that it is indeed 
reasonable for everyone—that is, not just women, Śudras, and Buddhists—to reject the Veda. 
They can be also viewed as arguing that the Brahmins’ derogatory use of those social labels 
(Śudra, woman, and Buddhist) in the pūrvapakṣa verse is unfounded. There is a long discussion 
on the equality of the four castes in TJ right before the third discussion,120 and the latter three 
discussions point out the absurdity of Vedic doctrines from the Buddhist perspective. In this 
manner, the derogatory labels of Śudra and Buddhist are contested. However, there is no 
argument given against the Brahmins’ neglect of women.  
 
2.4.1. The First Independent Discussion (MHK 9.59-93): The Hindu trinity is morally 
and intellectually defective. 
The first discussion contains Bhāviveka’s thoughts on the three major Hindu gods—Brahmā, 
Viṣṇu, and Śiva—who collectively form one entity, with three aspects of creating, maintaining, 
and destroying the world (trimūrti). Given that the entire discussion is provoked by the 
Mīmāṃsaka argument that “the Vedic path is rejoiced in by gods,” it is interesting that 
Bhāviveka takes the word “gods” (deva) to mean Hindu gods rather than Vedic gods. 
Bhāviveka’s attack on the Hindu gods indeed does not seem to be appropriate for the atheist 
Mīmāṃsakas. It seems all the more unlikely for this section to be anti-Mīmāṃsaka, given that 
the introductory verse of the discussion refers to the three gods as the authors of the Veda 
(trayīmārgapraṇetṛ). The nature of this discussion may have originated in Bhāviveka’s peculiar 
notion of the Veda, which we shall discuss later.121  
                                                 
120 TJ D304a3-305b2. 
121 See 2.5.1 The Second Independent Discussion: The Mīmāṃsakas are not the sole opponent in MHK 9 
(1). 
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 The entire discussion can be divided into three parts, in which Bhāviveka discusses 
Śiva’s evil behavior (63-5), Viṣṇu’s evilness and the abstract conception of him (66-86), and the 
unity of the three and their inability to protect dharma (87-93). Apart from a passing remark at 
MHK 9.63, Bhāviveka only touches on Brahmā’s evilness in TJ; on MHK 9.59, he portrays 
Brahmā as evil because of his incestuous desire for his granddaughters.122  
  After a set of contextual pūrva-uttarapakṣas that confirms that bad karma cannot be 
removed even with supernatural powers (60-2), Bhāviveka lists the evil deeds of Śiva (śūlin). He 
fell in love with Tilottamā (63), burned down the city of Tripura, and hurt Pūṣan’s teeth and 
Bhaga’s eyes at the Dakṣa’s sacrifice (64). He killed Brahmā, drinks liquor, and is full of sexual 
desire (65). According to TJ, each verse respectively shows that Śiva possesses the three poisons 
of passion, hatred and ignorance.   
 Bhāviveka tries to prove the same for Viṣṇu. He (keśava, hari) robbed demons of their 
lives and riches (66), stole others’ women and wealth, drank liquor, and killed living beings as 
savages and robbers do (67). If he commits such evil acts to protect dharma (dharmagupti; 68) as 
some say, he should stop stealing others’ wives and wealth (69). Occasions of adharma must be 
created by Viṣṇu himself and this shows his ignorance of the consequences of such creation. If he 
protected the world with desire, he would be a slave of desire. He cannot protect the world out of 
compassion, since he would be deceiving the world by making it suffer (71). Lastly, seeing 
Viṣṇu’s discrimination against Asuras, it cannot be assumed that he is a compassionate. (72). 
How can Hari who commits evil deeds motivated by the three poisons be called the “best among 
man” (puruṣottama)? (73) 
 Having thus impugned the morality of Viṣṇu, Bhāviveka introduces another abstract 
form (mūrti) of him that surpasses being (sattva), non-being (asattva), and both being and non-
                                                 
122 See TJ D291a5-292a1. 
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being (sadasattva); upon seeing it, an ascetic (yati) becomes liberated (74-5). In his review of 
this “superior” (parā) form of Hari, Bhāviveka questions the logic of such a conception of him. 
This abstract form cannot be different from his lower forms, namely, the ten avatāras, nor can it 
be the same (76-7). As he is inexpressible, he cannot be called “superior”; as he is not existent, 
he is not the “cause” (kāraṇa); and, as he is not even born, he is not “immortal” (acyuta) (78-9). 
If the immortal one is a being, he would perish and if he is a non-being, he is non-existent, like a 
flower in the sky. He cannot be conceived contradictorily as being both being and non-being. He 
is said to be inexpressible like the notion of “Ātman”; in both cases, they cannot be described as 
“inexpressible” (anabhilāpya) as long as they have such appellations (80-2).  
 Bhāviveka concludes the section on Viṣṇu by rejecting the possibility of the liberation of 
the devotees of Hari (haribhakta). They cannot be liberated by seeing avatāras fabricated only to 
save the world in emergencies. Nor can they be liberated by practicing their yoga, that is, by 
retracting their senses like a turtle and reciting “Oṃ.” This is because the vision of Hari 
(haridarśana) is a conceptual thought (parikalpitā dhī) (80-4). 
 Toward the end of the discussion, Bhāviveka treats the three gods collectively. He points 
out that they are not free from the three poisons (87) and notes that to be a protector of dharma, it 
is necessary either to teach the true dharma or to achieve liberation oneself (88). He then argues 
that the unity of those three gods is impossible, given the discrepancies among their scriptures 
(89-91ab). He concludes by declaring that the three Hindu gods cannot be regarded as protectors 
of dharma since they do not teach the right dharma and their spiritual achievements are inferior 
(91cd-93). 
 
2.4.2. The Second Independent Discussion (MHK 9.94-119): The notion of a Creator 
    66 
God and Śaiva tantric methods of liberation are absurd. 
The second independent discussion can be divided into two parts based on the subjects of 
discussion. In the first part (95-113), Bhāviveka reviews and criticizes various characteristics 
attributed to the notion of God (īśvara). Though this part may be directed against the Śaiva 
(Bhāviveka calls God by the name of “Rudra” in verse 109), he does not mention the name of 
Śiva or other epithets and does not allude to other characteristics of him. Rather, the opponent’s 
views suggested in this part most resemble ideas contained in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, which 
exalts Rudra as the monotheistic God. The second part (114-8), on the contrary, is explicitly 
directed against the Śaiva; as he begins this part, in TJ, Bhāviveka remarks that he proceeds to 
criticize the “teachings of the Śaiva Tantra” (shi ba’i rgyud; or the Śivatantra?). 
 Bhāviveka opens the discussion by declaring that the Veda is filled with illogical 
doctrines (ayuktiyukta) (94). Then, having referred to the relevant discussion in chapter three of 
MHK (tattvajñānaiṣaṇā), he states that he will review the notion of the Creator God (95). God 
cannot be the creator of Self (ātman) and dharma and adharma. Neither the body of beings at 
present nor the body of beings at the beginning of the kalpa are created by him; these are only a 
result of past deeds (96-98). 
 In a series of nine verses, Bhāviveka reviews the opponent’s conception of God. God’s 
power cannot be caused by merit (puṇyakṛta), as it would make him dependent upon meritorious 
deeds (99). It cannot be uncaused (akasmāt) either, since, then, there would be no difference 
between him and others (100). If God’s essence lies in his consciousness (jñasvabhāva), 
everything in the world would be endowed with consciousness, since the product resembles the 
producer (101). By the same reasoning, if God is the cause (hetu) of the world, the world should 
possess eight supernatural powers such as the ability to become as small as an atom (aṇiman) 
(102). If he is the actual doer (karmakartṛ) of all beings’ acts, it is he, instead of others, who 
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should be tormented in hell (103). Suffering would not cease, since the cause of it, God, is 
eternal (nitya) (104), and it is not reasonable to assume that God, the unitary being (eka), has 
manifold functions (105). In short, God is a conglomerate of curious ideas, viz. that he is eternal, 
partless (anavayava), subtle (sūkṣma), and the cause of the world (106). Finally, if creation were 
the play (krīḍā) of God, he would be not God since he would depend on the sense of pleasure 
(107). 
 Then follows a series of mocking verses. Bhāviveka pays homage to Rudra, whose name 
is fitting to his nature: he is the one who enjoys observing the miserable state of animals, hell 
beings, and humans (108-9). Nonsensical phenomena prevail in the world of his creation, for 
example, the vile are wealthy and the righteous live like parasites (110-2). Only karma accounts 
for the variety of the world, and, for the reasons stated thus far, the other two gods, viz. Brahmā 
and Viṣṇu (kṛṣṇa), cannot also be held as the Creator (sṛṣṭikartṛ) (113). 
 The second part of this independent discussion demonstrates that the soteriological 
scheme of the Śaiva tantra is wrong. Bhāviveka lays it out as follows: one restricts the senses, 
fixes the mind on Śiva, meditates on the syllable of “Oṃ,” holds attention at the heart, and, with 
the mind thus concentrated, repeatedly meditates on an object such as earth. Then, when Śiva 
(īśa) is pleased, a yogin would conquer death (114-5). Bhāviveka flatly dismisses the possibility 
of liberation through such practice. Liberation is not possible as long as there is an awareness in 
the mind (116) and as long as the devotee enjoys the vision of Śiva (sthāṇudarśana) (117). The 
suffering that a Śaiva yogin strives to end cannot be counteracted as long as the cause of that 
suffering is the eternal lord (118).  
 To conclude, Bhāviveka states that the illogicality of the Śaiva is common to other 
advocates of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Ātman, and therefore, intellectual delight must not be taken in 
the notions of God (īśa) and the like (119).  
    68 
  
2.4.3. The Third Independent Discussion (MHK 9.120-126): Sin cannot be washed 
away or transferred to others. 
The remaining three independent discussions have the common purpose of proving that Buddhist 
rejection of the Veda is not unfounded. The three initial verses of the discussions express this 
common purpose by having the same second line: “as one witnesses such and such bad teachings 
in the Veda, it is reasonable that the Veda is rejected” (dṛṣṭvā durvihitaṃ trayyāṃ yuktaṃ yat 
tyajate trayī).  
 The third independent discussion argues for two things: First, it is unreasonable to 
assume that sin (pāpa) can be washed away with water. Second, it is unreasonable to assume that 
karma can be transferred to others, like buying and selling goods (120). 
 Bhāviveka first characterizes sin as something that cannot be touched, seen, or 
moistened; it is placed in the mind as a dispositional impression (vāsanā). Thus, it cannot be 
washed away with water (121). Thus, even water from the Puṣkara and Gāṅgā cannot eliminate 
sin just as sewage water at home cannot (122). If one could wash away sin, those born with sin, 
such as the blind and deaf, would no longer suffer (123). It is just absurd to imagine that one 
commits a sin and removes it by bathing at the sacred bathing place (tīrtha). In that case, there 
would be no sinners at all. By extension, the opponent’s opinion that it is ātman inside that is 
purified by water is also wrong (124). 
 Sin (pāpa) cannot be transferred to others, as it is amorphous, just as the three poisons 
are not transferable (125). It is not reasonable to suppose that one can give merit (puṇya) to 
others or take it from them; karma is something bound to one’s own mind like pleasure and pain 
(126). 
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2.4.4. The Fourth Independent Discussion (MHK 9.127-138): Self-mortification is 
useless and the Buddhist practice of eating meat is not to be censured. 
The fourth independent discussion is peculiar. Midway through it, the topic is diverted from the 
Hindus’ extreme form of self-mortification to the Buddhist meat-eating practice. In accordance 
with the shift of the topic, Bhāviveka changes his offensive tone to an apologetic one as the 
discussion proceeds.  
  As we can see in the initial verse that criticizes the Hindu practice of jumping into a fire 
in order to reach the world of Brahmā, the opponent in this section is the ascetics (127). 
Bhāviveka points out that jumping into a fire (agniprapāta) only harms one’s life instead of 
bringing about the attainment of Brahmā’s world (128) and refers to another ascetic practice of 
abstaining from food and drink (annapānaparityāga) for the sake of heaven (129). He further 
notes that renunciation is not in itself meritorious (130); what is important is to renounce evil, 
and eating food in itself is not evil (131).  
 In the subsequent TJ commentary, Bhāviveka specifies the Mahābhārata (rgyas byed) as 
the scripture that endorses and propounds the ascetic practice of fasting and quotes fifteen verses 
from it to show the inner contradictions among them. At the end of the quotations, he introduces 
an outsider’s critique of Buddhist meat eating. Then, even on the kārikā level, the discussion 
suddenly turns into an apologetic for Buddhist meat-eating. As he alludes to the scripture of 
Śrāvakayāna (nyan thos kyi theg pa’i gzhung), Bhāviveka states that it not sinful to eat meat that 
is pure in terms of three points. That is, if the eater has not seen, heard, or wondered whether a 
living being was killed for the sake of himself or herself, it is not demeritorious to eat meat 
(132). Eating meat is not motivated by evil intention and is only to counteract hunger (133). 
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Meat is not an impure object (134) and, likewise, fish is not impure (135). Ascetics (dka’ thub) 
who accuse Buddhists of killing because they eat meat do not have a conclusive argument that 
meat eating is sinful since the ascetics themselves kill by wearing animal skin (136). Moreover, 
by eating meat, one does not impose pain on any living being (137). Meat-eating is not the cause 
of passion as some might argue; passion arises even in grass-eating cows (138). 
 
2.4.5. The Fifth Independent Discussion (MHK 9.139-147): Trees do not have 
consciousness. 
The last independent discussion accuses the Veda of the ill-formulated teaching that immobile 
insentient plants have consciousness (caitanya) (139). From the Buddhist perspective, trees 
(taru) are not included in the four categories of beings: those born from eggs, from wombs, from 
moisture, and born spontaneously. Even when they are cut right in half, they do not tremble 
(140). If mimosa trees are claimed to have consciousness because they fold their leaves (141), 
one may note that a hair, an apparently insentient object, also coils itself up in the vicinity of fire 
(142). Trees cannot be asserted to have consciousness because they heal; even liquor that has 
gone bad can be restored (143). One may further argue for the sentience of trees based on the 
following five reasons: they beget the same species, they grow old, they have a feeling of enmity 
(or longing), they are born in a specific season, and they sleep. However, one may find counter 
examples that would make each of the reasons unestablished or inconclusive (144-6). Trees of 
this world, like sword trees in hell or jewel trees in heaven, are born from the karma of sentient 
beings (147). 
 Before proceeding to reply to the next pūrvapakṣa verse (MHK 9.12), Bhāviveka inserts 
a set of contextual pūrva-uttarapakṣas and considers the claim that the Veda is truthful since it is 
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taught either by Brahmā or ancient seers. TJ unambiguously attributes this claim to the 
Mīmāṃsakas (dpyod pa pa) (148). Brahmā’s teaching, Bhāviveka answers, may be erroneous, 
just as Prajāpati’s teaching is (149). Even if one come across some truthful words, it does not 
follow that all his words are truthful since the words of cowherds and madmen’s words are 
sometimes true (150). The seers’ supernatural knowledge of the past and future does not cover all 
of the past and future, like that of pretas and others (151). 
 
2.5 Is Bhāviveka’s Critique Directed against the Fifth Veda? Measuring the Mīmāṃsaka-
ness of the Independent Discussions 
We have thus sketched the structure and contents of MHK 9. In so doing, we have discerned 
three components that constitute the chapter as a whole and have attempted to delineate, on the 
most general level, the main arguments. With this general picture of the chapter in mind, let us, 
in this and the next section, review previous opinions on the identity of Bhāviveka’s opponent in 
MHK 9. Just as the contents of the two parts of MHK 9, the official pūrva-uttarapakṣas and the 
independent discussions, are outlined separately, we shall divide scholars’ opinions into two 
groups according to the parts of MHK 9 they base their claims on. To my knowledge, there has 
been no argument on the identity of the opponent in MHK 9 that considers both parts of the 
chapter. We begin by reviewing the opinions formulated based on the independent discussions. 
 
2.5.1 The Second Independent Discussion: The Mīmāṃsakas are not the sole opponent 
of MHK 9 (1) 
The independent discussions are quite distinctive from the official pūrva-uttarapakṣas in terms 
of their topics of discussion. Their subject matter is conspicuously Hindu in nature. The Hindu 
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trinity of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva that are the main object of criticism in the first two 
discussions are not only foreign to Mīmāṃsā, they are to the Veda as well. Criticisms of ablution 
in the sacred tīrthas, fasting, and the belief in the sentience of trees seem to be made in reference 
to Hindus in general rather than the Mīmāṃsakas.  
 Inclusion of those discussions on apparently “Hindu” topics in the chapter devoted to 
Mīmāṃsā has led scholars either to discredit Bhāviveka as a historical informant or to 
inappropriately attribute certain ideas presented in the independent discussions to the 
Mīmāṃsakas. Nicholson’s remark represents the first inclination. In the context of discussing 
Bhāviveka’s MHK as one of the earliest instances of doxography in India,123 Nicholson (2010, 
152), in reference to the second independent discussion, states: 
Bhāviveka begins with the two schools that he elsewhere maintained do have 
some soteriological usefulness, the Hīnayāna and Yogācāra schools. Like most 
Indian polemicists, his portrayal of his opponents is not always reliable as a 
historical source. For instance, he ascribes to Mīmāṃsā the belief that a God 
created the world, when in fact most recorded schools of Mīmāṃsā are 
atheistic.  
Nicholson’s statement is problematic since Bhāviveka nowhere attributes the notion of the 
Creator God to the Mīmāṃsakas. As the fixed phrase common to all the introductory verses of 
the independent discussions that marks them as such clearly expresses (“[therefore,] it is 
reasonable that the Three (that is, the Veda) is rejected”), Bhāviveka’s criticism in those 
discussions is directed at the Veda rather than the Mīmāṃsakas. Using criticism of the Veda 
against the Mīmāṃsakas is justifiable since the ultimate objective of their project is to defend the 
authority of the Veda and its sacrificial norm. Bhāviveka may freely attack the value most 
cherished by the opponent, regardless of how the Mīmāṃsakas seek to safeguard it.  
                                                 
123 Due to the polemical nature of Bhāviveka’s work immanent in the pūrva-uttarapakṣa structure, 
Nicholson (2010, 154) refrains “from labeling the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā as a doxography, in spite of 
its obvious importance to historians.” 
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 The real problem lies instead in the fact that the contents of the Veda that Bhāviveka 
refers to do not belong to the Veda as we know it. The second independent discussion based on 
which Nicholson made this statement begins with the critique of the idea that God (īśvara) 
created the world (jagat). As noted, this may be a critique of one of the Upaniṣads, namely, the 
Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad,124 which is regarded as a forerunner of the later Śaiva tradition (Flood 
1996, 153 and 2003, 205). There Bhāviveka (94-113) refers to God only with the word “īśvara,” 
and in one instance, he calls him Rudra (109). The characteristics that Bhāviveka lists, such as 
being eternal (nitya), unitary (eka), and the cause (kāraṇa) also match those of Rudra eulogized 
in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. If Bhāviveka indeed had that specific Upaniṣad in mind in that 
section, his critique is in accordance with the objective he announces in the introductory verse, 
that is, showing the rationality of rejecting the Veda.  
 However, Bhāviveka speaks of eight masteries (siddhi) of Śiva (102) and, as he 
introduces MHK 9.114, he explicitly proclaims that, from that verse on, he shall examine one 
specific doctrine of the Śaiva Tantric tradition: “In order to prove that the teaching of 
Dhyānayoga (bsam gtan gyi rnal ’byor) of the Śaiva Tantra (shi ba’i rgyud) is also unreasonable, 
the following has been stated.”125 Therefore, in the second independent discussion, Bhāviveka, 
although he sets his own objective to reveal that the Veda is filled with irrational doctrines 
(ayuktiyukta), what he really examines there is the Śaiva notion of God and the Śaiva 
soteriological scheme. And he does not conceal this fact.  
 I think the discomfort we feel in Bhāviveka’s act of criticizing the Śaiva doctrines while 
calling them Vedic, or his act of confusing the Veda with the Śaiva scriptures, is due to his 
peculiar notion of the Veda expressed in the commentary on the last verse of the discussion. 
                                                 
124 For the text and translation of the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad, see Olivelle (1998, 414-433). 
125 TJ D303a5-6, “shi ba’i rgyud las bstan pa’i bsam gtan gyi rnal ’byor yang mi rigs pa nyid du bsgrub 
pa’i phyir smras pa.” 
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There, Bhāviveka states that with the refutation of the Śaivas’ Dhyānayoga, others—the 
advocates of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Ātman—are also refuted (119ab) and declares that intellectual 
delight is not to be taken in the notion of God and so forth (īśādi) since they are irrational 
(ayukta) (119cd).126 TJ, commenting on the second line of the verse focusing on the expression 
“and so forth” (ādi), lists the objects with which one should not be delighted:  
Therefore, as their tenets are faulty, we do not take pleasure in Brahmā, Viṣṇu, 
Maheśvara, and the tenets of the Veda that they follow and teach either.127 
This elaboration of “and so forth” includes the tenets of the Veda (rig byed kyi grub pa'i mtha') 
and they are qualified as something followed and taught by the three Hindu gods. The 
subsequent passage of TJ is interesting in that Bhāviveka, as if he expects the reader’s immediate 
objection to such a qualification of the Veda, presents his thoughts about it. 
The fourfold division of the Veda and the like is not reasonable either. Its 
divisional system proposed in the works such as the Essence of the 
Mahābhārata (the Mahābhāratasāra?) is not reasonable either. Why? It is 
because the Veda is one. It is because it is nothing other than Prajāpati. It is 
because it is born from [his] mouth, shoulder, thigh, and feet. For example, it is 
like the following case. Panasa fruits of a Panasa tree hanging on its trunk, 
branches, root, and twigs are not different; they are same.128  
In this passage, Bhāviveka refuses to acknowledge the ordinary division of the Veda into the four 
Vedas, namely, the Ṛg, Sāma, Yajur, and Atharva. It is not only that that standard division of the 
Veda is denied. Bhāviveka is not willing to accept any sort of “division” of the Veda, including 
                                                 
126 MHK 9.119, “etena śeṣāḥ pratyuktā brahmaviṣṇvātmavādinaḥ/ prītiś caivam ayuktatvān neśādau 
dhīyate dhiyaḥ//” 
127 TJ D303b7–304a1, “des na grub pa’i mtha’ skyon can yin pa’i phyir, kho bo cag ni tshangs pa dang 
khyab ’jug dang dbang phyug chen po dang de dag gis nye bar brten cing bstan pa’i rig byed kyi grub 
pa’i mtha’ la yang dga’ bar mi byed pa yin no.” 
128 TJ D304a1-3, “rigs bzhi’i dbye ba la sogs pa yang mi rigs la. rgyas byed kyi snying po la sogs pa las 
de’i dbye ba’i tshig ’byung ba yang mi rigs te. gang gi phyir, rigs gcig nyid yin te. skye dgu’i bdag po las 
gzhan ma yin pa’i phyir. kha dang dpung pa dang brla dang rkang pa las skyes pa yin pa’i phyir. dper na 
pa na sa’i shing gi sdong po dang yal ga dang rtsa ba dang yal ga phre’u la sogs pa las byung ba’i pa na 
sa’i ’bras bu ni gzhan ma yin te, gcig pa nyid yin pa bzhin no.” 
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the proposal of the *Mahābhāratasāra, because the Veda is one. However, this does not imply 
that Bhāviveka considers the Veda to be a single text. When he speaks of the “oneness” of the 
Veda, Bhāviveka points to the oneness of the source shared by plural texts rather than confining 
the term “Veda” to a certain individual text. For that shared source, Bhāviveka refers to a certain 
cosmogonic narrative, resembling the Puruṣasūkta (Ṛg Veda 10.90), according to which all 
Vedas came from the body of the Vedic creator Prajāpati. Then he provides felicitous imagery to 
explain what he means by the “oneness” of the Veda. Just as fruits dangling on any parts of a 
Panasa tree are commonly called Panasa fruits, any text, as long as it shares the common origin, 
can be called a Veda.  
 The second independent discussion, along with the other independent discussions, awaits 
future research that would compare its contents with other relevant materials both within and 
without Buddhist literature. Only an in-depth study from the comparative perspective would 
enable us to confidently identify the opponent in this section, and thereby, to locate it properly in 
the history of Buddhist polemics against outsiders. However, with reservations, we may observe 
that Bhāviveka engages with Śaiva doctrines and soteriology and would expect that, based on 
this observation, future research would illuminate the identity of the specific trend or sect among 
the various Śaiva traditions being examined in the second independent discussion.129 We cannot 
simply disregard Bhāviveka, based on this portion of text, as being “not always reliable as a 
historical source” simply because such theistic contents are included in the “Mīmāṃsā” chapter. 
For Bhāviveka, the Veda, for which the Mīmāṃsakas aspire to be the foremost saviors, includes 
those texts putatively attributed to Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva. In this regard, he may have found an 
                                                 
129 In this regard, Eltschinger (2014, 91, fn. 219) leaves a valuable note: “The Mīmāṃsā chapter (= 9) of 
Bhāviveka’s MHK is replete with allusions to and criticism of sectarian Hindu beliefs and practices. 
Alexis Sanderson kindly informs me that MHK 9.62 and 9.114-115 paraphrase PSū [=the Pāśupatasūtra] 
5.20, 4.4-5, 5.37 and 25, and 5.40.” 
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opportunity in MHK 9 to criticize, along with the Mīmāṃsakas, those who elevate purānic and 
tantric texts ascribed to those gods to the prestigious status of the Veda or those who argue that, 
like those “extra-Vedic” texts, the Veda itself was composed by those Hindu gods.  
 
2.5.2 The Fourth Independent Discussion: The Mīmāṃsakas are not the sole opponent 
of MHK 9 (2) 
Some scholars, based on the independent discussions, have attributed a seemingly non-
Mīmāṃsaka doctrine to the Mīmāṃsakas. For example, Kawasaki (1985)’s pioneering study and 
translation of part of the fourth independent discussion assumes that the opponent in that section 
is the Mīmāṃsakas. In so doing, whether he intends it or not, he eventually ascribes the 
opponent’s arguments to the Mīmāṃsakas.   
 The fourth independent discussion, as summarized above, first discusses ascetic 
practices such as jumping into a fire and abstaining from food and drink, and then proceeds to 
defend the meat-eating of Buddhists. Kawasaki’s paper focuses on the second “meat-eating” part 
of the discussion; his general understanding differs from mine because he states that Bhāviveka 
“shows a negative attitude toward meat-eating, as is natural thing for a sixth century Indian 
Mahāyāna Buddhist.” (ibid., 174-5) This is contrary to my reading of the text, but I will not enter 
into the details of the problem here. What I would like to note is that Kawasaki, with no 
justification, presupposes Bhāviveka’s opponent to be a Mīmāṃsaka, as shown in the following 
passage in which he attempts to reconcile the obvious anti-vegetarian arguments of Bhāviveka 
with his assessment that Bhāviveka maintains a negative stance toward meat-eating. 
It is only because the opponent of this chapter [=MHK 9] is the Mīmāṃsakas 
who approve of animal sacrifice in a ritual setting and because he 
[=Bhāviveka] discusses the topic of meat-eating with such Mīmāṃsakas solely 
from a logical viewpoint that he manifests a tone in the arguments different 
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from the anti-meat-eating arguments of Chinese and Japanese Buddhists who 
advocate morality by emphasizing the spirit of compassion.130 
There is an internal contradiction in this passage. The purpose of the whole passage is to explain 
why a sixth-century Indian Buddhist, Bhāviveka, presents different, that is, anti-vegetarian 
arguments that are not found in East Asian Buddhist tradition. Kawasaki lists the Mīmāṃsaka 
identity of the opponent and the polemical context of Bhāviveka’s arguments as the first reason. 
That is to say, it is because of the fact that Bhāviveka’s argues against the Mīmāṃsakas who 
allow bloody sacrifices that Bhāviveka demonstrates an anti-vegetarian tendency, which is in fact 
unnatural to him. However, does it make sense to argue against vegetarianism with those who 
slaughter animals in their rituals?  
 That the opponent is not a Mīmāṃsaka in the anti-vegetarianism section is hinted at 
when the fourth independent discussion turns from the criticism of absurd austere practices to 
defense of the Buddhist meat diet. After having denounced the opponent’s thesis that fasting is 
meritorious (9.130cd-131), in TJ on MHK 9.131, Bhāviveka presents another point of attack, 
namely, internal inconsistencies in the scripture of the opponent. And the scripture of the 
opponent in this context is, as Bhāviveka identifies, the Mahābhārata (rgyas byed).131 The 
Tibetan word rgyas byed has been in fact identified as the Mahābhārata by Kawasaki (1992b, 
140-1) himself in reference to this same text.  
 To illustrate his points, Bhāviveka quotes fifteen verses from the Mahābhārata and 
divides them into four groups so that he can demonstrate the internal contradictions within each 
group. For example, in the last group of Mahābhārata quotes, Bhāviveka first cites a verse that 
urges one to fight and die on the battlefield, and promises a heavenly abode to the warrior. Then 
                                                 
130 Kawasaki (1985, 175); translated from Japanese.  
131 TJ D308a5, “Since there is the following contradiction between the former and later parts in [your] 
scripture, that is, the Mahābharata, it [i.e., your pro-fasting argument] is not rational.” (rgyas byed la sogs 
pa’i lung las ’di ltar snga phyi ’gal ba yang yod pas, rigs pa ma yin te.) 
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he contrasts that verse with another verse that warns that one who does harm to others will fall 
into a hell. Finally, he quotes the famous Golden Rule, “do not do to others what is not agreeable 
to oneself” (na tat parasya saṃdadyāt pratikūlaṃ yad ātmanaḥ).132 I could only identify four 
verses among the fifteen from the Mahābhārata,133 but it is significant that all four are from 
Mahābhārata Books 12 (Śāntiparvan) and 13 (Anuśāsanaparvan), which espouse Brahmanical 
renunciatory values (esp., ahiṃsā) sometimes overlaid with the Sāṃkhya-Yoga metaphysics 
(esp., the Mokṣadharma).  
   The immediate response of the opponent to this critique also reveals that the opponent is 
an upholder of that portion of the Mahābhārata. 
Even though Buddhists are sarcastic toward others and criticize others while 
thinking “we are abiding by dharma,” it is well known that they themselves 
make a great effort to eat meat. One cannot obtain meat without killing the life 
of sentient beings, and in this respect, they [the meat-eating Buddhists] are 
devoid of compassion. Therefore, they, like animal hunters, commit sin.134  
Here we encounter the “no meat without killing” logic, which Alsdorf (2010[1962]) finds at 
Mahābhārata 13.116.26.135 However, this logic is not merely declared in passing in that one 
verse. In the subsequent verses, it is paraphrased (“the killer kills a living being for the sake of 
                                                 
132 Mahābhārata 13.114.8ab. It is translated in TJ D308b7-309a1 as “rang la rjes su mi mthun pa, de ni 
gzhan la mi bya ste.” 
133 The second quote (TJ D308a6-7) corresponds to the Mahābhārata 12.214.4 and 13.93.4, the fifth (TJ 
D308b1) to 12.236.10, the ninth (TJ D308b3) to 12.80.17, and the fifteenth (TJ D308b7-309a1) to 
13.114.8. The numbering of the Mahābhārata is be noted according to the Critical Edition. For Book 12 
and 13 see Belvalkar (1948-1954) and Dandekar (1966), respectively. 
134 TJ D309a1-2, “sangs rgyas pa ni ’di ltar bdag nyid chos la gnas pa yin no snyam du sems shing gzhan 
la kha zer zhing dmod par byed kyang, rang nyid sha za ba la ’bad pa cher byed par grags la; sems can 
srog ma bcad par ni sha rnyed par mi ’gyur bas, des na snying rje dang bral ba yin pa’i phyir, ri dwags 
kyi rngon pa la sogs pa bzhin du sdig pa byed pa nyid yin no.” 
135 Mahābhārata 13.115.26 (acc. to Alsdorf’s numbering) [13.116.26 in the Critical Edition], “For flesh is 
certainly not produced from grass, wood or stone! Flesh comes from the killing of creatures, therefore it is 
a sin to eat it.” (na hi māṃsaṃ tṛṇāt kāṣṭhād upalād vāpi jāyate. hatvā jantuṃ tato māṃsam, tasmād 
doṣas tu bhakṣaṇe.); the text and translation are from Alsdorf (2010, 3, fn.6) 
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the eater”136 and “killing of animals is done for the sake of the eater”137), and the positive 
propositions are explicitly drawn from that logic (“if there is no eater, then there would be no 
killer”138 and “if it [=meat] is prohibited from eating, killing would cease”139). Such logic is 
further employed to accuse not only the [meat-]eater (khādaka) but also the buyer (krāyaka) of 
the sin of killing (vadha).140 
 The non-Mīmāṃsaka identity of Bhāviveka’s opponent is also reflected in Bhāviveka’s 
arguments themselves throughout the section, since most of the opponent’s arguments that he 
critically examines are found in the Mahābhārata 13.114-117 in which “the most detailed 
treatment of the theme of ahiṃsā and vegetarianism is located” (Alsdorf 2010, 34). In one verse 
formulated directly against the opponent’s “no meat without killing” thesis quoted above, 
Bhāviveka explicitly reveals that the opponent is not a “householder-oriented” Mīmāṃsaka but 
an ascetic.  
If you think eating meat is [tantamount to] killing a living being on the basis of 
that reason, then your reason would be inconclusive because of [the counter 
example of] wearing animal skin.141   
The verse does not respond to the critic’s point. Instead, Bhāviveka turns it on the opponent for 
wearing leather. TJ elaborates on his logic: “If there is no ascetic (dka' thub) who wears animal 
skin, there would be no killing of [animals] such as Śarabha.”142 Therefore, when all the 
evidence is considered, it is reasonable to conclude that the opponent in the anti-vegetarianism 
                                                 
136 Mahābhārata 13.116.29cd, “ghātakaḥ khādakārthāya taṃ ghātayati vai naraḥ/”  
137 Mahābhārata 13.116.30cd, “khādakārtham ato hiṃsā mṛgādīnāṃ pravartate/” 
138 Mahābhārata 13.116.29ab, “yadi cet khādako na syān na tadā ghātako bhavet/” 
139 Mahābhārata 13.116.30ab, “abhakṣyam etad iti vā iti hiṃsā nivartate/” 
140 Mahābhārata 13.116.37-8, “yo hi khādati māṃsāni prāṇināṃ jīvitārthinām/ hatānāṃ vā mṛtānāṃ vā 
yathā hantā tathaiva saḥ// dhanena krāyako hanti khādakaś copabhogataḥ/ ghātako vadhabandhābhyām 
ity eṣa trividho vadhaḥ//” 
141 MHK 9.136, “māṃsādaḥ prāṇighātī cet tannimittatvato mataḥ/ ajinādidharair hetoḥ syād evaṃ 
vyabhicāritā//” 
142 TJ D310a2-3, “gang pags pa la sogs pa thogs pa’i dka’ thub med na, sha ra ba la sogs pa gsod par 
yang mi ’gyur ro.” 
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section of MHK 9 is not the Mīmāṃsakas but, rather, Brahmanical renunciants who base their 
arguments on the 12th and 13th Books of the Mahābhārata.  
 
2.5.3 The Fifth Independent Discussion: The Mīmāṃsakas are not the sole opponent of 
MHK 9 (3) 
In his work, The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism, Schmithausen (1991) 
investigates the opinions of later Buddhist authors. He is drawn to the fifth independent 
discussion of MHK 9 in which Bhāviveka argues that trees do not have sentience (sacittakā hi 
taravo na).143 Schmithausen leaves numerous valuable philological notes along with rigorous 
identifications and explanations of the often unfathomable terms for various kinds of plants. As 
he commences his section on MHK 9, Schmithausen (ibid., 83-4) expresses a doubt about the 
Mīmāṃsaka identity of the opponent in the fifth independent discussion and suggests that:  
...whereas in the Madhyamakahṛdaya and in the Tarkajvālā the arguments are 
found in the chapter against the Mīmāṃsā,—the Brahmanic school of the 
methods of exegesis of Vedic ritual texts; but actually they are, perhaps, rather 
directed against Vedic texts (śruti) and the authoritative Brahmanic tradition 
(smṛti) themselves.144 
Schmithausen makes three observations in this passage. The first is that Bhāviveka’s arguments 
seem to be not against the Mīmāṃsakas to whom the chapter of MHK 9 is devoted. In the 
footnote,145 he states that he could not find “a pertinent discussion in an early (Pūrva-)Mīmāṃsā 
text.” As we have seen thus far, this is a problem for all the independent discussions. Second, he 
points out that Vedic texts might be the object of Bhāviveka’s criticism. In this regard, he quotes 
the introductory verse of the fifth independent discussion in which, along with all the other 
                                                 
143 from MHK 9.140; Schmithausen (1991, 79, fn. 443) reads it as “sacetanā hi taravo na.” 
144 Ibid. 83-4. 
145 See ibid., 83, fn. 467. 
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introductory verses of the independent discussions, Bhāviveka explicitly states that it is the Three 
(trayyī), the Veda, that is to be scrutinized in the subsequent section.146 Schmithausen also points 
to the former part of his study in which he collects from Vedic corpus “sufficient evidence that 
not only animals but also plants as well as seeds and even water and earth were, more or less 
naively, believed to be living and even sentient” (ibid., 3).147  
 Lastly, Schmithausen states that Bhāviveka’s discussion may be in reference to the smṛti 
texts. Quoting Kawasaki’s study, he lists smṛti texts such as the Manusmṛti and the 
Yājñavalkyasmṛti as examples of texts that contain arguments for the sentience of plants.148 Then 
he notes that the opponent’s argument contained in TJ on MHK 9.139 closely resemble the 
arguments presented in the Mahābhārata 12.177.10-8 “according to which plants are sentient 
beings like men, etc., because they have all the six senses (and the corresponding perceptions)” 
(ibid., 87-8, fn. 493). I do not wish to enter into in-depth analysis of the parallelism between the 
two works based on Schmithausen’s keen observation, but I would like to underline the fact that 
Bhāviveka’s opponent’s arguments in the fifth independent discussion are again, like those in the 
fourth one, found in the Mahābhārata, specifically, Book 12.  
 The portion of TJ upon which Schmithausen’s observation is based is not a quotation but 
a paraphrase of the opponent’s arguments, and therefore, there is a certain limitation in arguing 
that Bhāviveka is criticizing the doctrines of the Mahābhārata based on that passage. Toward the 
end of the fifth independent discussion, however, Bhāviveka seems to quote directly from the 
Mahābhārata and assume it to be the opponent’s scripture:  
[In your scripture] the following teaching is found: “Ahiṃsā is the supreme 
dharma” (’tshe ba med pa chos kyi mchog). Therefore, [for you,] if one always 
engages in the act of eating, then one comes to participate in injuring others 
                                                 
146 See ibid., 84, fn. 468. 
147 See the footnote (14) to this sentence. 
148 See ibid., 84, fn. 469. 
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(’tshe ba; Skt. hiṃsā); how can there be dharma? [Moreover,] how can one 
become liberated from saṃsāra? If those who aspire to liberation do not eat 
food, they would die. If they eat, since they injure living beings [by eating], the 
dharma would decline. Therefore, those who imagine that trees have sentience 
are tormenting themselves [by contradicting themselves].149    
In this passage, Bhāviveka supposes that his opponent is maintaining two incompatible positions. 
One is that plants are sentient, and this is the thesis that Bhāviveka refutes throughout the fifth 
independent discussion. The second position, which, he argues, contradicts the first, is that the 
value of “non-injury” (ahiṃsā) is the highest principle. It is not compatible to uphold both 
positions because if one is committed to the vow of ahiṃsā (non-killing of living beings) and, at 
the same time, regards even plants as endowed with life, then there is nothing that one can eat. 
To show the dilemma of the opponent, Bhāviveka quotes a sentence that must be a pāda (quarter) 
of a verse, since it has seven syllables in its Tibetan translation. I wonder whether it is a 
quotation from the Mahābhārata’s vegetarianism section (13.114-117) in which Bhīṣma 
emphasizes to Yudhiṣṭhira that “ahiṃsā is the supreme dharma” (ahiṃsā paramo dharmaḥ) at 
13.116.25a and 13.117.37a. With this evidence of a direct quotation, and given Schmithausen’s 
observation of the parallelism between MHK 9 and the Mahābhārata, I think it is reasonable to 
conclude that the opponent in the fifth independent discussion is, as it was the case in the fourth, 
advocates of the Mahābhārata, particularly Books 12 and 13, as their scripture.  
 In the process of reviewing previous scholars’ opinions on the identity of the opponent, 
each based on one of the independent discussions of MHK 9, we have thus far noted that 
Bhāviveka’s opponent in those discussions is not the Mīmāṃsakas. To arrive at a more accurate 
                                                 
149 TJ D315b3-4, “’tshe ba med pa chos kyi mchog ces bstan pa ’byung bas, des na kha zas kyi bya ba la 
rtag tu spyod pa na, ’tshe ba la ’jug pa nyid du ’gyur ba’i phyir, chos kyang ga la yod de? ’khor ba las ji 
ltar grol bar ’gyur te? thar pa ’dod pa rnams zas ma zos na ni ’chi bar ’gyur la, zos na ni srog chags la 
gnod par ’gyur bas chos nyams par ’gyur ro. des na ljon shing la sems yod par rtog pa ’dis ni bdag nyid 
la gnod pa byed pa yin no.” 
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picture of Bhāviveka’s opponent in that part of MHK 9, we need, first of all, to attend to a large 
number of quoted verses in TJ and compare them with the relevant Sanskrit literature. However, 
before undertaking the task, some guidelines for future research might be suggested. First, 
Bhāviveka seems to challenge the authority of scriptures promoted and labeled as the Veda by 
the advocates. Each introductory verse to the independent discussions makes it clear that 
Bhāviveka aims to denounce the Veda (trayyī). Second, Bhāviveka seems to be mainly concerned 
with two different kinds of the text—purānic and epic literature—which are not only claimed to 
be the “fifth Veda,” but the “Veda of the Vedas” (Pollock 1989, 610). The purāṇic texts seem to 
be involved in the first and second, that is, “theistic” independent discussions, while the 
Mahābhārata is deeply engaged in the remaining three independent discussions. However, we 
also need to consider the Śaiva Tantras as we pursue the investigation since Bhāviveka specially 
notes in the second part of the second independent discussion that he is criticizing the teaching of 
the Śaiva Tantra. Lastly, we need to imagine a group exclusively affiliated with the Books 12 and 
13 of the Mahābhārata as Bhāviveka’s opponent in the third, fourth, and fifth independent 
discussions. For the latter two discussions, we are on fairly solid ground although not all the 
quotations contained there have yet been identified with the Mahābhārata. As for the third 
independent discussion, although a close examination of its contents is still a desideratum, I 
suspect that Bhāviveka is criticizing the practice of ablution in the sacred rivers recommended in 
the Mahābharatā Book 13. 
 
2.6 Who is the Mīmāṃsaka in MHK 9? Measuring the Mīmāṃsaka-ness of the Official 
Pūrva-uttarapakṣas 
Apart from the independent discussions, the ideas being discussed and examined in the official 
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pūrva-uttarapakṣas seem to be, at least on first reading, Mīmāṃsaka doctrines. Encompassing 
several hallmark Mīmāṃsaka doctrines laid out especially in the Tarkapāda (Mīmāṃsāsūtra 
1.1.1-32) such as the authorlessness of the Veda (vedāpauruṣeyatva) and the eternality of words 
(śabdanityatva), the official pūrvapakṣas, the first seventeen verses of MHK 9, seem to be 
genuine Mīmāṃsaka claims, and Bhāviveka’s refutation of them, i.e., the official uttarapakṣas, 
appears to be addressed to them. Upon close reading, however, the Mīmāṃsaka arguments do 
not squarely fit the Mīmāṃsaka sources at our disposal. A systematic comparison of Bhāviveka’s 
report on the Mīmāṃsakas with the extant Mīmāṃsaka materials will be necessary in order to 
accurately map MHK 9 in the history of Indian philosophy. As a preliminary step toward that 
goal, in this section, I would like to review the previous opinions on this matter.  
 
 2.6.1 Is Bhāviveka’s Opponent Bhartṛhari? 
In a series of works, Kawasaki (1973, 1974, 1976, 1992a) examines the contents of the official 
pūrvapakṣas and presents his view on the identity of the opponent in MHK 9. Based on the 
Japanese translation of the verses of MHK 9.1-17 (1973, 1992a) together with the English 
translation of excerpts from TJ (1976), Kawasaki summarizes the opponent’s arguments in the 
official pūrvapakṣas in eight points: 1. sacrificial rituals are the sole means to achieve liberation, 
2. such rituals are exclusively defined by the Veda and all other teachings on dharma are based 
on the Veda, 3. the Veda is authorless because its author is not remembered and it has been 
transmitted without interruption, 4. words are eternal and they have eternal relations with their 
meanings, 5. the Veda is to be considered as an independent means of knowledge discrete from 
perception and inference, 6. the Veda is not to be criticized by the means of logic, and lastly, 7. 
an omniscient being does not exist.  
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 After having summarized the official pūrvapakṣas, Kawasaki (1973)150 observes that 
these points are again discussed later in Śāntarakṣita’s polemics against Kumārila, however, none 
of Bhāviveka’s seventeen verses are found in the former’s Tattvasaṃgraha or in the latter’s 
Ślokavārttika. He further remarks that, although Śabara’s commentary on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra 
includes discussions of Bhāviveka’s opponent’s agendas, each of the terms that the latter uses 
and the arguments that he makes for the most part do not coincide with those of the 
Śābarabhāṣya. On the basis of these two facts, each of which excludes Kumārila and Śabara as 
the possible candidate for Bhāviveka’s opponent, Kawasaki calls for a third, albeit unknown, 
figure who would connect our knowledge of Mīmāṃsā and the Mīmāṃsaka arguments presented 
in the official pūrvapakṣas of MHK 9.  
 In this regard, Kawasaki, quoting Nakamura’s study on the early Vedānta,151 notes that 
Bhāviveka quotes a verse from Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya (1.42) at MHK 9.14.152 As Kawasaki 
states, although they do not match word by word, there is no significant difference between those 
two verses, and therefore, it may be said that Bhāviveka is quoting Bhartṛhari’s verse as a 
pūrvapakṣa.153 On the basis of this single quotation, along with other circumstantial evidence, 
Kawasaki advances a thesis that “the doctrines of Mīmāṃsā introduced by Bhāviveka may not be 
particularly different from the contents of the Vākyapadīya” (81). To support his thesis, 
Kawasaki points out that the context and many of the terms used in the Vākyapadīya 1.30-42 
overlap and that, despite the historical contestation between the grammarians (vaiyākaraṇa) and 
the Mīmāṃsakas, they both share the traditionalist attitude toward the Veda and its sacrificial 
                                                 
150 Since all the four publications of Kawasaki make the same argument, I will mainly make reference to 
his earliest and most detailed paper, Kawasaki (1973). 
151 Nakamura (2004, Part VII) originally published in 1956. 
152 Lindtner (1992) also takes note of Bhāviveka’s quotation of Vākyapadīya 1.42.  
153 cf. Vākyapadīya 1.42, “hastasparśād ivāndhena viṣame pathi dhāvatā/ anumānapradhānena vinipāto 
na durlabhaḥ//”, MHK 9.14, “pādasparśād ivāndhānāṃ viṣame pathi dhāvatām/ anumānapradhānānāṃ 
pātas teṣāṃ na durlabhaḥ//”. 
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norm. In Kawasaki (1974, 1120), a variant of this thesis also appears: “there is a probability of 
Bhavya’s getting his knowledge on the Mīmāṃsakas through some grammarian’s works.”  
  Kawasaki’s suggestion to seek Bhāviveka’s opponent not among the Mīmāṃsakas, but 
rather the grammarians is indeed valuable and is to be retained as a possibility. However, his 
thesis needs much proof and analytical demonstration. For example, the fact that the official 
pūrvapakṣas of MHK 9 and the Vākyapadīya 1.30-42 share a common context cannot be 
established by a single sentence; it needs meticulous comparison of the two texts. The historical 
rivalry and cooperation between the grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas over Vedic orthodoxy 
and orthopraxy is also an important and interesting topic to be investigated. However, without 
specifying the common doctrine of the two parties, their general tendency of being “Vedic 
traditionalists” cannot be used to make the Mīmāṃsakas into grammarians and vice versa. Lastly, 
it has not been conclusively established that Bhāviveka quotes Bhartṛhari at MHK 9.14. Despite 
the nearly identical content of the two verses, as Nakamura has noted and as Kawasaki himself 
acknowledges, Bhāviveka also quotes the same verse in his commentary on Nāgārjuna’s 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 9.3. Significantly, in that context, the verse is put forward not by the 
Mīmāṃsakas (or others affiliated with any Brahmanical school) as in MHK 9 but by those 
Buddhists of another school, namely, the Vātsīputrīyas. It is not Bhāviveka but the his 
commentator Avalokitavrata who identifies the verse as that of Bhartṛhari and, in this regard, 
there is a possibility that Bhāviveka attributes the verse to whoever claims that scripture is 
superior to human reasoning. Kawasaki (1973, 82) also suggests the possibility that the verse 
circulated among Brahmanical intellectuals before Bhartṛhari.154 
 Although it would be worth comparing MHK 9 and the grammarians’ work, especially, 
the Vākyapadīya, I think the Mīmāṃsaka imprint in MHK 9, particularly in the official 
                                                 
154 See also Saito (2005, 833, fn. 7). 
    87 
pūrvapakṣas, is rather clear. There Bhāviveka points out important issues that the Tarkapāda of 
the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (MS 1.1.1-32) and the Śābarabhāṣya address. The first two (9.1-2) can be 
viewed as a representation of MS 1.1.2 in which dharma is exclusively defined as the ritual 
means (artha) prescribed by the Veda (codanālakṣaṇa) whereas the next two verses (9.3-4) can 
be seen as a summary of Śabara’s discussion on the distinction between man-made speech and 
the authorless Veda.155 MHK 9.5 corresponds to MS 1.1.4-5 in that both argue for the 
impossibility of obtaining knowledge of things beyond human perception without the Veda. 
MHK 9.6-7 introduces the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the eternality of words (śabdanityatva), the 
topic of MS 1.1.6-23. Therefore, up to MHK 9.7, it may be said that Bhāviveka follows the order 
of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra and the Śābarabhāṣya.  
 However, the arguments of his opponent contain some elements that cannot be found in 
those two—the Mīmāṃsāsūtra and the Śābarabhāṣya—the earliest extant Mīmāṃsaka works. 
For example, MHK 9.8-9 introduces the Mīmāṃsaka objection to the Buddhist subordination of 
scripture (śabda) as a kind of inference (anumāna) which is not dealt with in the Śābarabhāṣya. 
Only in the work of the next Mīmāṃsaka author whose writings are extant, Kumārila’s 
Ślokavārttika, do we find an extensive discussion of that topic.156 Also, the Mīmāṃsaka critique 
of omniscience introduced in MHK 9.15-17 can only be found in Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika157 
and his lost work, Bṛhaṭṭīkā.158 Although the universalistic vision of the Veda expressed in MHK 
9.12 is, as Kasaski (1976, 12, fn.5) observes, seemingly a quotation from the Mahābhārata, and 
although it is presented in a rudimentary form, it is also reflected in Kumārila’s other work, the 
                                                 
155 See Śābarabhāṣya (Frauwallner 1968) 18:3-20:2.  
156 See the Śabdapariccheda section under Ślokavārttika on MS 1.1.5. 
157 See Ślokavārttika on MS 1.1.2 and Kataoka (2011, pt. 2)’s translation (section 6. Criticism of 
omniscience).  
158 See Kataoka (2011, pt.2, 35ff). Some of verses of the Bṛhaṭṭīkā are, allegedly but most probably, 
quoted in the last two chapters of Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha as the pūrvapakṣas. 
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Tantravārttika159 but not in Śabara’s commentary.  
 It is evident that Bhāviveka’s summary of the Mīmāṃsaka arguments in the official 
pūrvapakṣas captures a certain stage of development of the Mīmāṃsā school after Śabara. And it 
is tempting to suppose that Kumārila is Bhāviveka’s opponent mainly because he is the next 
Mīmāṃsaka to whom we have access and it is in his works that we can locate the above 
discourses that are found in MHK 9 but not in the Śābarabhāṣya. However, the major problem in 
supposing Kumārila is Bhāviveka’s opponent in MHK 9 is that Bhāviveka (500-570)160 is 
generally dated earlier than Kumārila (600-650)161.  
 
2.6.2 Is Bhāviveka’s Opponent Kumārila? 
Despite the generally acknowledged relative chronology of Bhāviveka and Kumārila, Krasser 
(2012) reversed the order and argued that Bhāviveka seems to be aware of Kumārila and to 
refute the latter in MHK 9. His thesis on Bhāviveka’s familiarity of Kumārila’s works is based on 
the fact that, in MHK 9, Bhāviveka introduces the Mīmāṃsaka critique of the Buddha’s 
omniscience, which is “not very important” to Śabarasvāmin but rigorously formulated by his 
successor Kumārila (580). Therefore, “one can easily read Bhāviveka as refuting Kumārila, 
unless one wants to postulate an unknown forerunner of Kumārila from whom he inherited all 
these ideas...” (565). Between two options of having Kumārila or an unknown pre-Kumārila 
Mīmāṃsaka as Bhāviveka’s opponent in MHK 9, Krasser opts for the first and concludes that 
“the material on the notion of omniscience suggests that the MHK, or at least portions of it, 
presuppose Kumārila.” (577) 
                                                 
159 See Tantravārttika on MS 1.3 (Smṛtipāda). See also de La Vallée Poussin (1902) and Halbfass (1991, 
Chapters Three and Four).  
160 See Kajiyama (1968-9). 
161 See Kataoka (2010, 112). 
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 It is indeed reasonable to posit Kumārila as Bhāviveka’s possible opponent on the basis 
of a post-Śabara topic (the Buddha’s omniscience), which is present in MHK 9. However, the 
evidence that Krasser adduces for the thesis is rather scanty and his comparative analysis of 
MHK 9 and Kumārila’s works is not precise. Under the heading of “2. Bhāviveka and 
Kumārila,” Krasser lists six points the first five of which (2.1-5) seek to demonstrate the 
correspondence between the works of two figures; the last (2.6) argues that there is another 
Mīmāṃsaka—before Kumārila—involved in MHK 9.  
 First, Krasser lists two half-verses, each from MHK 9162 and Ślokavārttika (ŚV),163 
which argue for the same thesis: an omniscient being does not exist since such a being is not 
observed today. These match each other in content but it cannot be said, as Krasser does, that 
their wording is the same; they simply express the same idea. It is also to be noted that 
Kumārila’s half-verse is a part of his argument164 that the established pramāṇas cannot be used 
to establish the existence of an omniscient being, which is absent in MHK 9. 
 Second, Krasser notes two correspondences between MHK 9 and Kumārila’s works. 
Bhāviveka’s opponent, at MHK 9.15cd, says that the idea of the Buddha’s omniscience is 
fabricated for the sake of winning worldly esteem (lokapakti) whereas Kumārila states, in the 
Bṛhaṭṭīkā as well as in the Ślokavārttika165, that the idea seems “attractive (only) to devotees” 
(śraddadhāneṣu śobhate).166 In the following sentences of the two works, Kumārila, in reference 
to the Buddhist claim that the Buddha’s teaching even flows out from a wall, wonders whether 
such teaching is from the Buddha, Brahmin-deceivers (brāhmaṇavañcaka), or wicked ghosts 
                                                 
162 MHK 9.15ab, “But an omniscient being does not exist at all, because it is not seen today.” (na cāsti 
kaścit sarvajño nedānīṃ dṛśyate yataḥ/); translation is from Krasser (2012, 559). 
163 ŚV on codanā sūtra (MS 1.1.2), 117ab, “First, an omniscient being is not seen by (ordinary) people 
like us today.” (sarvajño dṛśyate tāvan nedānīm asmadādibhiḥ/); translation is from ibid.  
164 See Kataoka (2011, pt. 2, 332ff.). 
165 See ibid., 370ff. 
166 Tattvasaṃgraha, 3242d; text and translation are from Krasser (ibid., 560). 
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(kṣudrapiśāca). Krasser observes in this regard that Bhāviveka also attributes the Veda to an evil 
being in MHK 9.31. I wonder, however, whether those two instances correspond to each other. Is 
it the same thing to argue that your teaching is concocted only to gain worldly fame and that your 
teaching only appeals to your own small group of devotees? Also, is it reasonable to suppose that 
Kumārila’s act of attributing the Buddha’s teaching to “evil-minded ghosts” motivated 
Bhāviveka’s denunciation of the Veda as a work of an evil being? As we have seen in the last 
chapter, Buddhists, from the time of Harivarman on, contended that the author of the Veda was a 
morally depraved being. Bhāviveka is not the first one to adopt such a strategy. 
 As for the third point, Krasser introduces MHK 9.16 in which Bhāviveka’s opponent 
argues for two things: 1. the Buddha’s words are not a pramāṇa and 2. the Buddha is not 
omniscient. Then he quotes two sample sentences from the Bṛhaṭṭīkā in which Kumārila argues 
the same. This observation is not objectionable; however, one cannot but have an impression that 
those claims are too general to be used to confirm Bhāviveka’s knowledge of Kumārila’s works. 
Anyone who is hostile to Buddhism would deny the pramāṇa-status of the Buddha’s words and 
the omniscience of the Buddha.  
 The fourth point seems to be on the mark. In the Bṛhaṭṭīkā, Kumārila, regarding the 
knowledge of an omniscient being, “only allows that a person can know everything other than 
the dharma (sarvam anyad vijānānaḥ puruṣaḥ).” (Kataoka 2011, pt. 2, 321, fn. 356). Bhāviveka, 
in MHK 9 and in PP, responds to an opponent who claims that the Buddha does not know “the 
path to heaven and liberation” (mtho ris byang grol lam zhe na; MHK 9.164c). 
 Krasser’s fifth and last point seems to be self-refuting. Krasser (565) notes that 
Bhāviveka “in MHK 9.19 refutes the possibility that the authority of the Veda can be established 
on the basis of its uninterrupted transmission” while Kumārila, similar to Bhāviveka, “in ŚV 
codanā 133-136 refutes the possibility that the omniscience of the Buddha can be established on 
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the basis of an uninterrupted transmission.” Krasser seems to assert that Bhāviveka, having seen 
that Kumārila denies the validity of Buddhists’ claim based on an uninterrupted tradition, applies 
the same critique against the Mīmāṃsakas. However, Bhāviveka advances such a critique only 
because, in the official pūrvapakṣa verse MHK 9.4, his opponent argues for the āgama-status of 
the Veda based on the uninterrupted transmission of the Veda through generations.167 In short, 
Bhāviveka’s opponent uses a strategy that is explicitly rejected by Kumārila. 
 Krasser (2012)’s study, which correctly discerned post-Śabara Mīmāṃsaka arguments in 
MHK 9 and properly correlates such contents with a post-Śabara author, Kumārila, points in the 
right direction for a future study of MHK 9. His study is indeed invaluable considering that it 
courageously challenges the generally accepted chronological order of the Indian masters. 
Nevertheless, the problem should be approached in a more systematic manner accompanied with 
more detailed analysis of the contents and contexts of both masters’ works. Sampling seemingly 
corresponding ideas from their works can be an effective means to show a plausible possibility 
and to formulate a hypothesis that overturns the previous scholarly norm at the initial stage of 
research. To take the next step, however, we need studies that compare the systematically divided 
units of texts and that place more value on the specificity of their arguments. With only a 
comparison of textual materials that can be generally termed “material on the notion of 
omniscience,” the discussion cannot produce meaningful information beyond that of the 
chronology of Bhāviveka and Kumārila.  
 Problems involved in determining the Mīmāṃsaka opponent in MHK 9 provocatively 
introduced by Krasser (2012) are still open and call for the attention of scholars. I do not intend 
to go into detail here; this dissertation is not devoted to them although in Chapter Four, I 
                                                 
167 MHK 9.4cd, “Because its tradition (of transmission) has not been interrupted, this is the [real] 
scripture. In the absence of it...” (saṃpradāyānupacchedād āgamo ’sau tadatyaye/). 
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obliquely address the necessity of taking Kumārila into account as we read MHK 9. However, 
before closing our review, I would like to make preliminary observations related to the identity 
of the Mīmāṃsaka in MHK 9 and suggest a possibility that Bhāviveka’s opponent might be a 
Mīmāṃsaka, although unknown, who postdates Śabara and predates Kumārila. The following 
points are notes for future research, and therefore, need to be developed and elaborated in 
separate studies.   
  First, the official pūrvapakṣas of MHK 9 do not fully reflect Kumārila’s arguments 
even when they discuss post-Śabara Mīmāṃsaka topics; some of them appear to be adaptations 
of older discourses to new contexts. For example, as stated above, the Mīmāṃsaka critique of the 
Buddhist practice of subordinating scripture (śabda) to inference (anumāna) begins to appear in 
the śabdapariccheda section of Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika on MS 1.1.5. Part of Kumārila’s 
critique is that the linguistic means of obtaining knowledge lacks three marks (trairūpya) with 
which, as Buddhists themselves lay out, a sound inference must be equipped.168 As this is a 
central argument of Kumārila, Śāntarakṣita, the later Buddhist who examines Kumārila’s 
contention against Buddhists, does not fail to quote this position as a pūrvapakṣa.169 The 
Mīmāṃsaka critique contained in the official pūrvapakṣas of MHK 9.8-9, though criticizing the 
Buddhist subordination of scripture as a means of obtaining knowledge, does not contain such an 
argument.170 Instead, they advance three arguments against the Buddhist denial of the pramāṇa-
                                                 
168 See ŚV on MS 1.1.5, Śabdapariccheda, 98, “tasmād ananumānatvaṃ śābde pratyakṣavad bhavet/ 
trairūpyarahitatvena tādṛgviṣayavarjanāt//” 
169 See Tattvasaṃgraha 1497. 
170 MHK 9.8-9, “1. This [means of knowledge, i.e., scripture] is different from inference, because it is a 
valid means of knowledge, just as another valid means of knowledge [for example, perception (added 
based on TJ paraphrase: “mngon sum gyi tshad ma bzhin no”)], or just as cognition [from perception and 
inference] that covers [respectively] one and many objects [cognition from scripture covers both objects]. 
2. [The scripture (śabda) is an independent pramāṇa] because it is the cause of the thoughts on the things 
whose relationships with their signs are invisible. Or, 3. it is because it is the cause of generating thoughts 
on [things of] different realms.” (anumānāt pṛthak cāsau pramāṇatvāt tadanyavat/ 
ekānekārthaviṣayapratipattir yathāpi vā// adṛṣṭaliṅgasambandhapadārthamatihetutaḥ/ 
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status of words or scripture, and one of them (MHK 9.8ab) seems to be a repetition of the 
Mīmāṃsaka argument originally put forward against those who deny scriptural means of 
knowledge based on perception, unlike Buddhists who assert the inclusion of scriptural means of 
knowledge in the category of inference.171  
 Second, Bhāviveka’s opponent argues for a doctrine that had already been overcome 
within the Mīmāṃsā tradition itself at the time of Kumārila. Bhāviveka’s opponent lists four 
reasons for the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the eternality of words at MHK 9.7. The third reason is 
that words are recognized as one and the same all the time (pratyabhijñānataḥ). The relevant 
discussion in Mīmāṃsā literature appears in the Śābarabhāṣya on MS 1.1.20 (saṃkhyābhāvāt) 
where Śabara argues that people recognize (pratyabhijānanti) a word to be the same when 
uttered many times. Then the opponent responds that, if this is so, then, thought and action 
(buddhikarmaṇī) would also become eternal since they are also recognized to be the same when 
they are repeated (pratyabhijñāyete). Up to that point in the dialogue between Śabara and the 
opponent, Śabara’s argument for the eternality of words is based on their recognizability; to 
express that idea he consistently relied upon the word “to recognize” (abhi+√jñā). However, he 
suddenly changes the vocabulary and answers in an ambiguous language.  
This does not affect our position; because these two [that are, thought and 
action] are not directly perceived (na...pratyakṣe); if they were directly 
                                                 
bhinnagocaradhījanmakāraṇatvād athāpi vā//) 
171 In the Vṛttikāra quotation section of the Śābarabhāṣya, the Vṛttikāra invites an opponent who argues 
(ŚBhF 48:16-7): “Scripture is not a basis of dharma. It is because, when one performs Vedic sacrifice, he 
does not see the fruit of it, and, at the other time [when the result of the sacrifice appears], the ritual act 
does not exist [any more]. [Therefore, scripture] is not a pramāṇa.” (animittaṃ śabdaḥ. karmakāle 
phalādarśanāt kālāntare ca karmābhāvāt, pramāṇaṃ nāstīti.) As the Vṛttikāra answers this objection, he 
defines the term ‘pramāṇa’ as follows (ŚBhF 48:18-20): “With whatever means we attain knowledge, 
such [means is to be recognized as] a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Also with scripture, we attain 
knowledge. Therefore, scripture is also a valid means of knowledge just as perception is.” (yena yena hi 
pramīyate, tat tat pramāṇam. śabdenāpi pramīyate, tataḥ śabdo 'pi pramāṇam, yathaiva pratyakṣam.) 
This definition of the term ‘pramāṇa’ seems to be the meaning of 9.8ab in which Bhāviveka’s opponent 
argues for the independent pramāṇa-status of scripture based on the reason of “its being a pramāṇa” 
(pramāṇatvāt) with the example of perception (mngon sum). See the previous footnote.  
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perceived (atha pratyakṣe), they also would be eternal.172 
In this passage, Śabara no longer uses the word “to recognize” and introduces the new word 
“perception” (pratyakṣa) into discussion. Jha (1933, 39), after having translated the above 
passage, remarks: “This is an obscure passage.” Then he suggests reading the passage according 
to Kumārila’s interpretation, which claims explicitly that “we (the Mīmāṃsakas) do not take 
‘recognition’ as a proof of the eternality [of words]” (nāsmābhiḥ pratyabhijñānaṃ 
nityasādhanam iṣyate/).173 To Kumārila, the sudden introduction of “perception” by Śabara is 
meant to point out that the opponent’s inference that aims to negate the eternality of words based 
on the common feature of recognizability shared by words, thought, and action is contradicted by 
a stronger pramāṇa, that is, perception, since words are perceived to be one and the same.174 
Therefore, Kumārila is not the Mīmāṃsaka who argues for the eternality of words based on their 
recognizability in MHK 9.7. 
 Interestingly, just before Kumārila proclaims that the Mīmāṃsakas do not take 
recognizability as the valid proof, he considers, in a series of six verses,175 a preliminary opinion 
held by someone, in the commentator Pārthasārathi’s words, “who only knows a partial truth” 
(ekadeśin),176 according to which Śabara speaks of “perception” in order to deny the 
recognizability of thought and action. Since recognizability presupposes perceptibility, by 
denying the perceptibility of thought and action, on this interpretation, Śabara intends to deny 
their recognizability.177 By reading the word “perception” (pratyakṣa) in Śabara’s passage as a 
ground for “recognition” (pratyabhijñāna), this interpretation attempts to safeguard 
                                                 
172 ŚBhK (Kataoka 2007) 536:5, “naiṣa doṣaḥ. na hi te pratyakṣe. atha pratyakṣe nitye eva.”; translation 
is from Jha (1933, 39). 
173 ŚV, śabdanityatvādhikaraṇa, 389ab. 
174 See ŚV, śabdanityatvādhikaraṇa, 389-392. 
175 See ŚV, śabdanityatvādhikaraṇa, 379-384. 
176 Nyāyaratnākara on ŚV, śabdanityatvādhikaraṇa, 379 (585:11), “tatraikadeśy āha.”  
177 ibid., 379, “na tayoḥ pratyabhijñānam etad eva kilocyate/ pratyakṣatvaniṣedhena pratyakṣeṇa hi tad 
bhavet//” 
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“recognizability” as valid evidence for the eternality of words. However, Kumārila rejects such 
an interpretative possibility since it is contradicted by everyone’s knowledge; such interpretation 
is far-fetched and is only possible by a forced interpretation of Śabara’s words 
(vācā...kliṣṭayā).178 What we can glimpse in Kumārila’s refutation of another possible 
interpretation of the difficult passage of Śabara is that there may have been someone before 
Kumārila (but after Śabara) who maintained that words are eternal because they are recognized 
to be the same. This opinion, if it was held by someone, exactly matches that of Bhāviveka’s 
opponent who lists the recognizability of words as one of the reasons for the Mīmāṃsaka 
doctrine of the eternality of words.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have outlined the structure and contents of MHK 9 (2.2-4) and reviewed 
scholars’ views on the identity of Bhāviveka’s opponent (2.5-6). Although MHK 9 is compiled as 
one chapter under the title of “Introduction to the Determination of the Truth of Mīmāṃsā” 
(mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra), we have seen that its contents are heterogeneous. Despite this, 
however, we have also seen that the various elements are clearly distinguished and constitute 
discrete sections of the chapter. While the Mīmāṃsaka agendas proper are discussed in the 
official pūrva-uttarapakṣas, the arguments that are unlikely to have been advanced against the 
Mīmāṃsakas are collected as independent discussions, collectively forming a response to one 
verse (MHK 9.11) of the official pūrvapakṣas. It is evident that those five independent 
discussions are directed against the non-Mīmāṃsaka opponents: Unlike the atheistic 
                                                 
178 ibid., 385, “evaṃ tu pratyabhijñānaṃ vācoktaṃ kliṣṭayānayā/ na ca śakyaṃ nirākartuṃ 
sarvalokaprasiddhitaḥ//” 
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Mīmāṃsakas, the opponents in the first and second independent discussions worship the three 
Hindu gods and believe them to be the Creator of the universe. The opponents in the third, 
fourth, and fifth independent discussions, again unlike the sacrifice-oriented Mīmāṃsakas, show 
that they seek to cleanse their sin by taking baths in the sacred rivers, practicing asceticism such 
as fasting, and upholding ahiṃsā as the principle of the prime importance. They even rebuke 
Buddhists for eating meat. The contrast between the opponents’ positions in the official pūrva-
uttarapakṣas and the five independent discussions is clear.  
 We have to assume that MHK 9 has more than one purpose. It is a chapter written to 
refute not only the Mīmāṃsakas but many others whose views are not compatible with each 
other. Then, why does Bhāviveka compile his critiques of various opponents who do not share 
the same view in a single chapter, MHK 9? Does he see a certain unity in those different 
opponents? Or, is there a special reason to collect the critiques of those opponents who differ 
from one another in one place? Here, I quote the most celebrated verse by Dharmakīrti as a 
concise summary of the Buddhist charge against Brahmins.  
1. [Believing in the] authority of the Veda, 2. claiming something [permanent] 
to be agent, 3. seeking merit in ablutions, 4. taking pride in one’s caste, and 5. 
undertaking penance to remove sin, these are the five signs of complete 
stupidity devoid of any discrimination.179 
In the verse, Dharmakīrti lists “five signs of complete stupidity” (pañca liṅgāni jāḍye) and those 
five signs, at first glance, resemble the topics dealt in MHK 9, especially when we consider 
Karṇakagomin’s commentary, which understands the second to be a critique of a Creator God180 
                                                 
179 Pramāṇavārttika 1.340, “vedaprāmāṇyaṃ kasyacit kartṛvādaḥ snāne dharmecchā jātivādāvalepaḥ/ 
saṃtāpāraṃbhaḥ pāpahānāya ceti dhvastaprajñāne pañca liṅgāni jāḍye//” Translation is from 
Eltschinger, Krasser, Taber (2012, 77-8). 
180 Kataoka (2011, pt. 2, 25) translates the second sign, seemingly reflecting Karṇakagomin’s 
commentary, as “doctrine of the Creator according to someone [such as Naiyāyikas] (or doctrine that 
something [permanent] is the agent [of actions]).” 
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and associates the fifth with the example of fasting.181  
 In fact, each of those five signs constitutes the separate agendas of the individual 
sections of MHK 9. As Kataoka (2011, pt. 2, 26) observes, sign 1 (vedaprāmāṇyam) is most 
applicable to the Mīmāṃsakas and Bhāviveka discusses this topic of the authority of the Veda in 
the official pūrva-uttarapakṣas. Sign 2 (kasyacit kartṛvādaḥ), the doctrine of Creator God, is the 
subject of the second independent discussion of MHK 9. The first independent discussion, which 
mainly accuses the three Hindu gods of evil behavior, can also be said to be a discussion of this 
subject. Sign 3 (snāne dharmecchā) is the topic of the third independent discussion. Sign 4 
(jātivādāvalepaḥ) does not form a separate section in MHK 9; nevertheless, as noted above, 
between the second and third independent discussions, Bhāviveka inserts a digressive discussion 
of considerable length on the nature of Brahminhood. Sign 5 (saṃtāpāraṃbhaḥ pāpahānāya) is 
examined in the fourth independent discussion. What is not mentioned in Dharmakīrti’s list of 
the signs of stupidity but included in MHK 9 is the belief in the sentience of plants, which is the 
topic of the fifth independent discussion. 
 Given this correspondence between Dharmakīrti’s list and the agendas of MHK 9, it 
seems that around the sixth and seventh centuries182 Buddhist intellectuals had a more or less 
fixed list that they shared to lay out their critiques of the common enemy, orthodox and 
orthoprax Brahmins. And, while Dharmakīrti sees “stupidity” as the common characteristic of all 
those who possess five signs, Bhāviveka makes it clear that they share an unfounded absolute 
trust in the symbol of the Veda. As Bhāviveka fixed phrase “therefore it is reasonable that the 
Veda is rejected” (yuktaṃ yat tyajyate trayī) makes clear, the non-Mīmāṃsaka five independent 
discussions are devoted to denouncing the authority of the “Veda,” whatever text the opponents 
                                                 
181 See Eltschinger, Krasser, Taber, (ibid., 77, fn. 171 and 78, fn. 174). 
182 According to Krasser (2012), Dharmakīrti also belongs to the sixth century.  
    98 
designate with that name. In this regard, we can conceive MHK 9 as a chapter in which 
Bhāviveka collects all of his critiques of the advocates of various “Vedas” under the name of the 
advocates of the Veda proper, the Mīmāṃsakas.  
 In the next two chapters, we shall delve into a portion of the “Mīmāṃsa proper” section, 
in which Bhāviveka accuses the Veda proper of its immorality. This is the first third of the 
official pūrva-uttarapakṣas. I have divided that portion again into two parts—the first consists of 
MHK 9.1-4 and 9.18-31 and the second of MHK 9.32-42. In each of these Bhāviveka continues 
the argument against the Veda and Vedic sacrifice discussed in Chapter One. By reading that 
small portion of MHK 9 in depth and comparing it with the contemporary as well as subsequent 
texts directly related with it, I would like to explore a change in the traditional Buddhist critiques 
of Vedic ritualists that resulted from their encounter with the Mīmāṃsakas.
    99 
Chapter Three: Decline of the Buddhist Critique of the Veda for its Evil Authorship 
 
3.1 Introduction 
According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the Veda is authorless. This peculiar Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the 
authorlessness of the Veda (vedāpauruṣeyatva) contrasts well with Buddhist critique that the 
Veda is the product of ancient seers who are intellectually and spiritually unqualified (pre-
Harivarman) and morally inferior (post-Harivarman). These contrasting views on the authorship 
of the Veda drew the attention of scholars of Buddhism and Mīmāṃsā, who suggested that the 
Buddhist critique of the Veda might have been an important factor in the Mīmāṃsakas’ adoption 
of the doctrine of authorlessness of the Veda from the time of the earliest document of the school, 
the Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini (MS) generally dated to the fourth to second centuries BCE.183  
 In his discussion of Buddhist critique of the Veda, Jayatilleke (1963) traces two ideas on 
its authorship in early Brahmanical literature. One is that the Veda is “derived directly from a 
divine omniscient being, namely Prajāpati or Brahmā” (191) who are often identified with each 
other in the Brāhmaṇas.184 This view is found in the Brāhmaṇas and early Upaṇisads. According 
to the other view, the Veda is the record of the visions of ancient seers (ṛṣi) capable of perceiving 
the supernatural. This is attested in the Nirukta 1.20.185 Noting the second idea’s development in 
                                                 
183 The date for the final compilation of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra is not certain. For discussions on dating this 
sūtra, see references cited in Verpoorten (1987, 5) and Clooney (1990, 52-3). 
184 Jayatilleke (1963, 178-9) lists places where either Prajāpati or Brahmā play the role of the creator of 
the Veda and where they are identified with each other.  
185 Nirukta 1.20 (translated in Sarup 1921, 20), “Seers had direct intuitive insight into duty. They by oral 
instruction handed down the hymns to later generations who were destitute of the direct intuitive insight. 
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the Naiyāyikas’ conception of the “words of a trustworthy person” (āptavacana), Jayatilleke 
assumes that the Buddhists oppose this view, which presupposes the supernatural capability of 
ancient seers. He suggests (191-2) that the Buddhist critique of ancient seers as the authors of the 
Veda might have contributed to the Mīmāṃsakas’ decision to abandon the strategy of founding 
the authority of the Veda on the author, thus eradicating authorship, divine or human, from the 
Veda. However, he cautions that this is “difficult to say with any degree of certitude.” (192) 
 Clooney (1990), based on his reading of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, accepts Jayatilleke’s 
suggestion. Over the series of six sūtras (MS 1.1.27-32), marked as the “section on the 
authorlessness of the Veda” (vedāpauruṣeyatvādhikaraṇa), Jaimini presents an inchoate version 
of the doctrine and considers the opponents’ argument that the Veda is a human composition, 
since some Vedic hymns are named after Vedic seers.186 In Jaimini’s rejoinder to this objection 
in MS 1.1.30,187 as Clooney (168) puts it, “it is conceded that the ṛṣis are intimately connected 
with the texts that bear their names, but the connection is defended in a way that minimizes it.” 
Based on this reading of MS, Clooney “supports what Jayatilleke has proposed as a possibility, 
that the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of apauruṣeyatva may have been set forth in response to the Buddhist 
                                                 
The later generations, declining in (power of) oral communication, compiled this work, the Veda, and the 
auxiliary Vedic treatises, in order to comprehend their meaning. Bilma = bhilma (division) or illustration.” 
(sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvus. te ’varebhyo ’sākṣātkṛtadharmabhya upadeśena mantrān 
saṃprādur. upadeśāya glāyanto ’vare bilmagrahaṇāyemam granthaṃ samāmnāsiṣur vedaṃ ca vedāṅgāni 
ca. bilmaṃ bhilmaṃ bhāsanam iti vā.) 
186 MS 1.1.27, “Some people say that the Vedas are similarly composed (saṃnikarṣa) because they are 
named after persons.” (vedāṃś caike saṃnikarṣaṃ puruṣākhyāḥ/) (translation is from Clooney (ibid., 
166)). Clooney understands the word saṃnikarṣa of this sūtra in the sense of “being composed” as it is 
used in that sense in the immediately preceding sūtra, that is, MS 1.1.26. Śabara’s commentary, however, 
explicitly states that the word is used in the sense of “modern.” See Śābarabhāṣya on MS 1.1.27, 
“saṃnikṛṣṭakālāḥ kṛtakā vedā idānīṃtanāḥ.” It is also to be noted that, while Jaimini’s sūtra only states 
that some Vedic hymns are “named after persons,” it is Śabara who identifies the “persons” as Vedic seers 
by enumerating four examples of such hymns, viz. Kāṭhaka (named after Kaṭhaka), Kālāpaka (named 
after Kalāpaka), Paippalādaka (named after Pippalāda), Mauhula (named after Muhula). 
187 MS 1.1.30, “The names (connected with various texts) are due to expounding (and not due to 
composing) the texts.” (ākhyā pravacanāt/) (translation is from Clooney (ibid.)). 
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critique of Vedic authority.” (215:fn. 64) The sequence would be as follows: 1. Buddhists (as in 
the Tevijja Sutta) questioned Vedic seers’ supernatural ability and thereby undermined their 
authority. 2. In reaction to the Buddhist critique, the Mīmāṃsakas (represented by Jaimini) 
minimized the traditional role of the seers by conceiving them not as the composers but as the 
expounders of the Veda.  
  I do not intend to assess this thesis. Instead, I would like to look into later Buddhists’ 
responses to this doctrine. Jayatilleke and Clooney’s thesis that the Mīmāṃsakas formulated the 
idea of the authorless Veda in reaction to the Buddhist critique implies that the Mīmāṃsakas 
intentionally linked their doctrine with the Buddhist critique of the Veda. However, such linking 
does not seem to have been universally noticed or acknowledged by later Buddhist thinkers. In 
what follows, I first analyze two divergent reactions of earliest Buddhists to confront the 
Mīmāṃsakas, Saṅghabhadra and Bhāviveka, to the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine (3.2). It is only 
Bhāviveka who continues the traditional Buddhist strategy of attributing the Veda to a certain 
immoral author. To analyze his strategy in more detail, in the second section (3.3), I examine 
Bhāviveka’s critique of the Veda focusing on one verse and the extensive commentary on it, i.e., 
MHK and TJ 9.31. Bhāviveka’s efforts to confront the Mīmāṃsakas with the old strategy, 
however, is not inherited by later Buddhist authors such as Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita. As we 
will briefly see in the third section (3.4), they follow Saṅghabhadra’s strategy of declaring the 
“unintelligibility” of an authorless text. Thus, the consistent Buddhist argument on the Veda that 
began in its earliest literature end in the confrontation with the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the 
authorlessness of the Veda.  
 
3.2 Is the Veda Intelligible? Saṅghabhadra’s and Bhāviveka’s Divergent Reactions to the 
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Authorless Veda 
Like his immediate predecessor Harivarman, Saṅghabhadra, as we saw in Chapter One, 
attributes the three poisons of passion, hatred, and delusion to Vedic seers. However, 
Saṅghabhadra does not directly connect such critique of the Veda with the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine 
of the authorlessness of the Veda. It is only when the opponent retreats from the original position 
that the Veda is without an author and takes recourse to the authority of Vedic seers that 
Saṅghabhadra brings in the traditional strategy of dismissing the spiritual capability of the seers. 
Against the Mīmāṃsakas’ doctrine, however, he puts forward quite a different answer and does 
not try to argue for the necessity of positing an author of the Veda, let alone mentioning the 
defects of such an author.  
 The fact that Saṅghabhadra’s opponent withdraws from the original position of total 
negation of authorship and introduces the seers as a medium for the formation of the Veda is one 
of the reasons that leads us to wonder whether the opponent is an orthodox Mīmāṃsaka or not. 
Interestingly, in Bhāviveka’s MHK 9, such arguments also appear that attempt to base the 
authority of the Veda on associated beings, for example, Brahmā, Prajāpati, or authoritative 
sages. In MHK 9.148-151, Bhāviveka introduces the opponent’s argument that the Veda is 
truthful because it is either taught by the god Brahmā or by sages (148) and sequentially refutes 
each of the two reasons (149-151).  
 It is hard to tell whether such arguments based on the authority of beings with 
supernatural abilities had indeed been put forward by the Mīmāṃsakas. However, in the verse of 
the official opponent section (9.11) to which MHK 9.148-151 replies, the opponent does not 
argue that the Veda is taught by either Brahmā or seers. In that verse, the opponent merely says 
that: “[The Veda] is the ancient auspicious path, and it is what gods (such as Brahmā) and seers 
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(such as Garga and Vasiṣṭha) rejoice in and what the learned people desire.”188 It is Bhāviveka 
who interprets this line as arguing that the Veda is taught by Brahmā or by those who know the 
past and future, that is, sages (thub pa).189 Hence, Bhāviveka may have introduced these 
arguments not because they are actual assertions of the Mīmāṃsakas but to dispel prevalent ideas 
about the extraordinary origin of the Veda. These two arguments, as Jayatilleke notes, existed 
around (or prior to) the Buddha’s time.  
  Instead of these seemingly non-Mīmāṃsaka arguments, let us focus on the authentic 
Mīmāṃsaka position on the origin of the Veda, that is, the doctrine of the authorlessness of the 
Veda, introduced in Saṅghabhadra and Bhāviveka’s works, and compare their answers to that 
specific doctrine.  
 
 3.2.1 Saṅghabhadra’s Reaction 
Saṅghabhadra’s answer to the doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda is short and simple. In 
his section on the Mīmāṃsakas (part 2),190 as we saw in Chapter One, the opponent begins to 
defend the practice of sacrificial killing based on the authority of the Veda by stating that the 
Veda is a definitive means of knowledge (定量; pramāṇa). On being questioned about reasons 
for the Veda’s authoritativeness, the opponent declares that the sound of Vedic mantras is eternal 
and, to support the eternality of Vedic mantras, he refers to their authorless nature. In the 
remaining portion of part 2, Saṅghabhadra presents arguments designed to refute the eternality of 
Vedic sound. The refutation of authorlessness can be found only in the following two sentences.  
Also, sound not originated from intellect is only heard by the ears and does not 
                                                 
188 MHK 9.11ab, “devarṣijuṣṭaśiṣṭeṣṭaṃ purāṇaṃ vartma śobhanam/” 
189 MHK 9.148, “yathārtho hi trayīmārgo brahmokter vaidyakādivat/ atītānāgatajñair vā tadukteś cet 
prasādhyate//” 
190 For the division of Saṅghabhadra’s section on Mīmāṃsā, see 1.5.  
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express any fixed meaning. Since you have already admitted that the Veda is 
not preceded by intellect [by presenting it as an authorless text], it cannot be 
included in the definitive means of knowledge.191 
What Saṅghabhadra points out in this passage is that not all sounds are able to convey meaning 
to their listeners. Only those sounds specifically formulated by the speaker’s intellect can express 
their intended meaning; the speaker’s intellect must precede the articulation of sound for it to be 
intelligible. The Veda, imagined to be authorless by the Mīmāṃsakas, is not preceded by any 
intellect, and therefore it must be concluded that the Veda is unintelligible. Though this logical 
step of confirming the unintelligibility of the Veda is skipped in Saṅghabhadra’s text, it is 
strongly implied in his discussion and needs no explicit statement. Then, Saṅghabhadra, 
countering the Mīmāṃsakas’ attempt to establish the Veda as the basis of their sacrificial 
practices, proceeds to propose that the Veda cannot be regarded as a definitive means of 
knowledge.  
 Saṅghabhadra’s refusal to acknowledge the Veda as a valid means of knowledge is based 
on the premise that only intellectually articulated sounds are meaningful. This premise is 
elaborated in more detail when Saṅghabhadra, against Vasubandhu, attempts to prove the 
existence of the abstract entity called “word” (nāma) differentiated from mere sound 
(ghoṣamātra).192 In refuting Vasubandhu’s argument that the separate stipulation of the abstract 
entity “word” is extraneous when we define linguistic expressions as sounds “confined to convey 
specific meanings by the speakers” (yo ’rtheṣu kṛtāvadhir vaktṛbhiḥ),193 Saṅghabhadra 
                                                 
191 Nyāyānusāra (T 1562; NA), 530c14-6, “又非覺慧所發音聲, 唯可耳聞, 無定詮表. 旣許明論非覺
爲先, 是則亦應非定量攝.” 
192 For a discussion on the debate between Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra over this issue, see Cox (1995, 
159-69) and her translation of the relevant section from the Nyāyānusāra (ibid., 377-99). 
193 This is the basic stance of Vasubandhu to this issue expressed in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Pradhan 
1975; AKBh) 80:24-5. The passage to which Saṅghabhadra directly criticizes in the following quote is the 
subsequent passage: AKBh, 81:5-10. 
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demonstrates his basic understanding of linguistic communication. 
The speaker first bears the intended word in his or her mind and only then 
formulates a thought as follows: “I will issue forth such and such speech in 
order to express to others such and such meaning.” After this, the speaker 
articulates sounds in accordance with that thought. The sounds generate 
phonemes and the phonemes again generate words. And the words at last 
manifest meanings. Based on this logical chain of transformation, I say sounds 
generate words and words can manifest meanings. This principle must be so as 
propounded here. If [the speaker] first did not bear the [intended] word in his or 
her mind, even if he or she generates sounds, as there is no fixed [meaning] to 
be expressed, it cannot make others comprehend its meaning.194   
The purpose of presenting this communication scheme is to emphasize the necessity of 
postulating the abstract entity of “word” different from mere sound. Toward the end of the 
passage, Saṅghabhadra illustrates his point by imagining a situation in which the speaker, 
without having a word in mind in advance, formulates sounds. Such “sound making” does not 
convey any meaning since the speaker did not posit any “word” in the mind beforehand. Positing 
a “word” in the mind is not just an act of intending to produce a certain sound; rather, when one 
bears a word in mind, he or she is then able to formulate an intention to convey a certain 
meaning to others with a certain sound pattern. The abstract entity called “word” is the receptacle 
of the speaker’s intention, since it provides a place where the speaker matches the sound aspect 
and the meaning aspect of language according to the linguistic contract made at the beginning of 
this era (kalpa).195 Also, the “word” entity is the speaker’s instrument of formulating an 
                                                 
194 NA, 414b3-9, “然能說者, 以所樂名先蘊在心. 方復思度: “我當發起如是如是言. 爲他宣說如是
如是義.” 由此後時, 隨思發語. 因語發字. 字復發名. 名方顯義. 由依如是展轉理門, 說語發名, 名
能顯義. 如斯安立, 其理必然. 若不以名先蘊心內, 設令發語, 無定表詮, 亦不令他於義生解.” cf. 
Cox (1995, 386-7). 
195 NA, 413b17-22, “[Q] Is the referent [of a word] (artha) expressible or inexpressible? [A] In fact, it 
can be summarily said that the referent is not expressible. [Q] If then, why, on the basis of a word such as 
“elephant,” the referent such as an elephant is understood? Why does it not produce other 
understanding? ...... [A] There is no such fault because [the relation between word and referent] is 
provisionally established. That is to say, people at the beginning of this era (kalpa) concertedly 
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intention because, through this sound-meaning entity “word,” the speaker coordinates a sound 
pattern with an intended meaning so that he or she can articulate sounds in a specific, 
communicative manner. In this respect, the act of intending to speak is nothing other than 
bearing a word in one’s mind. And the act of having a word in the mind, in turn, is nothing other 
than coordinating a sound pattern with a meaning that one wishes to convey to others according 
to the social convention. 
 Saṅghabhadra’s theory of language explains the process by which an idea is 
communicated from one linguistic agent to another by laying out the elements involved in any 
instance of communication. That is to say, all the elements involved in this communicative chain 
of “(speaker) intention – word – sound – phoneme – word – comprehension (listener)” are 
needed for an event of communication to be successful. In the light of this scheme, an authorless 
Veda, lacks the critical element of a speaker and, consequently, intention. Intending to speak is an 
intellectual act of coordinating sound and meaning, and the authorless Veda, which does not 
permit this intellectual activity, cannot be considered meaningful. Therefore, any linguistic 
encounter with the Veda is a priori a failure. The Veda does not produce any kind of knowledge, 
let alone definitive knowledge. 
 Saṅghabhadra thus does not connect the traditional critique of Vedic seers with his 
criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorless Veda. Rather than concluding that the 
Veda must have a human author to question his authority, Saṅghabhadra tentatively accepts the 
Mīmāṃsakas’ assertion and simply applies his linguistic theory to their doctrine. By doing so, he 
                                                 
established various words of different [sound-]images regarding various referents. As this [relation 
between word-images and their referents] has been transmitted to each other [that is, from generation to 
generation,] concerning all word-images, our understandings do not go awry.” (義爲可說不可說耶? 如
實應言, 義不可說. 若爾何故, 因象等言, 解象等義, 非顚倒解? ...... 無斯過失, 假安立故. 謂劫初
人, 於種種義, 共立種種差別想名. 由此相傳, 於諸名想, 解無顚倒.) cf. Cox (1995, 381). 
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concludes that the Veda is an unintelligible text.   
 
 3.2.2 Bhāviveka’s Reaction 
Unlike Saṅghabhadra’s strategy of drawing out the consequences of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine to 
its inevitable end that the Veda is unintelligible, Bhāviveka offers a faithful succession of the 
traditional arguments. However, Bhāviveka’s discussion is not or could not be a simple repetition 
of the old critique. The pre-Bhāviveka participants did not have to dispute with their opponents 
over the existence of an author of the Veda. Their discussions acknowledged the attribution of the 
authorship of the Veda to Vedic seers, whose existence was not questioned by either party of the 
debate. The task of Buddhists was to prove the defects of those authors, whose existence was 
accepted by the opponents. But Bhāviveka’s opponent is the Mīmāṃsakas who do not accept any 
sort of authorship of the Veda, human or divine. To argue against the Mīṃāṃsakas for any defect 
in the Veda’s authorship, one must first prove the existence of an author. 
 Bhāviveka’s response to the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda 
consists of eight verses (MHK 9.24-31). Among those eight verses, only one, MHK 9.31, in 
which Bhāviveka formulates a syllogism that proves the evil authorship of the Veda, inherits the 
traditional Buddhist critique of the Veda. What Bhāviveka does in the first seven verses (24-30) 
is to lay the groundwork: proving the existence of an authorship against the Mīmāṃsaka 
doctrine.  
 Bhāviveka’s inheritance of the traditional critique, i.e., MHK 9.31 that ends the section 
on authorlessness will be analyzed in the next section. Here I attend only to the “groundwork.” In 
order to contrast Bhāviveka’s strategy with that of Saṅghabhadra and later Buddhists, 
Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, I will only highlight two arguments expressed in three verses. The 
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first is the somewhat eccentric argument that, in a certain sense, Buddhist scriptures are also 
authorless. Since Śāntarakṣita later mentions this line of reasoning, we examine Bhāviveka’s 
thesis of the “authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures” for the sake of comparison. The second 
argument is that the Veda, as linguistic material, engenders understanding, and therefore, must be 
a human product. This is the directly opposite approach to the Mīmāṃksaka doctrine of 
authorlessness when compared to that of Saṅghabhadra; this approach, we shall see, is unique 
among those Buddhists who confronted the Mīmāṃsakas.  
 
 (1) The Authorlessness of Buddhist Scriptures 
Bhāviveka states the first argument in terms of logical fallacies in the Mīmāṃsaka argument that 
“the Veda, as it is not a human product, is the valid means of knowledge.”196 MHK 9.24 
specifically mentions two fallacies of the reason that “it is not a human product” 
(apuruṣakartṛtvāt): first, there is no similar case of an authorless text to support the Mīmāṃsaka 
claim (asādhāraṇatā); and second, to opponents like Buddhists who accept no unproduced 
entity,197 the reason does not hold, and therefore, it cannot be used to support any claim 
(asiddhārthatā). After having thus criticized the Mīmāṃsaka argument for being erroneous, 
Bhāviveka argues for the authorlessness (akartṛtva) of Buddhist scriptures using a specific 
understanding of the term: 
If [you assert that] the authorlessness [of the Veda] is because of its continuous 
repetition, Buddhist scriptures are also authorless. It is because Buddhas repeat 
what has been fully realized by previous Buddhas.198  
                                                 
196 MHK 9.3cd, “vedo ’puruṣakartṛtvāt pramāṇam iti gṛhyate/” Note that this is the same assertion to 
which Saṅghabhadra responds.  
197 TJ D280a3, “sangs rgyas pa la ni byas pa ma yin pa cung zhig kyang yod pa ma yin par grags pas, de 
gzhan la ma grub pa nyid kyang yin no.” 
198 MHK 9.25, “anuvādād akartṛtve bauddham apy asty akartṛkam/ pūrvabauddhābhisaṃbuddhaṃ yato 
buddhair anūdyate//” 
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What Bhāviveka seems to argue in this verse is this. If the term “authorlessness” is used to 
describe the situation in which many people throughout the ages say the same things, Buddhist 
scriptures can also be called authorless texts. It is because, as TJ interprets, “what has been 
taught, after having completely awakened, by previous Buddhas has been taught by the Blessed 
one without adding or omitting a letter.”199 TJ notes an implication of this argument: “Therefore, 
as the words of the Buddha are also repetitions and [accordingly] are not something produced, 
they are the valid means of knowledge.”200 Here Bhāviveka’s purpose in arguing for the 
authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures is explicit. If the Veda is authoritative because it is 
authorless, the Mīmāṃsakas cannot argue that the Veda alone is authoritative. Should they use 
such an argument, the Mīmāṃsakas must admit the authority of Buddhist scriptures as well.  
 In this respect, Bhāviveka’s thesis of the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures may be 
taken to be an argument formulated only to refute the Mīmāṃsaka’s claim without believing his 
own argument. In short, Bhāviveka may be making the case only to meet the demand of the 
context, that is, the confrontation with the Mīmāṃsakas. However, in one passage of his other 
work, the Prajñāpradīpa, in the same context of criticizing the Mīmāṃsakas, Bhāviveka states 
this argument in more detail.201 Here, his mode of argumentation is firmer as if it is his objective 
to establish the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures as his own position. Right before 
Bhāviveka presents the following rejoinder, the Mīmāṃsakas, as introduced by Bhāviveka, 
denied the authority of Buddhist scriptures because they have a human author, that is, the 
Buddha. 
The reason that you present, “there is an author,” is not valid. Why? It is 
                                                 
199 TJ D280a5, “sngon gyi sangs rgyas kyis rdzogs par sangs rgyas nas bstan pa de dag nyid yi ge mang 
nyung med pas bcom ldan 'das kyis bstan pa yin no.” 
200 TJ D280a5-6, “de'i phyir sangs rgyas kyi gsung yang rjes su bstan pa yin gyi byas pa ni ma yin pas 
tshad ma nyid yin no.” 
201 This passage only appears in the Chinese translation of the work (PPC). The Tibetan translation (PPT) 
does not contain this discussion, nor does Avalokitavrata’s commentary comment on it.  
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because [the Buddha’s effortless words] are witnessed to have an effect of 
saving sentient beings. The Tathāgata, without any effort, spontaneously brings 
out [his] words just as the heavenly drum, independently [of a drummer], 
resonates in the sky. [Also,] as there is neither agent nor receiver according to 
our teaching, [the reason] that you established, “there is an author,” is not 
valid.202 
Bhāviveka’s argument in this passage is qualitatively different from that of MHK 9.25 because 
here he does not insist on the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures in the limited sense of the 
term, that is, authorlessness in terms of verbatim repetition of the same teaching. He rather 
argues for another kind of authorlessness truer to its meaning, just as the Mīmāṃsakas do: 
authorlessness in terms of origin.  
 The task of proving the non-existence of an author of Buddhist scriptures, at first sight, 
seems to be impossible, since the ultimate source of Buddhist scriptures must be the mouth of the 
Buddha, that is, a human being, and it is precisely for this reason that the Mīmāṃsakas reject the 
validity of Buddhist scriptures, as indicated above. Bhāviveka’s rejoinder does not, however, 
attempt to deny that Buddhists regard their own scriptures as the words of the Buddha (or 
buddhas). Instead, Bhāviveka attempts to show that the medium of an enlightened being (i.e., a 
buddha) is tantamount to no medium in the context of communicating truth. The Buddha speaks 
“effortlessly” (無功用) and his words pour forth “spontaneously” (自然). Hence, the Buddha 
does not intentionally formulate his words; exactly the same message of all buddhas is spoken 
from the Buddha’s (or any buddha’s) mouth. No human element is involved in the Buddha’s 
speech, just as the heavenly drum resonates without human engagement. In addition to this 
analogy, Bhāviveka brings in the hallmark doctrine of his own school: emptiness. As a 
representative Madhyamaka master, Bhāviveka, from the outset, does not acknowledge the 
                                                 
202 PPC (T 1566), 119b17-21, “若有作者, 汝出因義不成. 何以故? 見有可化衆生故. 如來無功用, 自
然出言說. 猶如天鼓空中自鳴. 如我法中作者受者皆無故, 汝立有作者義, 是因不成.” 
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ultimate existence of any being, including the speaker (and listeners) of Buddhist sūtras. 
 It is clear from this passage from the Prajñāpradīpa that Bhāviveka’s thesis of the 
authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures is not fabricated simply to refute the Mīmāṃsakas. 
Although he does not go so far as to eradicate the existence of the Buddha as the speaker of 
Buddhist scriptures as the Mīmāṃsakas do with the Veda, by showing the absence of a human 
element in the Buddha’s speech and the ultimate emptiness of linguistic agents in the 
composition of Buddhist sūtras, Bhāviveka presents Buddhist sūtras literally as authorless texts. 
We will return to this peculiar vision of Bhāviveka regarding the authorship of Buddhist 
scriptures later, when Śāntarakṣita also discusses this strategy of presenting one’s own scripture 
as an authorless text against the Mīmāṃsakas.  
 
 (2) The Intelligibility and Authorship of the Veda 
Regardless of whether Bhāviveka thinks Buddhist scriptures are authorless without reference to 
the Mīmāṃsakas, his first argument, when employed in the debate with the Mīmāṃsakas, 
undermines the force of the Mīmāṃsaka claim that the Veda is the sole authority and a unique 
example of an authorless text. The second argument that the Veda is intelligible and therefore 
must be a human product, on the contrary, actively demonstrates that the Mīmāṃsakas’ claim of 
the authorlessness of the Veda is wrong. Here, Bhāviveka sets the most important stepping stone 
to continue the traditional critique of the Veda. In order to argue for the evil authorship of the 
Veda, he must prove the existence of an its author.   
 Over two verses (MHK 9.29-30), Bhāviveka tries to confirm that the Veda is a human 
work by emphasizing that the Veda is linguistic material. In the first (9.29), he lists three reasons 
to regard the Veda as linguistic material: 1. Vedic statements (vedavākya) are linguistically 
comprehensible (pratipattyā), 2. they conform with linguistic format (anuguṇyena), and 3. they 
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have the tradition of oral, that is, linguistic recitation (varṇāmnāyāt). After having highlighted 
the linguistic aspect of the Veda by elaborating each of these reasons, TJ takes a further step by 
locating language in human beings.  
Therefore, how can you say that this [the Veda] is not produced by a human? 
Because a linguistic expression is produced by the articulatory points (sthāna), 
organs (kāraṇa), and efforts (yatna), we infer that there is no linguistic 
expression that is not born [through such a human process]. Therefore, [your 
argument] that the Veda is not produced by a human does not stand.203  
Every instance of linguistic expression must be accompanied by human elements. It must be 
produced through a combination of breath travelling through articulatory points such as breast, 
throat, and lips, a movement of articulatory organs such as tongue, and an articulatory effort 
made by the speaker. After having observed how linguistic material comes into being, Bhāviveka 
infers that such a human process is the necessary condition for any linguistic expression. In other 
words, human agency or involvement must be accepted in any linguistic material including the 
Veda. To arrive at this conclusion, Bhāviveka adds, one does not need to resort to inference. It is 
common sense that no linguistic expression manifests causelessly from the sky or mountains.204  
 To prove the human authorship of the Veda, Bhāviveka also points out that the Veda is 
“the cause for engendering thoughts [in people’s minds] on the intended meaning (or object)” 
(vivakṣitārthadhījanmakāraṇatvād).205 Here Bhāviveka’s approach to the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine 
of Vedic authorlessness differs most from that of Saṅghabhadra. While the latter focuses on the 
absence of an author, as assumed by the Mīmāṃsakas, and draws out an unwanted (for the 
                                                 
203 TJ D281a2-3, “des na, 'di skyes bus byas pa ma yin pa yin zhes bya ba ji lta bu yin. gnas dang byed pa 
dang 'bad pa la sogs pa gang dag gis yi ge mngon par bsgrubs pa las, rjes su dpag nas, ma skyes pa'i yi 
ge ni yod pa ma yin pas, rig byed ni skyes bus byas pa ma yin no zhes bya ba ma grub la.” 
204 See TJ D281a3-4, “rjes su dpag pa dang 'gal ba dang grags pas kyang gnod pa yang yin te. 'jig rten 
na ni skye dgu'i 'bad pa la ltos nas yi ge mngon par 'grub pa mthong gi, glo bur du nam mkha' 'am ri la 
sogs pa las ni ma yin no.” 
205 See MHK 9.30. 
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Mīmāṃsakas) consequence, i.e., the unintelligibility of the Veda, the former, from the outset, 
acknowledges that the Veda is intelligible and endowed with communicative function. Just as 
regular words like “water,” “earth,” and “sky” express objects corresponding to those words and 
create thoughts in others’ minds about those objects, the Veda performs the basic communicative 
function of language. If nothing distinguishes the Veda from other linguistic materials, it must 
have human authorship.206  
 It is noteworthy that Bhāviveka does not use the unintelligibility of the Veda to attack the 
Mīmāṃsakas. The Brahmanical fear of the inability of understanding the meaning of the Veda is 
expressed from a very early period, as attested by Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya (c. 2 cen. BCE).207 As 
he enumerates the purposes for learning the science of grammar (vyākāraṇa) in the beginning of 
the treatise, Patañjali says that the Veda would become fruitless when it is only memorized 
without understanding the content (yat adhītam avijñātam). Just as dried fuel would never blaze 
without fire, mere recitation of the Veda (nigada) would bear nothing.208 To prevent Vedic 
reciters from mindlessly memorizing the Veda, Patañjali stresses the need to study his own 
discipline, grammar.209 Patañjali’s remark shows that it is one thing to memorize the Veda and it 
is another to understand its meaning.210 Saṅghabhadra’s strategy of driving the Mīmāṃsakas to 
                                                 
206 See TJ D281a6-7, “de bzhin du, chu sa mkha' zhes bya ba ni chu dang sa dang nam mkha'i don mngon 
par brjod pa can gyi tshig yin la; de lta bu la sogs pa'i rig byed kyang brjod pa'i don gyi blo skyed ba'i 
rgyu yin pas, ji ltar na 'di skyes bus byas pa ma yin.” 
207 The Nirukta of Yāska (ca. 5th cen. BCE), much older than the Mahābhāṣya, also introduces and refutes 
the opinion that the Vedic mantras are meaningless (“anarthakā hi mantrāḥ”) in I.15-16. See Sarup (1921, 
15-17)’s translation. This is known as the “Kautsa controversy” since Yāska attributes such opinion to a 
figure named Kautsa who is, according to Renou (1965, 47), also an author of a Prātiśākhya of the 
Atharvaveda.  
208 Mahābhāṣya (Kielhorn 1892) 2:15-6, “yat adhītam avijñātaṃ nigadenaiva śabdyate/ anagnav iva 
śuṣkaidho na tat jvalati karhi cit//”; The source of this quotation is unknown. See Joshi and Roodbergen 
(1986, 42, fn. 120). 
209 Mahābhāṣya 2:17, “Therefore grammar should be studied so that we will not recite a meaningless 
sound.” (tasmāt anarthakam mā adhigīṣmahi iti adhyeyam vyākaraṇam.) 
210 For an analysis of the section of the Mahābhāṣya to which I refer here, see Deshpande (1993b, 
Chapter 2). 
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admit that the Veda is unintelligible may have been a sarcastic comment on this discrepancy 
between two levels of knowing: memorizing and understanding the Veda. Those Brahmins who 
mechanically memorize the Veda without proper understanding are indeed embodiments of 
Saṅghabhadra’s thesis. Their recitations are not preceded by intellect, and therefore, the Veda 
recited by them qualifies as an authorless text. That is, while they recite the words of the Veda, 
they do not articulate the sound of the Veda with an intention to convey meaning. Such an 
authorless text is, therefore, unintelligible to its Brahmin reciters. Saṅghabhadra’s thesis, “the 
Veda is unintelligible since it is authorless,” is exemplified by its reciters.  
 The Mīmāṃsakas, like Patañjali, find the raison d’etre of their discipline in the study of 
the Veda beyond mere memorization. However, they do not consider the possibility that the Veda 
is an unintelligible text. The Veda not only conveys knowledge through linguistic means, but 
knowledge from the Veda is definite in the sense that its veracity does not fluctuate like human 
statements.211 Moreover, for the Mīmāṃsakas, there is no doubt about the contents of knowledge 
that the Veda conveys. The Veda causes humans to know the duty of rituals (karmāvabodha), 
and, in order to fulfill the purpose of the Veda, the study of Mīmāṃsā or inquiry into Vedic duty 
(dharmajijñāsā) should be undertaken after having completed memorization. Mere memorization 
(adhyayanamātra), Śabara argues, would bear no fruit.212 Bhāviveka’s argumentation seems to 
be made in reference to this Mīmāṃsaka tradition, which does not doubt the intelligibility of the 
Veda. The Mīmāṃsakas believe that the Veda is linguistic material and that it creates knowledge 
in its human listeners. These two beliefs are confirmed by Bhāviveka in his argument. Based on 
                                                 
211 Śābarabhāṣya (Frauwallner 1968; ŚBhF) 24:6-7, “upadeśa iti viśiṣṭasya śabdasyoccāraṇam. 
avyatirekaś ca bhavati tasya jñānasya. na hi tad utpannaṃ jñānaṃ viparyeti.” See also ŚBhF 18:13-5, 
“viplavate khalv api kaścit puruṣakṛtād vacanāt pratyayaḥ. na tu vedavacanasya mithyātve kiṃcana 
pramāṇam asti.” 
212 ŚBhF 12:11-4, “tad ucyate: atikramiṣyāma imam āmnāyam. anatikrāmanto vedam arthavantaṃ 
santam anarthakam kalpayema. dṛṣṭo hi tasyārthaḥ karmāvabodhanaṃ nāma. na ca tasya 
adhyayanamātrāt tatrabhavanto yājñikāḥ phalaṃ samāmananti.” 
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these, Bhāviveka infers that the Veda must be a human product, because 1. no linguistic material 
is observed apart from a human process (MHK 9.29) and 2. as long as the Veda is linguistic, the 
knowledge it conveys must be an “intended meaning” (vivakṣitārtha; MHK 9.30). 
 The discrepancy between Saṅghabhadra’s and Bhāviveka’s strategies of countering the 
Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda may be explained by their different points 
of reference. While Saṅghabhadra may have general Vedic reciters in mind when he asserts that 
the authorless Veda is meaningless, Bhāviveka deduces the existence of an author of the Veda, 
referring specifically to the Mīmāṃsaka presuppositions regarding human reception of the Veda. 
What is significant, historically speaking, in these two divergent approaches to the Mīmāṃsaka 
doctrine during the fifth and sixth centuries is that each represents the past and future Buddhist 
policy of rebutting the authority of the Veda. Saṅghabhadra’s strategy of declaring the Veda as 
unintelligible can be said to have paved the way for future Buddhists; it is inherited by later 
Buddhists such as Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita as we will see below. Bhāviveka’s strategy of 
demonstrating the existence of an author of the Veda is, on the contrary, inherits the old critique 
of the Veda. His work seems to be the last document attesting to this trend. In the next section, I 
analyze Bhāviveka’s thesis in MHK and TJ 9.31 which, as the culmination of Bhāviveka’s 
critique of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of authorlessness, is designed to prove that the Veda is 
authored by an evil being.  
 
3.3 Proving the Evil Authorship of the Veda: An Analysis of Bhāviveka’s Critique of the 
Veda (MHK/TJ 9.31) with Reference to the Commentaries on Sāṃkhyakārikā 2 
After having established that the Veda is intelligible linguistically, and therefore, must be 
endowed with a human author, Bhāviveka, in MHK 9.31, presents a syllogism to prove that the 
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putative author of the Veda is an evil being. Then, to corroborate his thesis, in the commentary, 
TJ 9.31, he compiles examples from the Veda that illustrate the Veda’s evil teachings. One of the 
problems in approaching this material is that all of the Vedic quotes collected in TJ 9.31 are only 
extant in Tibetan, making it difficult to recover the original Sanskrit. Their original Sanskrit is 
critical in this case since, in their Tibetan translations, it is difficult to discern even the basic 
meaning of the sentences.  
 Given this difficulty in understanding the material contained in TJ 9.31, I must defer the 
task of deciphering and identifying the Vedic quotations.213 Instead, I would like to highlight one 
fact: Bhāviveka’s collection of Vedic quotes includes almost all the quotes that the Sāṃkhyas 
compiled in their commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā 2 (SK 2). Sāṃkhya, as an ascetic 
tradition, maintained a critical stance toward Vedic sacrificial culture from the beginning214 and 
such an attitude is epitomized in the second verse of the Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa which 
declares that Vedic sacrifice (ānuśravika) is impure (aviśuddhi). Under this verse, Sāṃkhya 
commentators list quotations from the Veda to demonstrate its impurity. Since this practice of 
supporting one’s criticism of the Veda by systematically (that is, not fragmentarily) quoting it is 
not found in Buddhism before Bhāviveka, it is likely that he is imitating the Sāṃkhyas in 
confronting the authority of the Veda in TJ 9.31.  
 However, Bhāviveka was not the first Buddhist to pay attention to the Sāṃkhyas’ critical 
attitude toward the authority of the Veda and sought a possible alliance with them against their 
common enemy, Vedic ritualists. Āryadeva’s Śataśāstra together with Vasu’s commentary on it 
already presented their favorable opinion of the Sāṃkhyas with specific reference to SK 2, long 
                                                 
213 See van der Kuijp (2006, esp. 196-9) for an analysis of the portion of text from, Bhāviveka’s another 
work, the Prajñāpradīpa along with Avalokitavrata’s commentary, which corresponds to MHK/TJ 9.31. 
Though they correspond in arguing for the evil authorship of the Veda, neither the Prajñāpradīpa nor 
Avalokitavrata’s commentary matches the richness of Vedic sources in TJ 9.31.  
214 See Olivelle (1993, 98-9). 
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before Bhāviveka (3.3.1). Bhāviveka’s allusion to this verse is not as obvious as theirs due to the 
context of the Abhidharma literature he is reading as he writes MHK/TJ 9.31 (3.3.2). However, 
given that most of the Vedic quotes that the commentaries on SK 2 cite are also found in TJ 9.31, 
Bhāviveka seems to have consulted the Sāṃkhya commentaries or at least draws upon a common 
source shared among those with anti-Vedic sentiments (3.3.3). After thus analyzing the contents 
of MHK and TJ 9.31, I will assess the significance of Bhāviveka’s critique of the Veda (3.3.4).
  
 3.3.1 A pre-Bhāviveka Instance of Buddhist-Sāṃkhya Alliance 
This peculiar case of Buddhist-Sāṃkhya partnership was already noticed by Chakravarti (1975 
[1951], 5): “In his Śata-śāstra, Āryadeva also refers to the same attitude of the Sāṃkhya towards 
sacrificial performances in a quotation from a Sāṃkhya work.” This statement needs to be 
revised for three reasons. First, though the text bears only one title “*Śataśāstra” (百論) in 
Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation made in 404 CE, it is a composite work consisting of 
Āryadeva’s sūtras (修妒路) and Vasu’s commentary. And it is Vasu, rather than Āryadeva, who 
quotes a Sāṃkhya text. Second, that quotation is from the second verse of the Sāṃkhyakārikā in 
which it is declared that Vedic sacrifice is “united with impurity, destruction, and relative 
superiority and inferiority” (aviśuddhikṣayātiśayayuktaḥ; 祀法不淨無常勝負相故).215 
Chakravarti may have failed to recognize this famous line due to the fact that Vasu identifies his 
source with the word “*Sāṃkhyasūtra” (僧佉經)216 which Tucci (1981 [1929], Āryadeva’s 
Śataśāstra, 18) translates as “the Sūtras of the Sāṅkhyas” without any reference to the 
Sāṃkhyakārikā. Lastly, the Śataśātra does not merely “refer to” the Sāṃkhyas; rather, when the 
                                                 
215 This is the translation quoted in the Śataśāstra (T 1569, 170b23-4); The translation by Paramārtha in 
the Suvarṇasaptati (T 2137, 1245b11) is: “有濁失優劣.” 
216 Śataśāstra, 170b23. 
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surrounding context is duly appreciated, it is obvious that the Buddhists (i.e., Āryadeva and 
Vasu) side with the Sāṃkhyas against their common opponent, Vedic ritualists. As we will see, 
the Sāṃkhya “influence” is more ingrained. 
 Vasu’s quotation of SK 2 is made toward the end of the first chapter of the Śataśāstra 
titled “Chapter on Renunciation of [both] Sin and Merit” (捨罪福品) and the relevant discussion 
is occasioned by Vedic ritualists’ rejoinder: “Eternal merit does not renounce its cause; therefore 
it must not be renounced.”217 Vasu, as he comments on Āryadeva’s sūtra, introduces, on behalf 
of the opponent, the case of the Aśvamedha (馬祀; “Horse Sacrifice”) to exemplify the point: the 
eternal fruit can be obtained. Thus, for the opponent, there are fruits that do not perish, and 
therefore, it is not to be argued, as the chapter title indicates, that even “merit” (福) should be 
abandoned. The opponent adds that such eternal fruits can be gained through Vedic sacrifices 
such as Aśvamedha.  
 After having adduced two reasons for objection, viz. 1. merit has dual aspect of giving 
pleasure (與樂) and giving suffering (與苦) and 2. a limited cause cannot produce an unlimited 
fruit, Āryadeva offers an interesting remark on Vedic sacrifice.   
One should renounce even pure, though still contaminated (有漏, sāsrava), 
merit since it is not eternal; how much more for merit mixed with sin (雜罪
福)?218 
As to the first part of the sūtra, nothing is noteworthy; describing “pure merit” as contaminated 
and advising the rejection of such merit based on its non-eternal nature aligns well with the basic 
Buddhist attitude toward merit. But Āryadeva’s sūtra becomes very non-Buddhist when he 
describes the fruit of Vedic sacrifice as “merit mixed with sin.” Can a Buddhist consider Vedic 
                                                 
217 Ibid., 170b7: “常福無捨因緣故, 不應捨.” cf. Tucci (1981, Śataśāstra, 17). Tucci translates the first 
phrase (“常福無捨因緣故”) as “merit is eternal; because the cause is not renounced”; but this does not 
conform to the syntax. 
218 Ibid., 170b21-22, “有漏淨福, 無常故, 尙應捨. 何況雜罪福?!” 
   119 
sacrifice as a means to produce any merit (puṇya) although it is mixed with sin (pāpa)? It is the 
commentary on this sūtra in which Vasu quotes a passage from SK 2.  
It is [mixed] because, in Vedic sacrifice (業) such as Aśvamedha (馬祀), there 
are sins such as killing. Moreover, according to the *Saṃkhyasūtra (僧佉經), it 
is said: “The means of sacrifice is [endowed] with aspects of impurity, non-
eternity, and relative superiority and inferiority.” Therefore, [merit] is [also] to 
be renounced [along with demerit or sin].219 
Vasu’s quotation is clearly made to support the Buddhist argument that he and Āryadeva put 
forward against Vedic ritualists. Given the regular practice of Buddhist argumentation in which 
one first presents the reasoned argument (yukti) and then corroborates one’s position with 
scripture (āgama), we may even venture to state that in the present case the Sāṃkhya quotation 
plays the role of Buddhist scripture. But this favorable gesture toward, or reliance on the 
Sāṃkhyas is not limited to the commentator Vasu.  
 In commentaries on SK 2, we encounter the Sāṃkhyas’ evaluation of Vedic sacrifice as 
of “mixed nature” (miśrībhāva). This expression is first found in the Gauḍapādabhāṣya (ca. 500-
600 CE).220 Gauḍapāda, having pointed out the impure aspect of Vedic sacrifice such as killing 
in Aśvamedha, notes: “Even though what is laid down by Śruti and Smṛti is dharma, still, as it is 
of mixed nature, it (i.e., such dharma) is united with impurity.”221 Vācaspati Miśra (9th or 10th 
century CE), on the other hand, in his commentary on SK, the Tattvakaumudī, specifically points 
                                                 
219 Ibid., 170b22-4, “如馬祀業中, 有殺等罪故. 復次, 如『僧佉經』言: “祀法不淨無常勝負相”故. 
是以應捨.” 
220 This expression “mixed nature” (miśrībhāva) is, in addition to the Gauḍapādabhāṣya, also used in two 
other commentaries, the Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti (Solomon 1973a, 8) and the Sāṃkhyavṛtti (Solomon 1973b, 
6), in the same context. The latter says: “The injunction of the Veda is united with impurity since it is 
mixed with evil actions such as those cited above.” (ityevamādinā pāpakarmaṇā miśrībhāvāt 
aviśuddhiyuktaḥ vedavidhiḥ.) The Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti has almost the same sentence with slight 
variations: “ityevaṃ pāpādīnāṃ karmaṇāṃ ca miśrībhāvād aviśuddhiyukto veda iti.” 
221 Gauḍapādabhāṣya on SK 2 (Colebrooke and Wilson 1837, appendix, 3), “yady api śrutismṛtivihito 
dharmas, tathāpi miśrībhāvād aviśuddhiyukta iti.” (the unnecessary double consonant in “dharmmas” is 
removed).  
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to an older authority of the Sāṃkhya tradition, Pañcaśikha, for this evaluation of Vedic sacrifice. 
According to Pañcaśikha, Vedic sacrifice is “slightly mixed ”; however, the fruit of that mixture 
of sin is “removable and endurable” (svalpasaṅkaraḥ saparihāraḥ sapratyavamarṣa iti).222 
Vedic sacrifice is mixed with a few sinful elements, Vācaspati explains, because one engages in 
the act of killing animals (paśuhiṃsā). But these negative elements can be easily removed by 
expiatory rites (prāyaścitta). Even when one is careless and does not perform such rites, that 
small drop of suffering produced by them is indeed bearable to “someone who has already 
plunged into the great nectar-lake of heaven” (svargasudhāmahāhradāvagāhin).223 
 Pañcaśikha is a quasi-mythical figure known as one of the oldest teachers of the 
Sāṃkhya school, listed along with the founding figures, viz. Kapila and Āsuri; his name is often 
“symbolically” invoked by the later Sāṃkhyas only to “attribute a great variety of hallowed 
Sāṃkhya or Yoga notions.” (Larson and Bhattacharya 1987, 117) Moreover, given the doubtful 
attribution of many quotations in the Yogabhāṣya to Pañcaśikha by Vācaspati in his 
Tattvavaiśāradī (Chakravarti 1975, 115), we may doubt the authenticity of Vācaspati’s 
attribution of the above-cited opinion on Vedic sacrifice to Pañcaśikha. However, since the more 
lengthy quotation that begins with the sentence quoted by Vācaspati (that is, svalpasaṅkaraḥ...) 
is also found in the Yogabhāṣya on the Yogasūtra 2.13,224 we may be at least assured that the 
evaluation of Vedic sacrifice as “mixed with sin” is not Vācaspati’s invention but comes from an 
older tradition.  
 In this regard, I wonder whether Āryadeva is adopting this Sāṃkhya view when he 
speaks of “merit mixed with sin” (雜罪福). Although Āryadeva does not repeat the later part of 
                                                 
222 See Tattvakaumudī (Dravida 1917) 10:6-8. 
223 See ibid., 10:8-17. 
224 Yogabhāṣya (Sastri and Sastri 1952) 156:5-8, “pradhānakarmaṇy āvāpagamanam. yatredam uktam – 
“syāt svalpaḥ saṃkaraḥ saparihāraḥ sapratyavamarṣaḥ kuśalasya nāpakarṣāyalam. kasmāt? kuśalaṃ hi 
me bahv anyad asti yatrāyam āvāpaṃ gataḥ svarge ’py apakarṣam alpaṃ kariṣyati” iti.” 
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the sentence, that is, that the sinful portion of the fruit is “removable and endurable,” the act of 
characterizing the fruits of Vedic sacrifice as fundamentally “merit” (福) itself suggests that he is 
here alluding to a non-Buddhist trend of thought. This hint was accordingly taken by his 
commentator Vasu, who was quick to cite SK 2. Viewed in this way, what Āryadeva does in the 
present context to refute Vedic ritualists’ claim is to confront them with yet another enemy, the 
Sāṃkhyas.  
 
 3.3.2 Bhāviveka’s Reading of Abhidharma on the Ten Unwholesome Courses of 
Action (akuśalakarmapatha) in MHK 9.31 
Like Āryadeva and Vasu, Bhāviveka makes use of the Sāṃkhyas’ negative views on Vedic 
sacrifice expressed in SK 2 when he, against the Mīmāṃsakas, argues that the Veda is authored 
by an evil being. This argument is posited as a conclusion to his repudiation of the Mīmāṃsakas’ 
claim that the Veda has no author. That is, after having “logically” demonstrated that the Veda 
must have a human author in MHK 9.24-30, Bhāviveka takes one further step: the Veda not only 
possesses an author, its putative author is evil. This thesis on the Veda’s authorship is expressed 
in the format of a syllogism in MHK 9.31; TJ on this verse corroborates the thesis with ample 
evidence from Vedic texts. And, since many of those evidential quotation that prove the evil 
authorship of the Veda in TJ overlap with those Vedic quotes that Sāṃkhya commentaries on SK 
2 use, Bhāviveka appears to ally himself with the Sāṃkhyas in MHK/TJ 9.31.  
 However, unlike Āryadeva and Vasu, Bhāviveka’s reference to Sāṃkhya is not explicit. 
This is evident not merely because he does not mention a Sāṃkhya text as Vasu does; rather the 
difficulty in discerning his alliance with the Sāṃkhyas is because the Sāṃkhya element appears 
in a predominantly Buddhist context, namely, discussions of the ten unwholesome courses of 
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action in Abhidharma literature. Thus, to discern Bhāviveka’s use of the Sāṃkhya source in 
MHK/TJ 9.31, it is imperative first to understand its Abhidharma background and then to locate 
features that cannot be explained solely from Buddhist sources. I will undertake this task of 
sifting the Sāṃkhya source from the Buddhist one in the next subsection. Here, by attending to 
the verse (MHK 9.31) itself and considering its Abhidharmic background, I will offer 
preliminary information to approach the Vedic quotations collected in TJ 9.31.  
 MHK 9.31 reads as follows: 
[Thesis:] Moreover, it is inferable that this text, the Veda, is produced by an 
evil person, [reason:] because it [teaches such evil things as] killing creatures, 
drinking liquor, and telling lies, [example:] just like the treatise of the 
Magas.225 
This verse, in accordance with Bhāviveka’s predilection for syllogism, consists of three parts 
that, taken as a whole, prove the thesis (pratijñā), that is, the evil authorship of the Veda 
(asatpuruṣakartṛkaḥ). The immoral practices of Brahmins—such as killing, drinking, and 
lying—are adduced as the reason (hetu) for the thesis. Lastly, to confirm the concomitance 
between the evil authorship and the evil teaching, Bhāviveka corroborates his inference with an 
example (dṛṣṭānta), that is, the treatise of the Magas (magaśāstra). Thus, just as the evil treatise 
of the Magas has the evil authors, (the Magas themselves), based on the evil nature of the Veda, 
Bhāviveka reasons, we need to presume an evil author behind the Veda. TJ begins with the 
confirmation on the known facts about the Magas. 
The Magas and so forth refer to those people with perverse practices. They 
reside in foreign countries such as Persia and their positions are known as 
follows. 
                                                 
225 MHK 9.31, “anumeyaś ca vedo ’yam asatpuruṣakartṛkaḥ/ bhūtahiṃsāsurāpānamithyokter 
magaśāstravat//” According to Kawasaki (1992, 415), the manuscript reads the underlined word as “-
kṛyokter” and Lindtner (2001a, 95) and (2001b, 17) emend it as “-kriyokter.” I have followed Kawasaki 
only because the Tibetan translation rendered that final item of the compound as “brdzun smra phyir” 
(MHK/TJ D281b1). Kawasaki also records a suggestion by V. Gokhale (or by Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana?; 
noted as “VS” which is not listed in the abbreviation (p. 406)) to read it as “-mṛṣokter.” 
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  [They maintain, for example, the following things:] Because they harm the 
earth, killing ants and so forth is not immoral conduct. By piling up [their] 
horns when one kills bulls, one goes to the heaven [after this life]. Likewise, 
[they also maintain that] when one fumigates [oneself with smoke] by burning 
the hearts of animals, one will be born in an elevated residence, that is, the 
superior heaven. Similarly, [they maintain the following:] Since all women are 
like mortars, flowers, fruits, cooked food, steps to a bathing place, roads and so 
forth, it is not good to say that one should not approach [for sexual purposes, 
one’s] mother, sisters, daughters and the like. 
  Is there any difference between the Veda and those Magas’ theses that speak 
of such [evil] things?226 
In this report on the tenets of a group called “Maga,” Bhāviveka explicitly mentions that his 
information is based not on firsthand knowledge, but what is known in the world about them (’di 
ltar grags te). For him, their immoral tenets that promote the practice of killing and incest are 
well known. Thus, what Bhāviveka attempts in this verse is to transfer the well-known 
immorality of the Magas, along with all the connotations of the word “foreigner” (mleccha), to a 
putative author of the Veda. By shifting the evil nature from the one (the Magas) to the other (a 
putative author of the Veda) based on the similarity of their teachings, the Veda, the text that is 
authorless for the Mīmāṃsakas, is proved to be a text authored by an evil being.  
 In Buddhist literature ranging from the earlier Abhidharma texts such as Karmaprajñapti 
(dated to early centuries of the Common Era)227 to the later Mahāyāna texts such as 
Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha (eighth cen. CE),228 the reference to the Magas of Persia is 
                                                 
226 TJ D281b1-4, “ma ga la sogs pa phyin ci log gi brtul zhugs can, par sig la sogs kla klo'i gnas na gnas 
pa, de dag gi grub pa'i mtha' ni 'di ltar grags te. sa la gnod pa byed pa yin pa'i phyir, grog ma la sogs pa 
bsad pa ni, chos ma yin pa ma yin no. ba lang bsad na, rwa brtsegs pa la brten nas, mtho ris su 'gro bar 
'gyur ro. de bzhin du, phyugs kyi snying bsregs pas bdugs na, gnas mthon po gong ma'i nam mkhar skye 
bar 'gyur ro zhes bya ba lta bu dang. de bzhin du, bud med thams cad ni gtun dang me tog dang 'bras bu 
dang g.yos zin pa'i zas dang khrus bya ba'i 'bab stegs dang lam zhes bya ba la sogs pa dang 'dra ba yin 
pas, ma dang sring mo dang bu mo la sogs pa la bgrod par bya ba ma yin no zhes zer ba ni legs pa ma 
yin no. zhes smra bar byed pa'i ma ga'i grub pa'i mtha' de dang rig byed la khyad par ci zhig yod de.” cf. 
Kawasaki (1992, 509-10)’s translation of this passage.  
227 For the reference to the Magas in this text, see Silk (2008, 436-7). 
228 Halbfass (1991, 126, en. 101) collects the post-Dharmakīrti references either to the Magas (maga) or 
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continually made, and those references indeed attest to the knowledge of the Magas’ tenets 
among Buddhist intellectuals. However, Bhāviveka’s “use” of the Maga case is different from 
that of previous texts; this difference can be summarized as follows.  
 First, the references to the Magas in previous texts differ from Bhāviveka’s in their 
purposes. While Bhāviveka draws upon the Magas’ tenets to prove the evil authorship of the 
Veda, previous sources cite the Maga case in order to criticize Brahmins in general. For example, 
the Mahāvibhāṣā cites the Magas’ views on killing (prāṇātipāta)229 and sexual misbehavior 
(kāmamithyācāra)230 in the context of the ten karmically unwholesome courses of action 
(akuśalakarmapatha). As the Mahāvibhāṣā lists the Magas’ views in the relevant sections, it 
curiously presents, side by side, Brahmins’ perverted views; in other words, it juxtaposes 
                                                 
to Persians (pārasīka). 
229 Mahāvibhāṣā (T 1545; MV) 605c16-21, “Also, in the western region from here, there are Mlecchas 
(foreigners) called Maga (ch. Mujia). They raise this views and posit this thesis: Parents (father and 
mother) became fragile, old, and sick. If one kills them, he or she would obtain merit and it does not count 
as sin. Why? Those who are fragile and old, as all their sense organs are decayed and defunct, cannot 
drink or eat. If they die and obtain new and excellent organs again, they [would be able to] drink fresh 
warm milk [again]. If one gets sick, mostly he or she are distressed by pain and agony. Since they become 
liberated from [the present suffering] when they die, killing them is no sin. ” (又此西方有蔑戾車名曰目
迦, 起如是見, 立如是論: 父母衰老及遭痼疾. 若能殺者得福無罪. 所以者何? 夫衰老者諸根朽敗
不能飮食. 若死更得新勝諸根, 飮新煖乳. 若遭痼疾多受苦惱. 死便解脫故殺無罪. ) 
230 MV 606a16-21, “In the West there are mleccha (barbarians) called Maga who produce such views as 
these, and establish such theories: there is absolutely no sin in behaving lustily with one’s mother, 
daughter, elder or younger sister, daughter-in-law or the like. Why? All women-kind are like ripe fruit, 
like prepared food and drink, a road, a bridge, a boat, a bathing spot, a mortar and so on. It is the custom 
that beings use these in common, and therefore there is no sin in behaving lustily towards them.” (又此西
方有蔑戾車名曰目迦, 起如是見, 立如是論: 母女姊妹及兒妻等, 於彼行欲悉無有罪. 所以者何? 
一切母邑, 皆如熟果已辦飮食道路橋船階梯臼等, 法爾有情共所受用. 是故於彼行欲無罪.); 
Translation is from Silk (2008, 437-8). 
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Brahmins’s views on killing231 and sexual misbehavior232 with the Magas’. And, in so doing, 
although the text does not explicitly comment on this juxtaposition, it alludes to their similarities. 
This practice of juxtaposing Brahmin and Maga views continues in later Abhidharma literature 
such as the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and two hostile commentaries on it, the Nyāyānusāra and 
the Abhidharmadīpa, in the same context of discussing the list of ten unwholesome courses of 
action.233 Thus, we may conclude that, before Bhāviveka, the Magas’ immorality was primarily 
used to compare them with Brahmins and, by doing so, implicitly criticizing Brahmins. 
Bhāviveka’s reference to the Magas is made to denigrate, not Brahmins, but their text, the Veda. 
 Second, pre-Bhāviveka references do not speak of the “treatise” (śāstra) of the 
Magas.234 They only relate the views held by the Magas and do not assume they exist in the 
form of “text.” When we consider this silence on the existence of the treatise of the Magas in 
previous sources and the fact that Bhāviveka supplies no new information on the Magas, it seems 
that Bhāviveka is simply reiterating the information on the Magas in the previous Abhidharma 
literature. It is thus plausible that Bhāviveka groundlessly assumed the existence of the Maga 
                                                 
231 The Mahāvibhāṣā lists the case of “one group of people” (一類) who sees no sin in killing animals in 
a ritual setting since they will be eaten by sacrificers after a sacrifice. (MV 605c12 – 14, “如有一類起如
是見立如是論: 駝馬牛羊雞豬鹿等, 皆爲祠祀人所食用, 是以殺之無罪.”) Though the text does not 
clarify the identity of this “one group of people,” it seems evident that the expression denotes Brahmin 
priests who kill animals in their sacrificial rituals. This case of Brahmin sacrificers is the first item in that 
category, while the Maga case is listed as the third example; between them lies the second case of those 
who do not see any fault in killing beings harmful to human. 
232 As for sexual misconduct, the Mahāvibhāṣā attributes the following opinion to Brahmins: “Brahmins 
raise this view and posit this thesis: ‘All Brahmins ought to accumulate four wives, Kṣatriyas three, 
Vaiśyas two, and Śūdras one. If a Brahmin does not fill this number [of wives], it is no sin to have sex 
with others’ wives.’ However, when they have sex, they have a conception that [those wives do] belong to 
others.” (MV 606a13-16, “婆羅門起如是見立如是論: 諸婆羅門應畜四婦, 刹帝利三, 吠舍應二, 戍
達羅一. 婆羅門等數若未滿, 婬他妻室亦無有罪. 然彼婬時起屬他想.”) 
233 See AKBh 240:18ff., NA 576c13ff., Abhidharmadīpa 154:1ff.  
234 Durvekamiśra is the sole exception. He speaks of a “Persian text” in his commentary on Dharmottara’s 
Nyāyabinduṭikā: “mātur vivāhasya kramaḥ paripāṭir upadiśyate yena pārasīkaśāstreṇa tadvat.” 
(Malvania ed. 15:17) 
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text. And it is also plausible that Bhāviveka made this groundless assumption in order to endow 
the Magas—whose evil nature is certain for his audience—with a text corresponding to the Veda. 
Only by supposing the existence of the Maga treatise could Bhāviveka propose the syllogism 
whose legitimacy hinges on the similarity between the contents of the Maga treatise and the 
Veda. Bhāviveka likely took this step in order to adapt the Abhidharma materials to the context 
of his confrontation with the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda.  
 MHK 9.31 is a “logical” conclusion reached by Bhāviveka from his reading of 
Abhidharma discussions on the ten unwholesome courses of action. He made the Buddhist 
derogatory views of Brahmins—only hinted at by the juxtaposition of their cases to those of the 
Magas—explicit by stating that the Veda is like the Magas’ treatise (magaśāstravat). He also 
transforms Abhidharma materials to meet the newly emerging opponent of the Mīmāṃsakas who 
claim that the Veda is without an author. The critique now aims at the Brahmins’ text, the Veda, 
instead of Brahmins themselves, and the Magas, accordingly, are given a text that can be 
compared with the Veda. What is missing in this process of transformation, however, is evidence 
that the Veda actually contains teachings comparable to those of the Magas. It is the task of TJ to 
present such evidence. For this purpose, Bhāviveka could not simply reuse the materials 
contained in his Abhidharma sources in their entirety, since they make no reference to the Veda. 
In other words, some of them lack the essential feature that Bhāviveka needed, that is, Vedic 
origin. To fill this lacuna, Bhāviveka presents a series of Vedic quotation which includes the 
Sāṃkhyas’ collection. 
   
 3.2.3 Correspondence of the Vedic Quotes between the Sāṃkhya Commentaries 
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on SK 2 and TJ on MHK 9.31 
TJ 9.31 contains quotations from the Veda, sometimes with short evaluative comments, which 
are collected to testify to its evil nature. They can be divided into six groups based on specific 
accusations.235 Those accusations are: killing (’tshe ba, hiṃsā),236 sexual misconduct (bgrod par 
bya ba ma yin pa la bgrod par bya ba, agamyāgamana),237 drinking liquor (chang btung ba, 
surāpāna),238 stealing (ma byin par len pa, adattādāna),239 lying (brdzun du smra ba, 
mṛṣāvāda),240 and prattle (ngag kyal ba, pralāpa).241 They do not fit into any of the established 
lists of precepts or wrongdoings. Despite Bhāviveka’s direct inheritance, in formulating his thesis 
on the evil authorship of the Veda at MHK 9.31, from the Abhidharma discussions on the ten 
unwholesome courses of action, it cannot be his framework since “drinking liquor” is not 
contained in the list of akuśalakarmapatha.242 Although the five Buddhist lay precepts 
(pañcaśīla)243 correspond to the first five items, the five precepts do not seems to be the model 
for Bhāviveka’s collection since TJ adds the sixth item “prattle.” One can think of similar Hindu 
                                                 
235 PP (PPT D215b4-5 and PPC (T1566), 119c15-7), on the contrary, only lists the first three (killing, 
sexual misconduct, and drinking liquor) in the same context of proving the evil authorship of the Veda. 
See Van der Kuijp (2006, 196) for a translation of the text both from Tibetan and Chinese. He also 
emends the text of Avalokitavrata’s commentary on that passage and translates it in pp. 197-8. 
236 TJ D281b4-6. 
237 TJ D281b7-282a6. 
238 TJ D282a6-282b1. 
239 TJ D282b1-3; This is the only case which the “heading” word for the accusation (that is, “taking what 
is not given” (ma byin par len pa)) is not attested in the text. However, it is clear that Bhāviveka intends 
to refer to the specific wrongdoing classified as “stealing” as he cites the same quotations which 
Abhidharma literature—from the Mahāvibhāṣā through AKBh to NA and AD—lists under the heading of 
“stealing” (adattādāna).  
240 TJ D282b3-283a4. 
241 TJ D283a4-283b5. 
242 Ten unwholesome courses of action (akuśalakarmapatha) consist of: killing (prāṇātipāta), theft 
(adattādāna), sexual misconduct (kāmamithyācāra), lying (mṛṣāvāda), malicious speech (paiśunyavāda), 
frivolous prattle (pralāpa), verbal abuse (pāraṣyavāda), covetousness (abhidhyā), malice (vyāpāda), and 
wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi). 
243 Five precepts of the Buddhist laity consists of abstention from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, 
lying, and drinking liquor. 
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lists such as the five great sins (mahāpātaka)244 and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga five “abstentions” 
(yama)245 for ascetics, but neither exhausts the six accusations of TJ. 
 In what follows, I list the Vedic quotations found in both TJ 9.31 and the Sāṃkhya 
commentaries on SK 2, or more precisely, on the word “impurity” (aviśuddhi) of SK 2. The 
Sāṃkhya commentaries, taken as a whole, accuse the Veda of teaching five of the six items of TJ 
- killing, sexual misconduct, drinking, lying, and prattle. Except for one case (the case of 
Gosava), instances of the correspondence between TJ and the Sāṃkhya commentaries are not 
found in Abhidharma literature. What this correspondence means is hard to determine. Given that 
TJ contains many more quotations from the Veda, it is unlikely that Bhāviveka copied those 
materials from Sāṃkhya commentaries. Nevertheless, it remains possible that he was inspired by 
the Sāṃkhya commentaries and independently collected similar sentences from the Veda. The 
reverse process—the Sāṃkhyas’ copying from TJ—is also a possibility. The exact relationship 
between them cannot be ascertained, in part because Bhāviveka is generally dated to 500-570 CE 
and most of the Sāṃkhya commentaries below are vaguely assigned to 500-600 CE (Larson and 
Bhattacharya 1987, 15-6).  
 Still, despite all the uncertainties, the following seems to be certain. Buddhists and the 
Sāṃkhyas shared a stock list of Vedic passages to be easily cited, much like clichés, whenever 
one undertook an argument against Vedic ritualists. 
                                                 
244 Cf. Manusmṛti 11.55, “Killing a Brahmin, drinking liquor, stealing, and having sex with an elder’s 
wife—they call these ‘grievous sins causing loss of caste’; and so is establishing any links with such 
individuals.” (brahmahatyā surāpānaṃ steyaṃ gurvaṅganāgamaḥ/ mahānti pātakāny āhuḥ saṃyogaś 
caiva taiḥ saha//); text and translation are from Olivelle (2005, 847 and 217-8). See also the remark of 
Kane (1953, 15): “…among the early sūtra works there was no general agreement about the nature and 
number of mahāpātakas, upapātakas and other classes of sins, even though as early as the Chāndogya 
Upaniṣad the mortal sins had been declared to be five.”  
245 Cf. Yogasūtra 2.30, “Abstinence from injury and from falsehood and from theft and from incontinence 
and from acceptance of gifts are the abstentions.” (ahiṃsāsatyāsteyabrahmacaryāparigrahā yamāḥ//); 
translation is from Wood (1914, 178). 
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 The Case of Aśvamedha and Puruṣamedha 
For killing, TJ lists only phrases such as “cattle should also be killed” (ba lang yang gsad par 
bya’o). However, the last quotation in the killing section refers to a specific sacrifice, the Horse 
Sacrifice (rta dag gi mchod sbyin; Aśvamedha). The Vedic injunction says “in the Horse 
Sacrifice, pierce each horse with five hundred needles and harshly torment them. Then offer 
them into the fire.”246 This is an injunction for the three—chief (mahiṣī), favorite (vāvātā), and 
neglected (parivṛktī)—wives of the royal sacrificer who use needles to indicate the lines along 
for the dissection of the horse by the Adhvaryu priest.247  
 In the previous Abhidharma literature, the case of ritual killing is alluded to, but the 
Horse Sacrifice is not. The commentaries on SK 2, on the other hand, are almost unanimous in 
identifying Aśvamedha as evidence for the Veda’s impurity. Beginning with the Suvarṇasaptati 
(金七十論, T 2137; SS)248 translated into Chinese by Paramārtha between 557 and 569, most of 
the commentaries quote the same unidentified verse that refers to Aśvamedha, viz. the 
Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti (Solomon 1973a, 7; V1), the Sāṃkhyavṛtti (Solomon 1973b, 5; V2), 
Gauḍapāda’s Bhāṣya (Colebrooke and Wilson 1837, 3; GBh), the Māṭharavṛtti (Sarma and 
Vangiya 1970, 6; M), and the Yuktidīpikā (Motegi and Wezler 1998, 31; YD), with the exception 
of the Jayamaṅgalā (Sarma and Vangiya 1970; JM) and the Tattvakaumudī. 
                                                 
246 TJ D281b6, “rta dag gi mchod sbyin la, rta re re la khab lnga brgya lnga brgya btsugs la, shin tu zug 
gzer dang ldan par byas nas, sbyin sreg bya'o.” 
247 See the Dumont (1948, 450)’s summary of this stage of Aśvamedha: “Then the Mahiṣī, the Vāvātā, 
and the Parivṛktī mark out, by means of needles, the lines for the dissection of the horse’s body. The 
Adhvaryu or one of his assistants then cuts the horse’s hide in order to take, for the oblation of the 
omenta, the fat that serves as a substitute for the omentum of the horse. The assistants of the priests then 
cut the other victims open, and pull out the omenta, which are to be offered into the fire.” The Taittirīya 
Brāhmāṇa 3.9.6 (trans. ibid., 482-3) describes this process but does not mention the number of needles. 
For a detailed analysis of Aśvamedha, see Jamison (1996, 65-88).  
248 T2137, 1245b17-9. 
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According to the [scriptural] instruction for Aśvamedha, on the second day,249 
six hundred animals minus three animals (i.e., totaling 597 animals) are bound 
[to the sacrificial posts and then killed].250 
Thus, TJ 9.31, like the Sāṃkhya commentaries, points to the same sacrifice to prove the evilness 
of the Veda, although it does not cite the same verse. However, it is not that Bhāviveka fails to 
quote this verse, which must have been famous among the Sāṃkhyas. Bhāviveka quotes this 
verse at TJ on MHK 9.2 where he, as in TJ 9.31, collects a number of Vedic quotations.251  
 MHK 9.2 belongs to the pūrvapakṣa, that is, the opponent’s section. As the quotation of 
this verse makes clear, the pūrvapakṣa is not an innocent presentation of the opponent’s tenets; it 
is rather an ironic picture of the opponent, with all the points of attack that would surface in the 
author’s own critique (the siddhānta) embedded. The Vedic quotations compiled under MHK 9.2 
are also filled with, at least to the outsiders, absurd and immoral words of the Veda. One is the 
infamous line from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa 3.4.1.1-4 on Human Sacrifice (puruṣamedha): “1. To 
the Power of the Order of the Brāhmaṇas he (i.e., the Sacrificer, or the Adhvaryu acting for the 
Sacrificer) offers as a victim a Brāhmaṇa. 2. To the Power of the Order of the Kṣatriyas, a 
Kṣatriya. 3. To the Maruts, a Vaiśya (i.e., a member of the third Order). 4. To Hardship, a Śūdra 
(i.e., a member of the fourth Order).”252 It is significant for our purpose to note that this same 
                                                 
249 Aśvamedha is basically a three-day Soma sacrifice preceded and followed by a year of preparatory 
and concluding ceremonies. See Dumont (1948, Introduction). 
250 I have used the text in YD (ibid.). “ṣaṭśatāni niyujyante paśūnāṃ madhyame ’hani/ aśvamedhasya 
vacanād ūnāni paśubhis tribhiḥ//” 
251 TJ D271b7, “bar gyi dus la bab pa na/ byol song drug gam bdun sbyar bya/ rta yis gtsang ma'i tshig 
yin no/ nyung la byol song gsum gyis so/” One of the interesting points of this Tibetan translation is that in 
the second pāda it says: “Six or seven animals are to be bound [the sacrificial posts].” This shows that the 
translators of TJ (i.e., Atiśa and his disciple Nag tsho Lo tsā ba Tshul khrims rgyal ba) read “six hundred” 
(ṣaṭśatāni) as “six or seven” (drug gam bdun; *ṣaṭsaptāni) in their manuscript. The translation of 
“aśvamedhasya vacanāt” into “rta yis gtsang ma’i tshig yin no” may indicate the translators had 
“aśvamedhyasya” instead of “aśvamedhasya” (“-medhya” in the sense of “gtsang ma,” that is, “pure”).  
252 Text and translation from Dumont (1963, 178), “1. brahmaṇe brāhmaṇam ālabhate. 2. kṣatrāya 
rājanyam. 3. marudbhyo vaiśyam. 4. tapase śūdram.” (Vedic accents are omitted). The corresponding 
Tibetan translation in TJ (TJ D272a2) is: “bram ze la ni bram ze bsad/ rgyal rigs kyi ni rgyal rigs bsad/ 
ma ru dag la rje rigs te/ dka' thub dag la dmangs rigs so/” This Tibetan passage is first identified in 
   131 
verse is also quoted in V1 (7), M (6),253 and YD (31).254 
 In sum, in Bhāviveka’s accusation of the Veda for teaching killing, with specific 
examples of Aśvamedha and Puruṣamedha, we see correspondences between the Sāṃkhya 
commentaries and TJ (9.2 and 31) but not between the Abhidharma source and TJ. 
 
 The Case of Gosava 
TJ refers to two cases when accusing the Veda of sexual perversity. One is a specific ritual 
named “Gosava” (D281b7-282a4) and the other deals with a rather general occasion in which the 
sacrificer desires sexual intercourse (D282a4-6). Between these two, the first seems to have been 
notorious among the opponents of Vedic sacrifice, since all three sources— Sāṃkhya, 
Abhidharma, and TJ—cite more or less the same Vedic prescription for this ritual.255 The TJ 
version reads:256 
Sexual approach to those whom should not be approached in such a way is also 
sanctioned [in the Veda]. Such is illustrated in the sacrifice of those under the 
cow-vow. It is said: “After having performed a cow-sacrifice, for a year, a 
Brahmin should live under the cow-vow. One should drink water and chew 
grass like a bull; should mount the mother; should also mount the siblings of 
mother; should also mount [others] of one’s own lineage. Wherever one finds 
those [females] to be entered and stayed, there he does it.257 When one behaves 
                                                 
Kawasaki (1974, 1123) based on which Halbfass (1991, 94) lists works that cite or allude to this passage 
including the Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti (V1), Yuktidīpikā, and TJ.  
253 The quotation in both V1 and M includes the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa 3.4.1.6 (but not 3.4.1.5), “6. To 
Hell, the killer of a man.” (6. nārakāya vīrahaṇam.) See Dumont (ibid.). 
254 YD only quotes the first line, that is, “1. brahmaṇe brāhmaṇam ālabhate.” 
255 It is noteworthy that even Hindu authors, like Bhartṛhari, expressed negative views of Gosava. One 
Hindu text, the Garuḍapurāṇa, even explicitly prohibits Gosava along with another two sacrifices, as we 
have seen, problematized by the Sāṃkhyas and Buddhists, viz. Aśvamedha and Puruṣamedha. See Thite 
(1972, 197). 
256 There are two corresponding Sanskrit texts to this translated passage from TJ. One is the Jaminīya 
Brāhmaṇa 2.113 (Caland 1919, 157) and the other is the quoted passage in V1 (7-8). The text quoted in 
AKBh (241) and Abhidharmadīpa (154) which copies AKBh lack the last two sentences of TJ.  
257 In translating this sentence I consulted the corresponding passage quoted in V1 (8): “yatra yatra 
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like a bull, he would be victorious over the whole world.”258 
Two Sāṃkhya commentaries on SK 2, V1 (7-8) and M (6)259, and three Abhidharma texts, AKbh 
(241), NA (577a13-5), and Abhidharmadīpa (154), refer to this same ritual. To this passage, 
Bhāviveka adds information on Gosava, not directly from a Vedic text, but based on a certain 
“branch of learning that helps understanding [of the Veda]” (rtogs pa la phan pa'i yal ga) and 
Brahmins’ justification of the ritual.260 This additional part, which is not found in other Sāṃkhya 
or Abhidharma sources, seems to serve as the source of information on Gosava for 
Avalokitavrata when he comments on Bhāviveka’s PP.261  
 
  The Case of Sautrāmaṇī 
Glossing the phrase “drinking liquor” (chang ’thung ba) of Bhāviveka in PP, Avalokitavrata 
specifies the Vedic ritual called Sautrāmaṇī (rendered as “sau ta ma ni”).262 Bhāviveka seems to 
have that ritual in mind, since TJ also speaks of the ritual called “nor bu skud pa la bskus pa” (TJ 
D282a7). I am unsure how to reconstruct the Sanskrit name for the ritual from this Tibetan 
translation, but Sautrāmaṇī seems that “nor bu” corresponds to “mani” and “skud pa” to “sūtra” 
                                                 
cainām upaviṣṭāṃ vindati tatra tatropaviśati.” It may rather correspond to the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa 
version of it (“yatra yatrainaṃ viṣṭhā vindet, tat tad vitiṣṭheta.”), but then the meaning of the TJ sentence 
would be like “wherever nature’s call finds him, there he does it.” However, taking “zhugs shing 'dug pa” 
(entering and staying) as “viṣṭhā” (as in JB) in the sense of “excrement” is more unlikely comparing to 
reading the same as “upaviṣṭā” (as in V1) in the sense of “seat.” 
258 TJ D281b7-282a2, “bgrod par bya ba ma yin pa la bgrod par bya ba yang rjes su gnang ngo zhes ba 
lang gi brtul zhugs can gyi mchod sbyin las bstan te. bram zes ba lang gi mchod sbyin byas nas, lo gcig gi 
bar du, ba lang gi brtul zhugs la gnas par bya ste. ba lang bzhin du chu btung zhing rtswa yang gcad par 
bya la; ma la yang bzhon par bya; ma'i spun zla la yang bzhon par bya; rang gi rigs la yang bzhon par 
bya ste. gang dang gang du zhugs shing 'dug pa der rnyed pa de dang de la spyad cing ba lang bzhin du 
spyad na, 'jig rten thams cad las rgyal bar 'gyur ro zhes bya ba.” 
259 M only mentions the name gosava without any further clarification. 
260 See TJ D282a2-4. 
261 The passage in which Avalokitavrata discusses Gosava (PPṬ D203a2-4) is translated in van der Kuijp 
(2006, 198) and Silk (2008, 441, fn. 17). 
262 See van der Kuijp (2006, 196 and 198). 
   133 
(See Negi 1993-2005, vol. 7 and 1, s.v.). If this conjecture is plausible, the translation shows that 
the translators of TJ were unfamiliar with this Vedic ritual since the name of the ritual, 
Sautrāmaṇī, has nothing to do with the words sūtra and maṇi according to the traditional 
understanding of its name. The Vedic tradition connects the ritual with the myth in which the 
Aśvins reinvigorate Indra who improperly consumed Soma,263 and thus, “the word sautrāmaṇī is 
derived from the word sutrāman, an epithet of Indra” (Kolhatkar 1999, 13) who “has good 
protection” (sutrāman) of the Aśvins.  
 As the ten unwholesome courses of action of Buddhists do not contain this 
“wrongdoing” of drinking liquor, Abhidharma literature does not make reference to the 
Sautrāmaṇī ritual in that context. The Sāṃkhya commentaries, on the other hand, decry the Vedic 
ritual for the drinking intoxicating beverages, though only in passing. JM (67) mentions 
“drinking soma” (somapāna) as one of the reasons for the impurity of Vedic sacrifice. V1 (8) 
also lists “drinking what should not be drunk” (apeyapāna) but glosses it as “drinking surā” 
(surāpāna)264 without mentioning a specific ritual.265 Lastly, M (6) directly mentions the fault of 
“drinking surā” in the context of Sautrāmaṇī.266 Though the Vedic quotations cited by Bhāviveka 
in this case do not appear in the Sāṃkhya sources, it is still significant that Bhāviveka 
problematizes the act of drinking liquor and refers to this ritual despite silence on this point in his 
immediate resource, Abhidharma literature.  
 
                                                 
263 See, e.g., Eggeling 1882-1900, pt. 3, 129ff. 
264 The word “surā-” in surāpāna is misprinted as “sura-.” 
265 Sautrāmaṇī is not the only ritual in which surā (“a kind of beer prepared from grains”) is used. It is 
used in some of both domestic (gṛhya) and solemn (śrauta) rituals. See Kolhatkar (1999, 2-3). 
266 “sautrāmaṇyāṃ surāpānam.” 
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 The Case of Vedic Lies   
There is a verse cited in the Sāṃkhya commentaries and the Abhidharma texts that enumerates 
five occasions in which lying is permitted: “Oh King, playful lying, lying to women, in marriage, 
or in danger of death, does not hurt; one says that these five lies are not transgressions.”267 
However, Bhāviveka does not quote this verse, perhaps due to its non-Vedic origin. De la Vallée 
Poussin (1988-90, 737, fn. 303) lists several texts that may have served as the source,268 but 
none of them can be classified as śruti, that is, the “Veda” proper, and V1 (8) explicitly 
introduces the verse by calling it smṛti (“atha smṛtāv apy uktam”). A verse from a secondary 
authoritative work like this is of no use to Bhāviveka, who wants to prove the evil authorship of 
the Veda.  
 Yet there is one verse commonly found in one commentary on SK 2 and TJ. The 
*Suvarṇasaptati, extant in Chinese, provides the following Vedic passage: “O thou animal! Thy 
father, thy mother and thy kindred all approve of thee. Now thou art about to abandon thy present 
body to be reborn in the heavens.”269 Though it does not match Ṛg Veda I.163.13,270 which 
Takakusu (1931, 4, fn.1) refers to, the text itself specifies the Veda (皮陀) as its source.271 TJ’s 
quote (TJ D282b3-4) only differs by listing more groups of assenters that can be subsumed under 
                                                 
267 AKBh (241:12-5), “na narmayuktam anṛtaṃ hinasti na strīṣu rājan na vivāhakāle/ prāṇātyaye 
sarvadhanāpahāre pañcānṛtāny āhur apātakāni//” Translation is from de la Vallée Poussin (1998-90, 
646). V1 (8) and V2 (6) cite this verse.  
268 The works listed by de la Vallée Poussin are the Mahābhārata, Gautama(-dharmasūtra?) and 
Vasiṣṭhasmṛti. He also mentions the 13th cen. Jaina work, the Syādvādamañjarī. Nance (2012, 77, fn. 6) 
also identifies this verse as Mahābhārata 1.77.16.  
269 Translation is from Takakusu (1931[1904], 3-4). SS, 1245b16-7, “獸! 汝父母及眷屬悉皆隨喜汝. 汝
今捨此身, 必得生天上.” 
270 See Jamison and Brereton (2014)’s translation of the verse: “The steed has gone forth to the highest 
seat, to his father and mother [=Heaven and Earth]. He should go to the gods today, for he is most 
pleasing (to them); then he expresses his hope for desirable things for the pious man.” (vol.1, 349) 
271 Curiously, in the quarrel between an ascetic opponent (yati) and Vedic ritualist (adhvaryu) that Alsdorf 
(2010, 37-8) reports referring to the Mahābhārata, the ascetic argues against the opponent that one should 
obtain consents from the family members and friends of the victim before sacrificing it.  
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the term “kindred” (眷屬): brothers (spun zla), siblings (mngal gcig pa), and those of the same 
family lineage (rigs gcig pa). This Vedic quotation is a sheer lie for Bhāviveka because it is 
absurd to assume that completely dull animals can give assent and one cannot go to heaven 
without accumulating wholesome karma by oneself.272  
 
 The Case of Bawdy Prattle 
In one of the Vedic passages about prattle, Bhāviveka unusually speaks in the first person, saying 
“the following is what I have heard” (bdag gis 'di ltar thos te). The ritual that Bhāviveka reports 
is called “the Bark-clad” (shing shun can). Although the entire meaning of the relevant 
passage273 is not clear, it seems that the ritual consists of 1. winning the debate with a female 
Brahmin who expounds (or recites?) the Veda and 2. the winner and the female Brahmin having 
sexual intercourse. The first two components of this ritual remind me of the coupling of a Vedic 
student (brahmacārin) and a prostitute (puṃścalī) on the Mahāvrata day (that is, New Year’s 
day), which marks the end of a year-long Gavāmayana sacrifice. Jamison (1996, 96) summarily 
notes this component of the ritual: “The two are stationed such that the student is within the vedi, 
the whore outside it. They both insult each other, in tones reminiscent of the bawdy dialogues in 
the Aśvamedha, and copulate.” Although the female figure in Bhāviveka’s report is a Brahmin, 
there are common elements between them: the male and the female first exchange words and 
then have sex. In this two-step process, sexual intercourse is more conspicuous, but Bhāviveka 
lists it under the heading of prattle (ngag kyal ba; pralāpa). There is one Sāṃkhya commentary, 
                                                 
272 TJ D282b4-5, “byol song rnams ni sems kun du rmongs pa yin pas, gnang ba ster ba yang rigs pa ma 
yin la, rang gi dge ba'i las byas pa med par, mtho ris su 'gro ba yang med do.” 
273 TJ D283b1-2, “gzhan yang bdag gis 'di ltar thos te. mchod sbyin shing shun can zhes bya ba su la 
yang rig byed smra bar byed pa'i bram ze mo dang rtsod pa las de rgyal bar gyur to. de nas des de dang 
'khrig pa spyad pa las, aa shvad tha'i 'bras bu za ba skyes te. de rig byed kyi slob dpon yin zhes grag go.” 
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the Māṭharavṛtti dated to the ninth century CE (Larson and Bhattacharya 1987, 291), that 
problematizes this sexually charged verbal exchange by listing “priests’ prattling on about their 
own desire with a slut” (raṇḍayā saha svecchālāpaś ca ṛtvijām; M 6). 
 
 3.2.4 Assessing Bhāviveka’s Critique of the Veda in MHK/TJ 9.31 
The correspondences between TJ and the Sāṃkhya commentaries on SK 2 indicate that Vedic 
passages deemed immoral were known to the anti-Vedic camp of intellectuals. Although this 
cannot be used to prove Bhāviveka’s actual use of the Sāṃkhya commentaries, the 
correspondence strongly implies Bhāviveka’s adoption of the Sāṃkhya strategy of challenging 
Vedic authority. This is because, while the collecting of immoral Vedic quotations is well 
developed in the Sāṃkhya commentaries on SK 2, such a practice is not found in the antecedent 
Buddhist literature. Nevertheless, Bhāviveka’s alliance with the Sāṃkhyas is not as explicit as 
that of Āryadeva and Vasu. His alliance is merely hinted at compiling immoral passages from the 
Veda rather than adopting the Sāṃkhya view without a critical comment (like Āryadeva) or 
citing the Sāṃkhya text in the place of Buddhist scripture (like Vasu). These differences in the 
degree of alliance with the Sāṃkhyas seems to be caused by the different identities of their 
opponents. In their respective contexts, Āryadeva and Vasu opposed Vedic ritualists and 
Bhāviveka opposed the Mīmāṃsakas. It is important to note that the Sāṃkhyas did not oppose 
the Veda as a whole, only a specific portion that prescribes Vedic sacrifice.  
 In one episode in the Mokṣadharma portion of the Mahābhārata, a certain Kapila, 
bearing the same name of the founder of Sāṃkhya, expresses his sympathy for a cow being 
dragged to sacrifice by saying “Alas, ye the Vedas.”274 When confronted by Vedic authority 
                                                 
274 See Chakravarti (1975, 5-6). 
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represented by the sage Syūmaraśmi, who entered into the body of the cow, Kapila restricts his 
critical stance to the “work” (karma) portion of the Veda and shows his preference for the 
“knowledge” (jñāna) portion of the Veda.275 This somewhat limited criticism of the Veda is also 
reflected in the SK 2 itself. Although it relegates Vedic means (i.e., Vedic sacrifice) to the level of 
mundane means such as Āyurveda (see SK 1) as far as its efficacy in removing human suffering 
is concerned (dṛṣṭavad ānuśravikaḥ; SK 2a), it still does not completely deny the value of Vedic 
sacrifice when it says that the Sāṃkhya way of discriminating the manifest, the unmanifest, and 
the knower (vyaktāvyaktajñavijñānāṭ; SK 2d) is superior (śreyān; in SK 2c). What is being 
argued is not a total rejection of the Veda or Vedic sacrifice, but only the superiority of the 
Sāṃkhya means of knowledge.  
 However clearly this “limited” critique of the Veda is expressed in the writings of the 
Sāṃkhyas, it must have been viewed as dubious at best by the Mīmāṃsakas, who take the 
entirety of the Veda, though with special emphasis on the “work” portion, as authoritative. To the 
Mīmāṃsakas, the Sāṃkhya statement that Vedic sacrifice is united with impurity, destruction, 
and relativity (sa hy aviśuddhikṣayātiśayayuktaḥ; SK 2b) and their compiling of Vedic sentences 
to prove the three defects of Vedic sacrifice are nothing other than attacks on Vedic orthodoxy. 
The Sāṃkhyas, with their critique of the Vedic cultural norm, went to an extreme and, by doing 
so, risked their membership in the loose association of Brahmanical intellectual circles, 
collectively termed “āstika.” Thus it is unsurprising to see that the Yuktidīpikā in its commentary 
on the word “impurity” in SK 2b invites a Mīmāṃsaka opponent276 to declare that the intention 
of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, the author of SK, is to point out the superiority of the Sāṃkhya method rather 
than to denounce the Veda altogether.277 In this sense, the confrontation with the Mīmāṃsakas in 
                                                 
275 See ibid. and Houben (1999b, 502) for this episode and relevant references. 
276 The Mīmāṃsaka opponent in the Yuktidīpikā is most probably Kumārila. See Halbfass (1991, 93-4). 
277 See Wezler and Motegi (1998, 31:19-35:9). Houben (2001, 177) sees a reason for the survival of 
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the Yuktidīpikā reveals the Sāṃkhyas’ deep affiliation with the Veda beneath their derogatory 
remarks on Vedic sacrifice.  
 Bhāviveka’s confrontation with the Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, forces him to break 
with the full alliance with the Sāṃkhyas exemplified by Āryadeva and Vasu. The Sāṃkhyas’ 
critique of Vedic sacrifice was good enough for Āryadeva and Vasu, who were refuting Vedic 
ritualists who assert the eternity of the fruit of Aśvamedha. However, when the opponents begin 
to base the legitimacy of Vedic sacrifice on the authority of the Veda, and thereby, move the 
debate from the morality of Vedic sacrifice to scriptural authority,278 Buddhists cannot, at least 
explicitly, cooperate with the Sāṃkhyas, who accept the authority of the Veda, at least in a 
limited a sense. Bhāviveka’s “alliance” with the Sāṃkhyas is therefore not made with the 
common goal of criticizing the immoral nature of Vedic sacrifice. Rather, the parallelism found 
between TJ 9.31 and the Sāṃkhya commentaries on SK 2 is limited to copying the strategy and 
sharing the source. That is to say, the strategy and source of the Sāmkhyas, through Bhāviveka, 
came to serve a different goal of proving the evil authorship and denigrating the authority of the 
Veda as a whole. 
 In this process, the Mīmāṃsakas played the role of “splitter.” By questioning their 
                                                 
Sāṃkhya in their double positioning vis-a-vis the Veda: “... proto-Sāṃkhya survived at all over the 
centuries as a system—and this in spite of the dominance of rationality in its earliest phases—because of 
its simultaneous association, in a kind of love-hate relationship, with the wide-spread and well-established 
Brahmanism or Bramanical ritualism.” (emphasis in the original) See also ibid., p. 175. It is noteworthy 
that, in Vācaspati’s commentary on SK 2, one may notice that the “rebellious“ spirit of the Sāṃkhya, so 
to speak, is arrested and domesticated to the Mīmāṃsaka scheme.  
278 This strategy of the Mīmāṃsakas to discuss Vedic sacrifice only in terms of the Veda and its 
hermeneutics in disregard of moral problems involved in Vedic sacrifice, is well expressed in MS 1.1.2: 
“Dharma is that which is indicated by (known by means of) the Veda as conducive to the highest good.” 
(codanālakṣaṇo ’rtho dharmaḥ) (Translation from Jha 1933, 4). Four syllogisms that Bhāviveka 
formulates as the conclusion of MHK/TJ 9.31 (TJ D283b5-284a1) are specifically directed at this sūtra. 
The first, third, and fourth reject the pramāṇa-status of the Veda concerning dharma while the second 
refutes the Mīmāṃsaka understanding of the term “dharma” as sacrificial activities exemplified in, for 
example, Śabara’s commentary on MS 1.1.2 (See ŚBhF 20:3-11).  
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attitudes, not toward Vedic sacrifice but toward the Veda, they successfully forced Buddhists and 
the Sāṃkhyas to choose between mutually exclusive options of pro- and anti-Veda. In other 
words, by drawing the nominal but normative line between āstika and nāstika around the 
authority of the Veda, the Mīmāṃsakas succeeded in attenuating the shared discontent with 
sanguinary sacrificial culture among the ascetic traditions of Buddhism and Sāṃkhya, requiring 
either a deep-rooted antagonism or sympathy to the eternal signifier of Indian orthodoxy, the 
Veda.  
 
3.4 The Fate of the Traditional Critique of the Veda in the post-Bhāviveka period 
The Mīmāṃsakas’ doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda received greater attention from 
Buddhist philosophers after Bhāviveka. We will consider in this section the critiques made by 
two, namely, Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita. Their engagement with the Mīmāṃsa system in 
general and with the doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda in particular are as extensive as 
that of Bhāviveka, and therefore, for a full appreciation of their arguments, they need to be 
independently analyzed. Our approach here will be selective in accordance with our comparative 
concern. The purpose of discussing their positions is only to show that they do not employ the 
traditional critique of the Veda against the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine and they curiously inherit the 
strategy of Saṅghabhadra, which declares the unintelligibility of the Veda. The continuation of 
Saṅghabhadra’s strategy is highlighted in the case of Dharmakīrti, since he does not show any 
awareness of Bhāviveka’s effort to link the traditional critique of the Veda with the Mīmāmsaka 
doctrine. In the case of Śāntarakṣita, on the contrary, we see evidence that later Buddhists 
consciously chose to adopt Saṅghabhadra’s or Dharmakīrti’s strategy of refuting the Mīmāṃsaka 
doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda over that of Bhāviveka. Viewed in this way, the 
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traditional critique of the Veda can be said to terminate with Bhāviveka as it was no longer 
inherited by later Buddhist intellectuals.  
 
 3.4.1 Dharmakīrti’s “Can the Veda Speak?” Policy 
Dharmakīrti’s strategy of countering the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda 
is lucidly epitomized in the title of the joint work by Eltschinger, Krasser, and Taber (2012): Can 
the Veda Speak? It contains a rigorous translation of the concluding part of Dharmakīrti’s 
extensive excursus on the critique of the Mīmāṃsakas at the end of the first chapter of 
Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika (PV 1.312-340) along with his auto-commentary (svavṛtti) 
(PVSV 164:24-176:16). The title unambiguously indicates that Dharmakīrti, like Saṅghabhadra, 
does not link the traditional Buddhist critique of the Veda with the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine and 
employs the strategy of revealing the undesirable consequence that the Veda is an unintelligible 
text if it is, as the Mīmāṃsakas claim, without an author.  
 However, Dharmakīrti’s engagement with this doctrine is far more extensive than that of 
Saṅghabhadra, and therefore, a multitude of arguments are employed to refute the Mīmāṃsaka 
claim. As Eltschinger (2012, 14-5) summarizes the situation, from diverse arguments employed 
by Dharmakīrti in this section, we may discern two main threads:  
(1) As Dharmakīrti strongly insists upon in an earlier passage, by denying the 
Veda any human agency and hence intentionality, the Mīmāṃsaka deprives it 
of any meaning, for meaningfulness depends on conventions (saṅketa, samaya) 
that are nothing but shared semantic intentions (vivakṣā, vaktur 
icchā/abhiprāyaḥ). An authorless scripture could only be unintelligible and 
devoid of truth value. (2) But there is yet another reason why the meaning of 
the Veda, granted it exists, cannot be arrived at by the Mīmāṃsaka unless he 
contradicts his own claim that humans, qua humans, cannot perceive 
supersensible things. Since Vedic words have an invisible relation to invisible 
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things, no one can pretend to ascertain what they really refer to. (numerals are 
added) 
Despite minor arguments that cannot be easily subsumed under this summary, Dharmakīrti’s 
section on the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda on the whole consists of 
two principal strategies. First he argues that the Veda, being an authorless text, cannot bear any 
meaning, and second, even if we suppose the meaningfulness of it, the Mīmāṃsakas cannot 
decipher its meaning since they do not admit a human capability of perceiving supersensible 
things, such as the relation between Vedic words and their putative supersensible referents. 
Among these two, the first exactly matches the argument of Saṅghabhadra that the Veda, which 
is speech not preceded by an intellect, does not convey any meaning. In what follows, in order to 
document the thesis that the first thread of Dharmakīrti’s arguments is, if not a direct inheritance 
from Saṅghabhadra, then at least in line with Saṅghabhadra’s strategy, I extract Dharmakīrti’s 
remarks that represent this thread from his section on the authorlessness of the Veda. 
 The whole strategy of demonstrating the unintelligibility of the Veda could not have 
been more poignantly expressed than in the following verse of Dharmakīrti. 
Therefore, what valid cognition is there that the [Vedic] statement [which is 
ordinarily taken to mean] “One who desires heaven should perform the 
Agnihotra” doesn’t mean “One should eat dog meat”?279 
This verse shows the meaninglessness of the Veda by rather maliciously interpreting the stock 
example of the Vedic injunction, “one who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra,” as 
meaning “one should eat dog meat.” This deliberate semantic distortion of the Vedic injunction is 
possible from subsequent verses and commentaries on them, mainly because, for Dharmakīrti, 
language is a system of conventions that operate in accordance with the speaker’s intention.  
                                                 
279 PV 1.318, “tenāgnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma iti śrutau/ khādec chvamāṃsam ity eṣa nārtha ity atra 
kā pramā//”; translation is from Eltschinger, Krasser, Taber (2012, 40).  
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 Over the three verses (PV 1.327-9),280 negating the Mīmāṃsakas’ contention that the 
word-meaning relationship is natural, Dharmakīrti argues that language is a conventional system 
that is instrumental in conveying the speaker’s intention (1.327ab), and consequently, the word-
meaning relationship is arbitrary rather than necessary (1.329ab). Accordingly, the authorless 
Veda has no fixed meaning (1.327cd, 1.328d). In the course of commenting on these verses, 
Dharmakīrti differentiates two orders, of nature and of convention, and points out that language 
belongs to the latter. The major difference between the two orders lies in the necessity of the 
“explanatory rule” (paribhāṣā). Those that belong to the order of nature (svabhāvabheda) such 
as the color “blue” are perceived, without any explanation, by sense organs (indriyagamya). On 
the contrary, it is improper to apprehend those which belong to the order of convention 
(sāmayika) such as the “insignia of a king” based on their natures, that is, as things themselves, 
since understanding the significance of such things requires an explanatory rule 
(tadapekṣapratīti) and their meanings conform to the intention of their users (icchāvṛtti).281 
 If the nature of language is a conventional system operating in conformity with the 
speaker’s intention, then the meaning of Vedic words, employed without any specific intention, 
cannot be ascertained. The word-meaning relationship is conventional, and therefore, arbitrary 
(svātantrya; as in PV 1.329a). Thus a word does not have a necessary relationship with any 
meaning and stands in relation to every meaning equally (sarvatra tulyatva), not having a natural 
relationship with any of them (kvacid apratibandha).282 The linguistic convention is specifically 
designed for the purpose of illuminating the speaker’s intention (vivakṣāprakāśana) and it is 
characterized by the function of announcing the speaker’s intention (abhiprāyanivedana). It is 
                                                 
280 For translation see ibid., 58-61.  
281 This is an explanatory paraphrase of PVSV on PV 1.328c (173:2-5) translated in ibid., 60. 
282 For a concise presentation of this “semantical principle” with information on relevant passages found 
in Dharmakīrti’s works and later commentaries on them, see Tillemans (1997). 
   143 
the speaker’s intention, tailored to be conveyed to others by this conventional system, that 
restricts a word to designate a specific meaning. In the case of the authorless Veda (apauruṣeya) 
in which neither an intention to speak nor a conventional system suited for expressing that 
intention is found, there can be no restriction (niyama) of the meaning of the text, and 
consequently, there can be no knowledge about it (tajjñāna).283 With these arguments, 
Dharmakīrti confirms what we have observed in Saṅghabhadra’s argumentation: Any linguistic 
encounter with the Veda, as long as it is assumed to be authorless, is a priori a failure. 
 It is this impotence of Vedic words to convey their own meanings that justifies 
Dharmakīrti’s interpretive violence to the Vedic injunction. Dharmakīrti explains: “A [Vedic] 
sentence such as “One who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra” is neither [inherently] 
close to nor remote from any [particular] meaning; [hence] we do not see any distinctive 
property [of the sentence which would determine] that its meaning is that one should pour ghee, 
etc., into a certain element [i.e., fire] in a way that is admissible [to Brahmins], but not that one 
should eat dog meat.”284 As this explanatory note makes clear, the rationale behind 
Dharmakīrti’s malicious interpretation is the fact that the word-meaning relationship is arbitrary 
and the conventional relationship between them does not operate without the speaker’s intention. 
Other scriptures are intelligible, as Dharmakīrti subsequently elaborates, specifically because the 
original teachers (upadeṣṭṛ) or the speakers (bruvāṇa) of those scriptures possess an intention to 
make their teaching known to others (lokapratyāyanābhiprāya) and, in accordance with such 
intention, they observe the linguistic conventions of the world (lokasaṃketaprasiddhi). In the 
case of the Veda, on the contrary, we cannot expect such desire for communication from anyone, 
                                                 
283 This is an explanatory paraphrase of PVSV on PV 1.327 (172:19-24) translated in Eltschinger, 
Krasser, Taber (2012, 59). 
284 PVSV 167:11-4, “kvacid apy arthe pratyāsattiviprakarṣarahitasyāgnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma 
ityādivākyasya bhūtaviśeṣe yathābhimataṃ ghṛtādi prakṣiped ity ayam arthaḥ na punaḥ śvamāṃsaṃ 
khāded iti nātiśayaṃ paśyāmaḥ.”; translation is from ibid., 40-1. 
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and therefore, the Veda, unlike other scriptures, must be unintelligible.285  
 Dharmakīrti’s refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda 
contains richer content than what is presented here; a separate analysis is needed to have an 
overall picture of his project. However, by pulling one theme from his discussion of the 
Mīmāṃsaka doctrine, one thing becomes evident: Dharmakīrti inherits Saṅghabhadra’s—rather 
than Bhāviveka’s—strategy of refuting the idea that the Veda is authorless. What has also 
become clear is that proving the unintelligibility and the evil authorship of the Veda are different. 
Just as Bhāviveka does not consider the unintelligibility of the Veda as a possibility, Dharmakīrti 
makes no effort to prove the existence of an author and his evil nature. That is to say, 
Dharmakīrti’s engagement with the Mīmāṃsakas does not involve the traditional Buddhist 
critique of the Veda via its author(s).    
 
 3.4.2 Śāntarakṣita’s Prioritization of Saṅghabhadra-Dharmakīrti’s Strategy over 
Bhāviveka’s 
The place where Śāntarakṣita discusses the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda 
is the chapter titled “Examination of the Revelation (i.e., the Veda)” (śrutiparīkṣā) in the 
Tattvasaṃgraha (Shastri 1968; TS). This extensive chapter of 725 verses and accompanied by 
Kamalaśīla’s elaborate commentary (Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā, ibid.; TSP) is divided into two 
sections: the opponent’s views (pūrvapakṣa; vv. 2084-2350) and their refutations (uttarapakṣa; 
vv. 2351-2809).286 Throughout the chapter, Śāntarakṣita takes up the Mīmāṃsaka view of the 
Veda, which includes its authorless and eternal nature.  
 As was the case with Dharmakīrti’s critique of the Mīmāṃsakas, a comprehensive and 
                                                 
285 See PVSV on PV 1.318 (167:16-21) translated in ibid., 41. 
286 Verse numbers are according to Shastri (1968) edition.  
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systematic analysis of this long portion of the text is inappropriate and unnecessary here. In 
accordance with our purpose of comparing post-Bhāviveka thinkers with Bhāviveka on the 
Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda and, ultimately, of showing that the 
traditional critique of the Veda became obsolete after Bhāviveka, I only focus on several verses 
from the concluding section (vv. 2786-2809) of Śāntarakṣita’s chapter. What I would like to 
demonstrate is this: Śāntarakṣita, although he was aware of Bhāviveka’s strategy of countering 
the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine, employed it only in a limited way, finally opting for Saṅghabhadra and 
Dharmakīrti’s strategy on the unintelligibility of the Veda.  
 Śāntarakṣita shows familiarity with two of Bhāviveka’s arguments. The first is that the 
Veda is a work of an evil being (MHK 9.31), and the second is that Buddhist scriptures are also 
devoid of authorship (MHK 9.25). Śāntarakṣita reiterates these two arguments in a limited 
manner, but his versions are highly reminiscent of Bhāviveka’s original formulations. As he 
reiterates the first argument, Śāntarakṣita, though alluding to Bhāviveka’s strategy of providing 
quotations from the Veda, does not argue for their evil authorship. Rather, he argues that the Veda 
may have been authored by a human being.  
Also, it is clearly possible (sambhāvyate) that the Veda originates from a 
human as it speaks of sexual misconduct, killing of living beings, and [telling] 
lies. [Other] characteristics of the Veda such as being hard to pronounce, 
vulgar, corrupt, and repugnant to the ears are also found in the words of the 
heretics (nāstika).287 
These verses resemble MHK 9.31 when it enumerates the immoral items that the Veda teaches 
and compares the Veda with the teaching of the heretics (instead of the treatise of the Magas). 
The similarity between those verses becomes more evident when Kalamaśīla lists the relevant 
                                                 
287 TS 2786-7, “sambhāvyate ca vedasya vispaṣṭaṃ pauruṣeyatā/ 
kāmamithyākriyāprāṇihiṃsāsatyābhidhā tathā// durbhaṇatvānudāttatvakliṣṭatvāśravyatādayaḥ/ 
vedadharmā hi dṛśyante nāstikādivacassv api//” cf. Jha (1937-1939, vol. 2, 1259). 
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Vedic quotations, though in a concise fashion compared to that in TJ 9.31.288 However, despite 
the similarities between Śāntarakṣita’s verses and MHK 9.31, what they attempt to achieve is 
quite different. Unlike MHK 9.31, Śāntarakṣita does not seek to prove the evil authorship of the 
Veda. He does not even argue that the Veda must be endowed with a human author. Śāntarakṣita 
states the authorship of the Veda merely as a possibility. Śāntarakṣita’s silence on the nature of 
the Veda’s putative author must be called peculiar, since what he observes in those two verses is 
that “the characteristics of the Veda such as teaching sexual misconduct are also found in the 
words of the heretics.”289 In other words, it is rather strange for Śāntarakṣita not to comment on 
the immorality of the Veda or its putative author while pointing out conspicuously immoral 
teachings as characteristics of the Veda (vedadharma).   
 Immediately after showing that the characteristics of the Veda are also found in works of 
human origin, thereby suggesting the possibility of the same human origin for the Veda, 
Śāntarakṣita changes his strategy against the Mīmāṃsakas, specifically attacking Kumārila’s 
claim that the Veda is not a human work since the everlasting Vedic lineage is a lineage of 
recitation that does not tamper with the Veda.290 It is at this juncture that Bhāviveka’s thesis of 
the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures reappears.  
Moreover, with this mode [of reasoning], no [scripture] whatsoever would be 
of human origin since even the words of the Buddha can be inferred to be such 
                                                 
288 See TSP (vol. 2, 896) on TS 2786-7. 
289 TSP on TS 2786 (vol. 2, 896:9-10), “kāmamithyācārādyupadeśāder vedadharmasya nāstikādivcaneṣv 
api darśanāt.” 
290 TS 2341, “vedasyādhyayanaṃ sarvaṃ gurvadhyayanapūrvakam/ vedādhyayanavācyatvād 
adhunādhyayanaṃ yathā//” This is the direct quotation from the Ślokavārttika’s “Sentence” chapter 
(vākyādhikaraṇa), verse 366. Compare the TJ passage that provoked Bhāviveka to formulate the thesis of 
the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures. TJ D275a1-2, “By Manu, Yājñavalkya, Vyāsa, Vasiṣṭha and so 
on, by those sages, the Veda has been taught, but not composed by them. The words and tradition of the 
Veda have been successively reproduced by a lineage of ancient sages, and this lineage of transmission 
has never been interrupted; for this reason it is called Āgama.” (ma nu dang dza ga nya ba la ka la dang 
‘bya sa dang aa shtha la sogs pa'i thub pa rnams kyis kyang rig byed rjes su bstan pa yin gyi, byas pa ni 
ma yin te. rig byed kyi yi ge dang lugs mthar gyis thub pa snga ma'i rgyud las rjes su bsgrubs shing 
brgyud nas 'ongs pa rgyun ma chad par byung ba yin pa'i phyir, lung zhes bya bar bstan pa yin no.). 
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[that is, authorless]. That (=the words of the Buddha) is said to be his (=the 
Buddha’s) because it was [merely] manifested[, that is, not created,] by him.291  
This version of the thesis resembles Bhāviveka’s presentation in the Prajñāpradīpa in that it 
relegates the Buddha to the medium of Buddhist scriptures. However, it does not go as far as 
Bhāviveka’s version to state that the Buddha is tantamount to non-medium and that a 
Mādhyamika, based on the doctrine of emptiness, recognizes no agent including, the speaker of 
Buddhist sūtras, from the beginning. The difference between Bhāviveka’s and Śāntarakṣita’s 
thesis of the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures is not just a difference in intensity of the same 
argument. Śāntarakṣita further elaborates the thesis and, in so doing, clarifies that this thesis is 
only for the sake of refuting the Mīmāṃsakas’ argument. That is, Śāntarakṣita, unlike Bhāviveka, 
does not allow himself to be seen to argue for the authorlessness of Buddhist sūtras as his own 
tenet.  
 Śāntarakṣita restricts the implication of his claim in two ways. First, he explicitly 
specifies that this is not what Buddhists claim. As he rather ironically expresses it: 
If you (=the Mīmāṃsakas) rejoin that such [a thesis of the authorlessness] is 
not argued for by Buddhists [themselves], [I would answer:] why do they not 
think in that same line of reasoning?292 
This is his way of criticizing the Mīmāṃsaka argument for its irrationality: “If this matter is 
endowed with rationality, then why would Buddhists not admit this? It is because it is not 
reasonable for a considerate person to reject a rational matter.”293 Thus, it is clear that the thesis 
of the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures is not what Buddhists, as considerate people, take to 
be true. It is employed only to show the Mīmāṃsakas that their tactic of proving the 
                                                 
291 TS 2789-2790ab, “kiñ cāmunā prakāreṇa pauruṣeyaṃ na kiñcana/ śakyaṃ saugatam apy evam 
anumātuṃ vaco yataḥ// tadabhivyaktarūpatvāt tadīyaṃ ca tad ucyate/”; cf. Jha (1937-1939, vol. 2, 1260-
1). 
292 TS 2791ab, “parair evaṃ na ceṣṭaṃ cet tulye nyāye na kiṃ matam/” 
293 TSP on 2791 (vol. 2, 897:21-3), “yady ayam artho yuktyupetaḥ syāt, tadā kimiti bauddho 
nābhyupagacchet? na hi nyāyopapanne ’rthe prekṣāvato ’nabhyupagamo yuktaḥ.” 
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authorlessness of the Veda based on the uninterrupted tradition of its recitation fails.  
Let it be that such is not the thesis of the other party [i.e., Buddhists]. However, 
because of [the logic of your own] reasoning, it is doubted to be so.294  
In short, “we are saying,” as Kamalaśīla interprets, “that for you [i.e., Kumārila] by [your own] 
reasoning, such [an absurd consequence that Buddhist scriptures are also without an author] 
would follow.”295  
 This absurd consequence would follow from the Mīmāṃsaka argument essentially 
because Kumārila takes a logical leap when he concludes that the Veda is without an author on 
the basis that the tradition of the Vedic recitation is everlasting. What we can deduce from the 
fact that the tradition is everlasting is only that “it is beginningless” (anāditā), but “not that it is 
independent of the human” (anarasaṃśraya). And, if Kumārila’s logic is to be followed, nothing 
in the world is new, and, in this sense, everything is beginningless. Even an original thought 
formulated by an author’s intuition is, in fact, initiated under the influence of pre-existing 
subjects and notions. In other words, it must be admitted that any idea or tenet (siddhānta), 
however creative it is, initially came into being under the influence of others.296 Therefore, 
should Kumārila take the everlasting tradition of Vedic recitation to entail the authorlessness of 
the Veda, he must admit that other scriptures are also authorless.297 Just as one’s recitation of the 
Veda is accomplished under the influence of one’s guru, all religious and philosophical tenets are 
formulated under the influence of others. If we were to turn this beginningless intellectual debt 
into a concept of “authorlessness” as Kumārila does, every intellectual tradition would be 
authorless.  
                                                 
294 TS 2791cd, “mā bhūd vaievaṃ parasyeṣṭir nyāyāt tv āśaṃkyate tathā//” 
295 TSP on 2791 (897, 24-5), “tathāpi nyāyād evam āpadyate bhavata iti brūmahe.” 
296 See TSP on 2796 (899:11-2), “ye ’pi tāvat svapratibhāracitasaṅketāḥ siddhāntāḥ teṣām api 
yathāśrutārthavikalpavaśenaiva pravṛtteḥ parasaṃskārabalenaiva pravṛttiḥ.” 
297 TS 2795, “api cānāditā siddhyed evaṃ nānarasaṃśrayaḥ/ tasmād akṛtakatve vā syād anyo ’py 
āgamo ’kṛtaḥ//” 
   149 
 Since the Mīmāṃsakas understand the authorlessness of a scripture as the mark of its 
authority, this vicious logical consequence of Kumārila’s logic (or logical leap) would further 
legitimize and authorize the validity of every tradition, however morally depraved it is (e.g., the 
Persians’ custom) or however intellectually inadequate it is (e.g., the tenets of the heretics).298 
Kumārila’s logic, devised to prove the exclusive authority of the Veda, thus comes to establish 
the authority of all intellectual traditions inclusively. As this Mīmāṃsaka project of successively 
translating “beginninglessness” (anāditā) into “authorlessness” (apauruṣeyatva) and the latter 
then into “authoritativeness” (pramāṇatva) de facto applies to all intellectual traditions, 
Śāntarakṣita finally doubts the usefulness of the project itself: “Even if such authorlessness is 
established, what merit is there for you? [There would be none] since your whole effort [was to 
establish the authorlessness] as the ground for [exclusive] truthfulness.”299 The Mīmāṃsakas’ 
final objective of attributing “truthfulness” to the Veda would never be achieved when all other 
scriptures, like the Veda, are authorless since they—the Veda and other scriptures—mutually 
contradict each other.300 
 In the course of nullifying Kumārila’s argument, Śāntarakṣita instrumentally employs 
Bhāviveka’s thesis on the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures. Applying Kumārila’s logic, first 
of all, to the case of Buddhist scriptures enables Śāntarakṣita to demonstrate the inherent flaw in 
the Mīmāṃsaka project of basing the authority of the Veda on its authorless feature. However, at 
the same time, Śāntarakṣita, unlike Bhāviveka, claims that the thesis of the authorlessness of 
Buddhist scriptures is presented only for the sake of refuting the Mīmāṃsakas, stating that it is 
not the position advocated by Buddhists and that Kumārila’s logic applies, not only to Buddhist 
                                                 
298 See TS 2796, “tathā hi pārasīkādivyavahārāḥ parāśrayāḥ/ nāstikānāṃ ca siddhāntaḥ 
parasaṃskārabhāvikaḥ//” 
299 TS 2797, “īdṛśyakṛtakatve ca kaḥ siddhe ’pi guṇas tava/ avaitathyanimittaṃ hi yatno ’yaṃ 
bhavato ’khilaḥ//” 
300 See TS 2794cd, “vedārthaviparītā hi teṣv arthāḥ pratipāditāḥ//”; cf. MHK/TJ 9.19. 
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scriptures, but also to all other scriptures. In this manner, Śāntarakṣita restricts the implication of 
Bhāviveka’s thesis and thereby controls its possible interpretive range. His approach toward 
Bhāviveka’s project of proving the evil authorship of the Veda is the same. By suggesting the 
human authorship of the Veda merely as a possibility, while alluding to Bhāviveka’s collection of 
evil quotations from the Veda at TJ 9.31, Śāntarakṣita, although he is clearly reading MHK 9, 
significantly weakens the original claim.  
 Śāntarakṣita’s heavy dependence on Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, is pervasive 
throughout the Tattvasaṃgraha,301 and his basic stance toward the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the 
authorlessness of the Veda is directly indebted to Dharmakīrti. Hence, rather than detailing 
Śāntarakṣita’s inheritance from Dharmakīrti, I would like to focus on the two verses (2806-7) 
found toward the end of the “Examination of the Revelation” chapter to demonstrate 
Śāntarakṣita’s policy of prioritizing Dharmakīrti’s opinion over Bhāviveka’s in his engagement 
with the Mīmāṃsakas’ “authorlessness” doctrine.   
 Before we proceed to analyze those concluding verses, let us recall basic facts about 
Bhāviveka’s and Dharmakīrti’s strategies of countering the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine. Bhāviveka 
continues the traditional critique of the Veda, and in so doing, formulates a syllogism, in MHK 
9.31, to prove the evil authorship of the Veda (vedo ’yam asatpuruṣakartṛkaḥ). Bhāviveka 
supports his thesis by listing evil teachings found in the Veda (bhūtahiṃsāsurāpānamithyokter) 
and corroborates his case with the example of the treatise of the Magas (magaśāstravat). 
Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, shows no awareness of such traditional critique and inherits 
Saṅghabhadra’s position that an authorless text is an unintelligible text. When we read 
Śāntarakṣita’s verses with these two contrasting views in mind, it is clear that Śāntarakṣita is 
                                                 
301 See McClintock (2010, 75ff.) for an assessment of Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s intellectual debt to 
Dharmakīrti as regards their pramāṇa theories.  
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drawing upon both trends of thoughts but, at the same time, gives primacy to Dharmakīrti’s over 
Bhāviveka’s strategy. This policy of prioritizing Dharmakīrti’s strategy is unambiguously 
expressed in the following two verses. 
The fools [i.e., Brahmins], like Persians to their custom (svācāre pārasīkavat), 
are attached to the Veda whose form and meaning are unintelligible to humans, 
and for that reason, which is like darkness [rather than light as you assume]. 
Those [Brahmins], for whom the meaning of it [ i.e., the Veda] remains 
unintelligible, just like [Persians], engage in evil acts such as killing living 
beings (pravarttante prāṇihiṃsādikamlmaṣe) as a consequence of the flow of 
their past sinful [karma].302 
In these two verses, Śāntarakṣita alludes to the reason (hetu) and the example (dṛṣṭānta) of 
Bhāviveka’s syllogism at MHK 9.31. The example of the Maga treatise is changed into 
“Persians” (pārasīka); the “people” of Persia replace their “text.” The reason of the Veda’s 
teaching on evil acts such as killing is changed into Brahmins’ engagement in such acts; the 
“acts” of Brahmins replace the “injunctions,” that is, the textual basis of their acts. With these 
modifications, in Śāntarakṣta’s presentation, the object of critique is changed from the Brahmins’ 
text, the Veda, to the Brahmins themselves. What is instrumental in both of those changes is the 
idea that the Veda is an unintelligible text. That is to say, as long as Śāntarakṣita regards the Veda 
as an unintelligible text, he cannot reproduce the elements of Bhāviveka’s syllogism without 
modification. 
   Bhāviveka compares the Veda with the Magas’ treatise; he finds them to be similar in 
teaching evil conducts. But, if one assumes that the Veda is meaningless, the similarity between 
them does not hold, since the Magas’ treatise is blamed for flagrantly justifying immoral acts, not 
for being meaningless. In the first verse, therefore, immorality is not the basis of comparison. 
                                                 
302 TS 2806-7, “narāvijñātarūpārthe tamobhūte tataḥ sthite/ vede ’nurāgo madānāṃ svācāre 
pārasīkavat// avijñātatadarthāś ca pāpaniṣyandayogataḥ/ tathaivāmī pravarttante 
prāṇihiṃsādikalmaṣe//” 
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Since the natures of the Veda and the Persian text (if one assumes its existence), are dissimilar, 
Śāntarakṣita changes the objects of comparison to people, viz. Brahmins and Persians, and notes 
the similar “blindness” of their faiths or obsessions, respectively, to the Veda and immoral 
practices. In the second verse, on the other hand, the immorality of Brahmins is noted and the 
similarity between Brahmins and Persians is also observed. However, unlike the case of Persians, 
Brahmins’ blind faith in the Veda does not explain their immoral practices. This is because the 
Veda does not produce any meaning for them, and hence, the Veda has nothing to do with 
Brahmin practice. Śāntarakṣita draws on the law of karma to explain the cause of Brahmins’ evil 
practices, and in this process, the Veda becomes almost extraneous to his critique of Brahmins.  
 We may summarize the significance of Śāntarakṣita’s verses as follows: It is certain that 
Śāntarakṣita reads and refers to MHK 9.31. However, Śāntarakṣita, in a more fundamental 
manner, subscribes to the idea that the Veda is an unintelligible text maintained by Saṅghabhadra 
and Dharmakīrti. It is impossible to harmonize this idea with MHK 9.31 since the latter, being a 
syllogism to prove the evil authorship of the Veda, presupposes a human author, and necessarily, 
the intelligibility of the Veda. As he combines both trends, Śāntarakṣita subjugates MHK 9.31 
under the principle of the unintelligibility of the Veda. In the course of this subjugation, the thesis 
of MHK 9.31, the evil authorship of the Veda, is entirely abandoned and, as we have seen, the 
attenuated form of it—the existence of a human author—is only suggested as a possibility. Other 
elements of MHK 9.31, the reason and example, are also distorted in accordance with the 
principle of the unintelligibility of the Veda. The Veda, as an unintelligible text, no longer plays 
the role of the textual basis for Brahmins’ killing animals in Vedic sacrifice, and accordingly, the 
comparison is made between people, not between texts. In short, as a consequence of 
Śāntarakṣita’s prioritization of the Saṃghbhadra-Dharmakīrti thesis over Bhāviveka’s, traces of 
MHK 9.31 are found, but only in a distorted manner.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have reviewed Bhāviveka’s continuation of the traditional Buddhist critique of 
the Veda and compared his position with those who came before and after him in the context of 
their encounters with the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda. In doing so, we 
have observed that there were two different and mutually incompatible tracks of countering the 
Mīmāṃsaka doctrine for those Buddhists. The first track, taken solely by Bhāviveka, is to prove 
the human authorship of the Veda based on its intelligibility and to demonstrate the evil nature of 
the putative author by adducing immoral teachings from the Veda. The second track is to draw 
the undesirable consequence from the Mīmāṃsaka argument that the Veda, being devoid of an 
authorial intention, must be a meaningless and unintelligible text. This second track of refuting 
the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine was initiated by Saṅghabhadra and followed by later representative 
Buddhist thinkers such as Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita. Given that the well-established Buddhist 
tradition of problematizing and criticizing the spiritual and moral defects of the authors of the 
Veda (Vedic seers) is discontinued after Bhāviveka, I conclude that the traditional Buddhist 
critique of the Veda via its author within the Indian Buddhist tradition became obsolete in the 
sixth century. As a conclusion, in what follows, I would like to comment on the historical 
significance of the contributions of the four thinkers to this process, that is, the decline of the 
traditional critique of the Veda.  
   It is Saṅghabhadra (fifth century) who anticipated the decline. If the Mīmāṃsakas 
formulated their doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda through their confrontation with the 
Buddhist critique of the Veda as Jayatilleke and Clooney suppose, this linkage goes unnoticed by 
Saṅghabhadra. As we have seen in Chapter One, Saṅghabhadra actually criticizes Vedic seers, as 
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the authors of the Veda, for not being free of the three poisons. However, it is important to note 
that he does not employ the critique of the Veda against the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the 
authorlessness of the Veda. The timing of his use of the old critique of the Veda is when the 
opponent withdraws from the original position and begins to advocate the authority of the Veda 
as the work of Vedic seers. When the opponent maintains the authorlessness of the Veda, 
Saṅghabhadra merely notes that the Veda would be an unintelligible text. This correlation 
between the ideas of “authorlessness” and “unintelligibility” is the key contribution of 
Saṅghabhadra to the later development of the Buddhist policy of confronting the Mīmāṃsaka 
doctrine.  
 Bhāviveka (sixth century), viewed in comparison with other thinkers, is peculiar in that 
he shows no doubt regarding the meaningfulness of the Veda. His reaction to the Mīmāṃsaka 
doctrine, taken as a whole, seems to support the Jayatilleke-Clooney thesis. That is, Bhāviveka 
reacts as if the traditional critique of the Veda is nullified by the Mīmāṃsakas when they 
eradicate its authorship. Bhāviveka’s arguments to prove the intelligibility, the human authorship 
of the Veda, and lastly, the evil nature of that authorship can be viewed accordingly as an attempt 
to recover and revitalize the official Buddhist attitude toward the Veda by providing concrete and 
detailed supporting materials. However, since later Buddhists did not inherit his strategy, 
Bhāviveka’s version of the traditional critique of the Veda marks the doctrinal and temporal 
culmination of the critique. 
 The two post-Bhāviveka Buddhists end the traditional critique of the Veda in different 
ways. Dharmakīrti (sixth or seventh century) does not consider the traditional critique of the 
Veda as a possible option to be employed against the Mīmāṃsakas and elaborates on 
Saṅghabhadra’s contention that the authorless text is unintelligible. The absence of the traditional 
critique of the Veda in Dharmakīrti’s engagement with the Mīmāṃsakas implies the following: 1. 
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Dharmakīrti opts for Saṅghabhadra’s strategy of dealing with the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine. 2. the 
Mīmāṃsakas whom Dharmakīrti criticizes no longer fall back on the authority of Vedic seers to 
establish the authority of the Veda; the need to directly attack the seers, the putative authors of 
the Veda, is not present in Dharmakīrti’s writing. While we can infer that Dharmakīrti chooses to 
dispense with the traditional critique of the Veda only indirectly through its absence, Śāntarakṣita 
(eighth century) explicitly selects Saṅghabhadra-Dharmakīrti’s strategy over Bhāviveka’s by 
showing his familiarity with Bhāviveka’s arguments. As we have seen, Śāntarakṣita restricts the 
force of Bhāviveka’s arguments, subjugating them to the principle of the unintelligibility of an 
authorless text.  
 When we lay out the reactions of these four Buddhist thinkers to the Mīmāṃsaka 
doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda in this fashion, it appears that the traditional critique of 
the Veda died out because it was not selected by Indian Buddhists of the fifth to eighth centuries 
as an effective manner of confronting the newly arisen opponent, the Mīmāṃsakas. That is to 
say, the earlier Buddhist strategy of countering the Brahmin advocacy of the Veda was not 
adopted by later Buddhists (except for Bhāviveka) who confronted, not Vedic ritualists in 
general, but particularly the Mīmāṃsakas. The Buddhist tradition of accusing the authors of the 
Veda of having spiritual and moral defects came to be lost, but not without repercussions, as later 
Buddhists encountered the Mīmāṃsaka group of Vedic ritualists who eliminated authorship from 
the Veda possibly under the influence of the Buddhist critique of the Veda. 
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Chapter Four: Decline of the Buddhist Critique of Vedic Sacrifice 
 
4.1 Introduction 
By comparing the reactions of several fifth- to eighth-century Buddhist authors to one specific 
Mīmāṃsaka doctrine (the authorlessness of the Veda), we saw in the last chapter how the 
original Buddhist strategy of demeaning the intellectual and moral capacities of the Veda’s 
authors is not inherited by later Buddhist intellectuals with the exception of Bhāviveka, who 
invested his thesis on the evil authorship of the Veda with concrete examples from it. This marks 
the doctrinal and temporal culmination of the traditional Buddhist critique of the Veda.  
 The critique of Vedic sacrifice is another major form of Buddhist critique of Vedic 
ritualists, developed from the earliest period of Buddhism. As we have seen in Chapter One, the 
main point of this critique is that killing animals in a ritual setting should be abandoned since the 
act of killing is karmically negative, and accordingly, would bring about a negative fruit to the 
actor in the future. We also observed that this tendency to criticize animal sacrifice is a well-
established Buddhist tradition. Along with the critique of the Veda for its defective authorship, 
the Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice is attested in pre-Bhāviveka texts, including the sacrifice-
related suttas, the Mahāvibhāṣā, the Tattvasiddhi, and the Nyāyānusāra. 
 In this chapter, I demonstrate that Bhāviveka also marks the end of the Buddhist critique 
of Vedic sacrifice. In his two works, the Prajñāpradīpa and MHK 9, Bhāviveka continues to 
criticize ritual killing in Vedic sacrifice in his polemics against the Mīmāṃsakas. However, a 
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comparison between Bhāviveka and post-Bhāviveka Buddhists cannot be adopted to show the 
decline of the critique of Vedic sacrifice. This is because, to my knowledge, later post-Bhāviveka 
Buddhist authors do not confront the Mīmāṃsakas on animal sacrifice. In the case of the critique 
of the Veda, although post-Bhāviveka Buddhists do not inherit the discourse, they expressed their 
views on the Veda by initiating a different line of argument against the Mīmāṃsakas; they argued 
that, if it is to be assumed authorless, it must be an unintelligible text. However, regarding 
Brahmins’ ritual killing, they offer no opinion.  
 While Buddhists criticized Vedic sacrifice from the beginning, the Mīmāṃsakas only 
began to defend animal sacrifice very late. The early Mīmāṃsā authors Jaimini (2nd c. BCE?) and 
Śabara (5th c. CE?) curiously do not respond to the persistent Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice. 
Considering the Mīmāṃsakas’ response to the Buddhist critique of the Veda from the earliest 
document of the school, the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (MS), at least according to the Jayatilleke-Clooney 
thesis,303 it is strange, as Clooney (1990, 216) puts it, that “Jaimini is silent on the topic of the 
killing of animals and indeed offers no defense against the charge that this hiṃsā is 
irreligious.”304 Jaimini’s silence is continued by Śabara, whose commentary is the next oldest 
extant text of the school. Commenting on the codanāsūtra (MS 1.1.2), Śabara considers whether 
ritual killing in the Śyena sacrifice is dharma (duty) or not. But the “killing” considered by 
Śabara is not animal sacrifice but killing an enemy as the result of a sacrifice.305 In other words, 
                                                 
303 See Chapter Three, 3.1 Introduction. 
304 Clooney (ibid.) adds: “At best (and putting it somewhat crudely) his [=Jaimini’s] view seems to be that 
animals are not “used” in the sacrifice, only parts of animals.” 
305 See Halbfass (1991, 89-90). Śabara seems to be motivated by an objection that must be similar to that 
of Harivarman. As we have seen in Chapter One, when the opponent attempts to justify Vedic sacrifice by 
drawing upon the magical power of Vedic seers who can kill by means of mantra, Harivarman argues that, 
though they practice such sorcery because of merits accumulated in the past, they would gain demerit by 
using that power for killing others. Harivarman claims that one gains demerits by practicing Vedic 
sacrifice with special reference to the black magic type, and Śabara seems accept that criticism by 
removing black magic sacrifices from the realm of dharma defined by the Veda (codanālakṣaṇa) and thus 
rescues the Veda from serving immoral purposes such as killing (hiṃsā). See Chapter One, 1.4 
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ritual killing that is discussed by Śabara as problematic is killing external to Vedic sacrifice itself, 
that is, killing that is not committed during the sacrificial session. In this sense, Śabara, like 
Jaimini, shows no awareness of the Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice. The first Mīmāṃsaka 
who acknowledges the outsiders’, including Buddhists’, critique of ritual killing is Kumārila (6th 
or 7th c. CE). As concisely but masterfully analyzed by Halbfass (1991),306 Kumārila defends 
ritual killing and refutes the outsiders’ censure in two works, the Ślokavārttika (ŚV) and the 
Tantravārttika (TV).   
 The last Buddhist works to consider Vedic sacrifice are Bhāviveka’s PP and MHK 9; 
thus, they belong to the sixth century CE. The first Mīmāṃsaka works to defend ritual killing in 
Vedic sacrifice are Kumārila’s ŚV and TV; thus, they belong to either the sixth or seventh 
century CE. In short, when Buddhists stopped criticizing Vedic sacrifice, the Mīmāṃsakas 
started defending it. The phenomenon that I call the “decline of the Buddhist critique of Vedic 
sacrifice” occurred, therefore, with the emergence of the defense of Vedic sacrifice.  
 However, those two events cannot be a mere coincidence. The Buddhist critique of Vedic 
sacrifice was specifically directed at Vedic ritualists and, after Saṅghabhadra, the same 
accusation was employed against the Mīmāṃsakas. Kumārila’s apologetics for ritual killing was 
                                                 
Harivarman’s Tattvasiddhi: Connecting the Two.  
A similar argument found in Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra, noted in Kataoka (2012, 354), seems 
to already assume the Mīmāṃsakas’ (like Śabara’s) acceptance of the adharmic status of black magic 
sacrifices. T1562, 530b16-7, “If that is the case, this action of killing by recourse to black magic or curse, 
such as causing [one’s enemy] to suffer fever or to end [his] life, would be accepted as [the cause] that can 
bring about a desirable fruit.” (若爾, 呪術或以厭祷, 令遭熱病, 乃至命終, 應許此殺能招愛果.) 
(trans. from Kataoka (ibid.); to convey a better sense of “應,” the underlined phrase needs to be changed 
to “should be accepted.”) Note that Saṅghabhadra, contrary to Harivarman, does not argue for the 
karmically negative status of black magic performed by Vedic seers. Instead, he employs a prasaṅga 
(reductio ad absurdum) against the Mīmāṃsakas, knowing that they would not accept that black magic 
sacrifices are meritorious. Therefore, if we maintain the dates assigned to Saṅghabhadra (430-490 CE) 
and Śabara (500-560 CE), it is not Śabara, but an earlier Mīmāṃsaka, who first conceded the 
unmeritorious status of black magic in Vedic sacrifice.   
306 See especially pp. 89-97. 
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likewise directed against the outsiders such as Buddhists who criticized it. There must have been 
a certain interaction between the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsakas. By attending to the dynamics 
between the vanishing critique on and the emerging defense of Vedic sacrifice around the sixth 
and seventh century CE, we may be able to discern a historical logic for why Buddhists stopped 
censuring Brahmin ritual killing.   
 The textual sources most relevant to our inquiry are the last Buddhist and the first 
Mīmāṃsaka works that discuss ritual killing. As noted, they are Bhāviveka’s PP and MHK 9 and 
Kumārila’s ŚV and TV. The nature of Kumārila’s apologetics in ŚV and TV and their presence in 
Bhāviveka’s works differ considerably, and, it is ŚV that bears closer dialogic relationship to the 
latter works. Therefore, in what follows, I compare PP’s and MHK 9’s sections on ritual killing, 
only using the relevant ŚV section to determine the Mīmāṃsakas’ role in the decline of the 
Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice.  
 
4.2 Once Again on the Bhāviveka-Sāṃkhya Alliance: Two Nearly Identical Syllogisms Held 
by Two Different Groups Against Two Yet Different Groups 
Comparing Bhāviveka’s criticism of and Kumārila’s defense of ritual killing in PP and ŚV, we 
find two almost identical syllogisms about the karmic consequences for the ritual killer. The one 
in PP is presented as Bhāviveka’s own argument; the other in ŚV as the opponent’s argument to 
be refuted by Kumārila. Let us first consider the syllogism found in PP.  
[thesis:] An action characterized as killing [conducted] in a sacrificial ground 
brings about, to the agent [of killing] in the future lifetime, the karmic fruit 
similar to the fruit that is brought about [to the sacrificial victim] in this life at 
that [sacrificial] ground. [reason:] it is because [the sacrificial killing] is a 
specific kind of action. [example:] For example, it is just as [an act of] giving 
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[brings about a corresponding result to the giver in the future].307 
To prove the thesis that the ritual killer would be killed in his future lifetime just as the victim is 
killed by him, Bhāviveka notes that ritual killing is not outside the karmic law of reciprocity 
between the agent’s karmic fruit and the result of the agent’s action imposed on the receiver. It is 
just as, when an agent gives something to others, he or she will gain karmic fruit similar to that 
which the recipient of the gift gains. 
 This syllogism, although appearing in the context of Bhāviveka’s critique of the 
Mīmāṃsakas, is not put forward against the Mīmāṃsakas. It is rather made against the 
Materialists (’jig rten rgyang phan pa, Skt. lokāyata) who are immersed in the teachings of the 
advocates of the Veda (rig byed smra ba, Skt. vedavādin) to the extent that they, in support of the 
Mīmāṃsakas, vindicate the dharma-status of ritual killing just as they justify ordinary non-ritual 
killing as irrelevant to future retribution.308 Thus, although the syllogism criticizing ritual killing 
has nothing to do with the Lokāyatas, it is addressed to them, rather than to the Mīmāṃsakas, 
since the Lokāyatas align themselves with the Mīmāṃsakas and even publicly defend them 
against the Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice.  
 Kumārila, on the other hand, in his defense of ritual killing, introduces the following 
syllogism as the opponent’s critique of the Mīmāṃsakas.   
[Objection:] [thesis:] Killing produces for its performer after death a fruit 
                                                 
307 PP D216a2-3, “mchod sbyin gyi gnas su ’tshe ba’i mtshan nyid kyi bya ba gang yin pa de ni tshe ’di la 
de’i gnas la ’bras bu ji lta bur mngon par sgrub par byed pa de lta bu kho na’i ’bras bu tshe phyi ma la 
byed pa po la mngon par sgrub par byed pa yin te, bya ba’i khyad par yin pa’i phyir, dper na sbyin pa 
bzhin no.” 
308 See PP D215b7-216a1, “Even the Materialists (lokāyata), following the instruction of the sinful Veda-
advocates (vedavādin), argue as follows: The action characterized as killing in a Vedic sacrifice, just like 
the action characterized as killing outside the sacrificial context, is not adharma, since the Veda (śāstra) 
does not teach any adharma; therefore, your example [i.e., “just as an action characterized by killing in a 
non-ritualistic space” (dper na mchod sbyin gyi gnas ma yin par ’tshe ba’i mtsan nyid kyi bya ba bzhin no; 
PP D215b7)] does not hold.” (gang dag ’jig rten rgyang phan pa dag pas kyang sdig che ba rig byed 
smra ba’i tham lag gi rjes su zhugs nas, mchod sbyin gyi gnas su ’tshe ba’i mtshan nyid kyi bya ba ni, 
mchod sbyin gyi gnas ma yin par ’tshe ba’i mtshan nyid kyi bya ba ltar, chos ma yin pa ma yin te, bstan 
bcos las chos ma yin pa mi ston pa’i phyir, dpe ma grub bo zhes zer ro.) 
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similar to that of its target, [reason:] because it is a kind of action, [example:] 
like a giving enjoined in the [Vedic] teaching[, that gives a similar fruit to its 
performer after his death].309 
As Bhāviveka’s syllogism in PP is not extant in Sanskrit, a direct word-to-word comparison 
between the two syllogisms is impossible. However, the syllogism of Kumārila’s opponent 
seems to match Bhāviveka’s almost word for word, with the exception of the example. Both 
theses highlight the analogy between the victim’s death and the karmic retribution that would 
befall the killer by using the “just as ... such” construction (“ji lta bu...de lta bu” in PP and 
“yādṛk...tathāvidham” in ŚV) and they both mention that the time of that retribution is the future 
lifetime (“tshe phyi ma” in PP and “pretya” in ŚV). The reason in PP syllogism is an exact 
Tibetan translation of that part in ŚV syllogism (bya ba'i khyad par yin pa'i phyir in PP and 
“kriyāviśeṣatvāt” in ŚV). Kumārila’s opponent also adduces the act of giving (dāna; 
corresponding to sbyin pa of PP syllogism) as a supportive example of his thesis, but qualifies it 
as “being enjoined in the Veda” (śāstrokta-). This qualification indicates that both the addresser 
and the addressee of this syllogism, unlike those of PP syllogism, belong to orthodox religious 
groups that acknowledge the authority of the Veda. Kumārila’s opponent, by presenting the 
example of “giving” (dāna) qualified as an act enjoined in the Veda, defines “giving” as a Vedic 
value and, at the same time, appeals to the authority of the Veda with an expectation that his 
syllogism would not be refuted by the Mīmāṃsakas.  
 Scholars, along with at least one traditional commentator on ŚV, concur that Kumārila’s 
opponent is the Sāṃkhyas. Umbeka (730-790)310 notes that Kumārila introduces this syllogism, 
                                                 
309 ŚV co. 235cd-236ab, “viṣaye ’syāḥ phalaṃ yādṛk pretya kartus tathāvidham/ hiṃsā kriyāviśeṣatvāt 
sūte śāstroktadānavat/”; Translation is from Kataoka (2011, pt. 2, 487). For the sake of discussion, I 
broke down the opponent’s syllogism into parts by adding the headings (e.g., “[thesis:]”) to Kataoka’s 
translation.  
310 According to Kataoka (2011, pt.2, 112). 
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formulated by the Sāṃkhyas, in order to refute it.311 Halbfass (1991, 116, fn. 11), in his 
overview of the contents of Kumārila’s defense of ritual killing, briefly opines that “Sāṃkhya 
ideas seem to be the main target of Kumārila’s argumentation in this section.” Houben (1999a, 
146) also comments on the identity of Kumārila’s opponent in the same vein: “Although 
Kumārila does not mention his opponents by name, they have here been identified primarily as 
Sāṃkhyas.” Based on these testimonies, we may conclude that the syllogism quoted by Kumārila 
is one maintained by the Sāṃkhyas against—or, perceived by Kumārila to be against—the 
Mīmāṃsakas.  
  We again witness the partnership between Bhāviveka and the Sāṃkhyas that we noted 
in Chapter Three with their common use of a collection of quotations on evil teachings from the 
Veda found between TJ 9.31 and the Sāṃkhya commentaries on SK 2. The present case of 
Bhāviveka-Sāṃkhya alliance is more meaningful. The correspondence between TJ 9.31 and the 
commentaries on SK 2 was of materials, not of views. Although Bhāviveka and the Sāṃkhya 
commentators shared the same materials, what the Sāṃkhya commentators claimed was the 
“impurity” (aviśuddhi) of Vedic sacrifice, while Bhāviveka’s objective was to prove the “evil 
authorship” (asatpuruṣakartṛka) of the Veda. Here, in PP and ŚV syllogisms, they express the 
same view with the same wording. Nevertheless, two differences should not be overlooked. First, 
the Sāṃkhyas showed their orthodoxy in the ŚV syllogism by qualifying the example of “giving” 
as enjoined by the Veda. Second, the addressees of the two syllogisms are different; PP syllogism 
is directed against the Lokāyatas and ŚV syllogism is against the Mīmāṃsakas.   
 
                                                 
311 ŚVTṬ 109:22, “idānīṃ sāṃkhyoktam eva prayogadūṣaṇāyopanyasyati, viṣaye ‘syā iti.” Sucarita (ŚVK 
183:10) simply describes the opponent as “someone skilled in inference” (kaścid anumānakuśalaḥ).  
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4.3 Pre-Bhāviveka Buddhist-Sāṃkhya Alliance: Shared Doctrine on the Act and Karmic 
Fruit of Killing in the Yogabhāṣya and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 
There is one problem in confirming the partnership between Bhāviveka and the Sāṃkhyas from 
the correspondence between the syllogisms of PP and ŚV: there is no Sāṃkhya work with the 
syllogism quoted by Kumārila. In fact, there is no similar formulation of the Sāṃkhya view 
against Vedic ritualists in general, or the Mīmāṃsakas in particular.  
 The Yogabhāṣya’s commentary on Yogasūtra 2.34 has been referred to as a possible 
source of the Sāṃkhya view on ritual killing by some scholars (Halbfass 1991, 116, fn. 11 and 
Kataoka 2011, pt. 2, 486, fn. 683). But, when we look at the Yogabhāṣya (YBh) passage, we 
notice that it contains a general Sāṃkhya view on the act of killing that lacks the sophistication 
of the syllogism. Although in agreement with the ŚV syllogism on the most basic level, YBh 
2.34 cannot only be considered an inchoate version of the Sāṃkhya syllogism. Furthermore, the 
entire content of YBh 2.34 seems to be of non-Sāṃkhya provenance. As was the case with PP 
and ŚV syllogisms, YBh 2.34 exactly matches another Buddhist text, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 
(AKBh). The correspondence of the underdeveloped version of ŚV syllogism in YBh with AKBh 
implies 1. that the PP and ŚV syllogisms evolved from preexistent doctrines on killing and its 
karmic consequences and 2. that a Buddhist-Sāṃkhya alliance had already been forged at that 
early stage. Such a pre-Bhāviveka Buddhist-Sāṃkhya alliance was likely made possible by the 
Sāṃkhya adoption of Buddhist views contained in AKBh.  
 The Yogabhāṣya, attributed to a certain Vyāsa,312 is known to have been compiled under 
                                                 
312 Maas (2013) argues for the single authorship of the Yogasūtra and the Yogabhāṣya (collectively called 
Pātañjalayogaśāstra) and, in support of his argument, presents internal (61-4) and external (57-61) 
evidences. He summarizes his view as follows: “The original source of information for Vyāsa’s alleged 
authorship is unknown to me. It could be a reflection of the memory that a single person called Patañjali 
collected some sutras from older sources, composed some sutras himself, arranged (vi+√as) the sūtra part 
of the śāstra and provided it with his own philosophical explanations which later came to be known as the 
Yoga Bhāṣya.” (68) Maas (2013, 65) also dates the work: “If one accepts the PYŚ to be a unified whole, 
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the influence of one branch of the Sāṃkhya tradition headed by Vindhyavāsin313 (ca. 300-400 
CE) who, according to Paramārtha (499-569 CE),314 defeated Buddhamitra, the teacher of 
Vasubandhu.315 And, according to Frauwallner (1973, vol. 2, 318-9), it was around the time of 
this Sāṃkhya master, Vindhyavāsin, that Sāṃkhya first took the doctrine of karma from the 
outside. YBh 2.34 documents Sāṃkhya’s recent adoption of the doctrine of karma as applied to 
the case of killing.  
 YBh 2.34 consists of three parts. In the first (YBh 218:8-219:8), the Bhāṣya elaborates 
on Yogasūtra 2.34; it lists and expands the classification of “sinful thoughts” (vitarka) such as 
killing (hiṃsā) and stresses the need to cultivate the opposite. In the second (219:8-220:6), it lists 
three different actions that constitute an act of killing and three results corresponding to each 
                                                 
the work can be dated with some confidence to the period between 325 and 425 CE.” This dating of the 
Pātañjalayogaśāstra is for two reasons: 1. A considerable time must have been elapsed since its original 
composition (or compilation) when it became renowned in the seventh century, and 2. the work shows an 
awareness of the “Vijñānavāda of Vasubandhu, who probably lived between 320 and 400 CE.” (66) As he 
notes, this dating of Vasubandhu is based on Schmithausen (1992)’s work on the relationship between 
Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā and the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, not on the more generally accepted date of 400-480 
CE. On the critical review of Schmithausen’s thesis that it is the Laṅkāvatārasūtra that quotes the 
Triṃśikā verses (nos. 20 and 28), see Park (2011). 
313 Bronkhorst (1985) collects traditional authors’ testimony to Patañjali’s authorship of the Yogabhāṣya 
(203-5), and then observes the correspondence between the theoretical positions attributed to 
Vindhyavāsin in the Yuktidīpikā and those of the Yogabhāṣya (206-8). Based on this observation 
Bronkhorst (208) proposes two possibilities regarding the authorship of the Yogabhāṣya: “1. 
Vindhyavāsin considered himself a follower of Patañjali (pātañjala); 2. Vindhyavāsin wrote the 
Yogabhāṣya in the name of Patañjali.” Maas (2013, 64-5) also considers, citing Aklujkar, two evidences 
that support Vindhyavāsin’s authorship of the Yogabhāṣya. 
314 See Takakusu (1900, 281-6).  
315 See Larson (1999) for his assessment of the Yogasūtra and the Yogabhāṣya as documents of the “Neo-
Sāṃkhyas,” represented in the figure of Vindhyavāsin, who revised the previous Sāṃkhya system as 
reflected in Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṃkhyakārikā in polemical encounter with Buddhists. He states (727): “To 
identify these two streams of philosophizing, however, is not to say that classical Yoga philosophy is 
nothing more than a combination of Sāṃkhya and Buddhist thought. It is, rather, an updating of the old 
Sāṃkhya, a creative intervention in the “tradition text” of Sāṃkhya in an attempt to bring the old 
Sāṃkhya into conversation with many of the issues that were developing in the early classical period, that 
is, ca., the fourth and fifth centuries of the Common Era. The hybrid formulation, or this new and updated 
“tradition text” is a kind of Neo-Sāṃkhya (hence, my inclination to agree with Frauwallner and others 
that it is primarily the creative innovation of Vindhyavāsin), and, thus, it is neither a mistake nor an 
accident that the Yogasūtrabhāṣya is entitled Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, or “A Commentary on an 
Interpretation of the Sāṃkhya.”” See also Larson and Bhattacharya (1987, 146). 
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action that would befall a killer. In the third (220:6-7), the Bhāṣya states that these three different 
kinds of actions and results accompany any violation of the five “abstentions” (yama), which 
begins with “non-violence” (ahiṃsā).316 To the Yogasūtra 2.34, the Bhāṣya adds the contents of 
the second and the third parts; it is the second that is most relevant to our inquiry. I cite it in full: 
1. And to continue, the killer, first of all, hurls down the vigor of the victim, 
then causes him pain by falling upon him with a knife or something of the kind, 
[and] afterwards, even deprives him of life.  
2. As a result of taking away [the victim’s] vigor, his own animate or inanimate 
aids begin to have their vigor dwindle away. As a result of causing pain, he 
himself experiences pain in hells and in [the bodies of] animals and of departed 
spirits and in other [forms]. As a result of uprooting [the victim’s] life, he 
himself continues [his own life], from moment to moment, at the very point of 
departure from life. And, even while wishing for death, he somehow [continues 
to] live since the retribution of pain, the fixed retribution [corresponding to his 
act of severing the life of the victim], must be experienced [before his death]. 
3. And if somehow the act of killing be mixed with merit, [and thereby,] even if 
he obtained happiness, it would be [on condition that] his length of life be 
short.317  
In passage 1, the Yogabhāṣya lists three actions involved in an act of killing and, in 2 it lists three 
fruits that correspond to each action. Then, in 3, it appends a note, as if in anticipation of a 
possible objection that would cite a counter-example of the killer having happiness despite his 
act of killing. Halbfass and Kataoka may have referred to this passage as representing the view 
of Kumārila’s opponent, since the second passage indicates the similarity observed between the 
actions involved in killing and the karmic consequences caused by them. By taking away the 
                                                 
316 I exclude the last sentence (YBh 220:6-7) from consideration; it says that those who contemplate the 
results of evil actions do not put their minds on the sinful thoughts. 
317 YBh 219:8-220:6, “tathā ca hiṃsakas tāvat prathamaṃ vadhyasya vīryam ākṣipati. tataś ca 
śastrādinipātena duḥkhayati. tato jīvitād api mocayati. tato vīryākṣepād asya cetanācetanam upakaraṇaṃ 
kṣīṇavīryaṃ bhavati. duḥkhotpādān narakatiryakpretādiṣu duḥkham anubhavati, jīvitavyaparopaṇāt 
pratikṣaṇaṃ ca jīvitātyaye vartamāno maraṇam icchann api duḥkhavipākasya niyatavipākavedanīyatvāt 
kathaṃcid evocchvasiti. yadi ca kathaṃcit puṇyāvāpagatā hiṃsā bhavet, tatra sukhaprāptau bhaved 
alpāyur iti.”; modified translation of Wood (1914, 184-5).  
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victim’s vigor (vīryākṣepat), the surroundings of the killer lose their vigor (kṣīṇavīrya); by 
causing pain in the victim (duḥkhotpādāt), the killer experiences pain (duḥkham anubhavati) in 
the form of lower rebirth; by depriving the victim of life (jīvitavyaparopaṇāt), he lives “on the 
edge of the life” (jīvitātyaye).  
 However, although the passage illustrates that one reaps results similar to what one does 
to the victim, it differs from the ŚV syllogism in four ways. First, it does not generalize the 
relation between actions and retributions. Though it enumerates specific karmic fruits 
corresponding to specific acts, it does not say that they are similar to each other. The thesis of the 
ŚV syllogism (“Killing produces for its performer after death a fruit similar to that of its target”) 
argues for the general similarity between action and karmic fruit. On this score, YBh 2.34 can 
only be considered to be reflecting an inchoate stage of the ŚV syllogism. Second, YBh 2.34 
does not refer to the general karmic law whereas the reason in the ŚV syllogism clearly indicates 
that ritual killing is just an instance of general action, and thus, cannot be an exception to karmic 
law. Third, in YBh 2.34, there is no mention of the ŚV syllogism’s example, i.e., the act of 
giving. Lastly, the doctrine on the act of killing and its karmic result is not put in a polemical 
context; it is expounded as a general law rather than being argued for against an opponent party.   
 Regardless of the merit of YBh 2.34 in illuminating the identity of Kumārila’s opponent, 
the more important fact is that the whole passage seems to adapted from the 
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 4.85 (AKBh 4.85). The immense influence of Vasubandhu’s works on 
the Yogasūtra has long been noted by scholars: “There is little doubt in my mind that the only 
reasonable conclusion to draw from these citations is that the Yogasūtra is heavily dependent on 
Buddhism and probably via the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika formulations as set forth in 
Vasubandhu II’s Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya.” (Larson 1989, 133-4). When Larson is drawing 
on de la Vallée Poussin’s work that “has systematically studied the terminology of the Yogasūtra 
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vis-à-vis comparable terminology in Buddhist texts and especially found in the Abhidharmakośa 
and Abhidharmakośbhāṣya of Vasubandhu (II)” (ibid., 133). Based on de la Vallée Poussin’s 
study, Larson himself collected more “terminologies” from the Yogasūtra that reflect Buddhist 
influence (ibid., Appendix B).   
 The parallelism found between YBh 2.34 and AKBh 4.85 is, however, not of 
terminologies but of ideas.318 When they are read side by side, it looks as if the author of YBh 
2.34, having read AKBh 4.85, rewrote the contents in different words. Let us first read the 
Abhidharmakośa 4.85 on which AKBh 4.85 comments:  
All the other courses of action have retributive results, outflowing results, and 
predominating results.  
The result is threefold, because one makes him suffer, because one makes him 
die, and because one destroys his vigor.319  
This verse states that every course of action (karmapatha) has three kinds of result, with special 
reference to killing (prāṇātipāta), the first of the ten unwholesome (akuśala) courses of action. 
The first and second line of the verse are separated by a long commentary that enumerates the 
specific results of the ten unwholesome courses of action, with several sets of questions and 
answers. Then AKBh 4.85, after introducing the second line, compiles the three results of killing 
that have been already enumerated.  
Because one causes suffering, there is a retributive result, that is, suffering in 
hell; because one makes him die, there is an outflowing result, that is, his life is 
short; and because one destroys his vigor, there is a predominating result, that 
                                                 
318 Also, it is the parallelism between the Yogabhāṣya (not the Yogasūtra) and the 
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. I do not mean that the Yogasūtra 2.34 is uninfluenced by the latter. The contents 
of the Yogasūtra 2.34 is also from the Abhidharmakośa and the Bhāṣya. De la Vallée Poussin has already 
noted the parallelism between the Sūtra and the Kośa verse in the footnote of his translation of the 
Abhidharmakośa 85cd (1988-90, 746:fn.413): “Compare Yogasūtra, ii.34.” 
319 AKBh 4.85 (253:23 and 254:17), “sarve ’dhipatiniṣyandavipākaphaladā matāḥ/ duḥkhanān māraṇād 
ojonāśanāt trividhaṃ phalam//” (slightly modified translation of de la Vallée Poussin 1988-90, 669 and 
670). 
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is, external herbs are of little vigor.320 The same for the other courses of 
action.321 
Although presented in Ābhidharmika terminology for different kinds of fruit (phala), the basic 
idea of AKBh 4.85 and YBh 2.34 is the same: three actions are involved in one act of killing, and 
therefore, there are three fruits. One conspicuous difference is the fruit resulting from the 
primary (maula) action of severing the life of the victim. Here in AKBh 4.85 it is said that one 
has a short life as the result of making the victim die, while in YBh 2.34 the result of “uprooting 
the victim from life” is a life full of pain that one cannot escape even if one desires to die. 
However, YBh 2.34 does mention the fruit of “short life”; as an addendum, it says that when 
killing is somehow mixed with merit (kathaṃcit puṇyāvāpagatā hiṃsā), although the killer 
obtains happiness, his life is short (alpāyus).  
 While the fruit of “painful life” seems to come from a source different from AKBh 4.85, 
the addendum reflects the following question and answer in AKBh 4.85. 
[Q] But, one would say, a human existence, even if it is short, is the retribution 
of a good action. How can one regard it as an outflowing result of murder? 
[A] We do not say that this existence is the result of murder; we say rather, that 
a murderer will have a short life by reason of the murder; murder is the cause 
which rends a human existence short.322 
                                                 
320 I have changed “external things” (ibid., 670) to “external herbs” (bāhyā oṣadhayaḥ). De la Vallée 
Poussin, who translated the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya in 1923-31, could not consult the Sanskrit text; the 
Abhidharmakośa was first published in 1946 (by V.V. Gokhale) and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya in 1967 
(by P. Pradhan). The Chinese translation by Xuanzang on which de la Vallée Poussin based his translation 
indeed speaks of “external things” (外物; T 1558, 90c25). However, the earlier Chinese translation by 
Paramārtha has it as “external plants, herbs and etc.” (外草藥等; T 1559, 245c13). 
321 AKBh 4.85 (254:18-20), “parasya duḥkhanād vipākaphalena narake duḥkhito bhavati. māraṇān 
niṣyandaphalam ālpāyur bhavati. ojonāśanād adhipatiphalenālpaujaso bāhyā oṣadhayo bhavanti. evam 
anyeṣv api yojyam.” (translation from de la Vallée Poussin 1988-90, 670). 
322 AKBh 4.85 (254:5-7), “alpam apy āyur manuṣyeṣu kuśalaphalam. tat kathaṃ prāṇātipātasya 
niḥṣyandaphalaṃ bhavati? nocyate tadevāyus tasya phalam. kiṃ tarhi? tenālpāyur bhavatīti. 
ato’ntarāyahetuḥ prāṇātipātas tasyāyuṣo bhavatīti veditavyam.” (trans. from de la Vallée Poussin 1988-
90, 669) I deleted from de la Vallée Poussin’s translation the phrase “an existence otherwise caused by a 
good action” attached to the last sentence. The Sanskrit text and Xuanzang’s translation (“應知殺業與人
命根作障礙因令不久住”; T 1558, 90c7-8) do not contain the corresponding expression. De la Vallée 
Poussin’s addition seems to reflect the explanatory notes by Xuanzang’s disciple Fabao (法寶). See T 
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Vasubandhu considers a possible contradiction in giving a “short human life” as the fruit of 
killing and he distinguishes “human life” and “short life” as the fruit of different actions; that is, 
the former is the fruit of a good action323 and the latter is the fruit of killing. Vasubandhu does 
not say a “short human life” is a “mixed” (āvāpagata) result. However, YBh 2.34 seems to be 
inspired by this passage, attaching the addendum as an afterthought.  
 The correspondence between YBh 2.34 and AKBh 4.85 is fascinating. It shows that the 
Sāṃkhyas and Buddhists shared the same doctrine about the act of killing and its karmic fruit. 
AKBh 4.85 does not present a developed form of the argument either. That is to say, like YBh 
2.34, when compared to the PP and ŚV syllogisms, AKBh 4.85 lacks reference to the similarity 
between an act and its fruit, the general principle of karmic law, and the example of giving. It is 
also not situated in a polemical context. AKBh 4.85 and YBh 2.34, in short, represent a prior 
version of a shared understanding on the act and karmic result of killing between Buddhists and 
the Sāṃkhyas when compared to PP and ŚV syllogisms.  
 We see parallel instances of Buddhist-Sāṃkhya partnership on the topic of killing and its 
karmic fruit but with different degrees of development. As noted, the doctrine presented in AKBh 
4.85 and YBh 2.34 lacks the four elements that would make them the direct sources of the PP 
and ŚV syllogisms. To my knowledge, there is only one text that documents a transition from 
AKBh-YBh to PP-ŚV. Strictly speaking, it only records a transition from AKBh to PP. It is 
Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra (NA), where two of the four conditions that prevent us from 
regarding AKBh 4.85 as the source of the PP syllogism are satisfied. NA explicitly states that the 
relationship between the act of killing and its karmic fruit is one of similarity; this marks an 
important developmental step toward the thesis of PP syllogism. In addition, Saṅghabhadra’s 
                                                 
1822, 674b17ff. Nevertheless, this seems to be a correct understanding of the passage. 
323 See the previous footnote. 
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whole discussion is directed against the Lokāyatas, that is, Bhāviveka’s opponent.   
 
4.4 Explaining the Transformation of the Older Alliance into the PP and ŚV syllogisms 
We saw in Chapter One that the *Nyāyānusāra by Saṅghabhadra, a hostile commentary to the 
Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya, is the first Buddhist consideration of Mīmāṃsaka arguments. 
Saṅghabhadra introduced them when he commented on the first verse of the fourth chapter of the 
Abhidharmakośa, devoted to the topic of karma (karmanirdeśa). That first verse lays out the 
basic scheme of Buddhist karma theory.  
The variety of the world is born out of karma. It (=karma) is intention and that 
which is produced by it (=intention). Intention is mental karma and vocal and 
bodily karmas are born from it.324  
Vasubandhu simply uses this verse to explain the elementary materials of Buddhist karma theory 
in his Bhāṣya. Yet Saṅghabhadra understands it in a peculiar way; to him, the first pāda (quater) 
of the verse (“The variety of the world is born out of karma”) is addressed to those who deny that 
an impure action such as killing brings about a painful fruit for the agent. And, as he criticizes 
their views, Saṅghabhadra does not refer to the rest of the verse where the “intention” factor, 
essential to Buddhist notion of karma, is introduced. His opponents in this section do not even 
accept that the world operates according to the karmic law and that the diversity within it is 
determined by karma alone. It is only after Saṅghabhadra refutes their opinions that he proceeds 
to explain the rest of the verse.325  
                                                 
324 AK 4.1 (192), “karmajaṃ lokavaicitryam, cetanā tatkṛtaṃ ca tat/ cetanā mānasaṃ karma, tajjaṃ 
vākkāyakarmaṇī//” 
325 See NA 531b16ff. It may be said that the two long disputations with the opponents who deny the law 
of karma comment only on the first word of AK 4.1 “born out of karma” (karmaja; 由業生) since he 
resumes his commentary with the explanation on the second word “the variety of the world” 
(lokavaicitryam, 世別).  
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 Although Saṅghabhadra does not clearly specify differences among his opponents, we 
can discern, based on the contents, that this long commentary on AK 4.1a is made up of two 
separate sections against the Lokāyatas (Materialists) and the Mīmāṃsakas. The latter is 
unmarked,326 but the first group is marked twice by expressions that characterize them such as 
“those who compliantly commit evil and who avoid disputation” (隨順造惡怯難論)327 and 
“those who hate reason(ing)” (惡因論者)328. The Lokāyata identity of the opponent is hinted at 
by the word “compliantly” (隨順), the second character (順, “to accord with”) of which is used 
in the Chinese translation of Lokāyata, Shunshiwaidao (順世外道), which literally means “the 
heretics who accord with the mundane world.” 
 Concluding his debate with the Lokāyatas, Saṅghabhadra states:  
There is no such fault. Since we can discern many events when one carries out 
an action, when one receives the fruit [from that action], various fruits 
originate. In other words, when people carry out an action, [for example,] those 
who kill living beings [in one act of killing,] make the victims experience pain, 
sever their lives, take away and destroy the light of their dignity by 
intimidating them. Therefore, when they receive the fruit, there are three 
[different fruits] similar to [those three actions]. That is to say, since they 
tormented others, as the retributive fruit, they receive extremely heavy pain in 
the hell realm. Since they sever others’ lives, as the outflowing fruit, they 
receive extremely short lives [even] in the good rebirths. Since they destroyed 
others’ dignity, as the predominating fruits, all external things such as herbs 
reduce their light of spirit. Therefore [in this scheme], there is no fault of 
relating cause and result in the reversed manner.329 
                                                 
326 The Mīmāṃsaka section that we have analyzed in Chapter One begins with the phrase “some 
maintain” (“有執”; NA 530b15). We can infer the opponent’s identity based only on their arguments.  
327 NA 529a7. 
328 NA 529c23. 
329 NA 530b2-9, “無如是失. 以造業時, 能辦多事, 故受果位, 亦有種種差別果生. 謂造業時, 諸殺
生者, 令他受苦, 隔斷他命, 令他怖畏失壞威光. 故受果時, 有三相似. 謂苦他故, 於地獄中, 受極
重苦, 爲異熟果. 斷他命故, 於善趣中, 受命極促, 爲等流果. 壞他威故, 感外藥物, 皆少精光, 爲
增上果. 故無因果成翻對失.” 
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Here Saṅghabhadra reiterates what has been said in AKBh 4.85: there are three actions and three 
fruits in one act of killing. He adds comments that the actions and their fruits are similar in form. 
He notes in the last sentence that cause and result cannot be related in the reversed manner; for 
example, torturing others cannot result in one’s happiness.  
 These comments, interspersed in the enumeration of three actions and three fruits, are 
made because the opponent, the Lokāyatas, relate “evil action” (惡行) with “pleasurable 
experience” (樂). The opponent, for instance, maintains that “hunting animals” (獵獸) generates 
“happiness” (歡悅) in the agent without knowing that such happiness is only temporary and the 
fruit of the act of hunting will be a painful experience, since every action begets a corresponding 
fruit. A similar case is winning wealth and high status from killing enemies in the battlefield. But 
if one argues that the act of killing is the cause for such rewards, one should accept that one 
could obtain the same by killing one’s friends. Thus, the wise do not enjoy such small pleasure 
that brings about great suffering.330 There is a strict causal relationship between seed and fruit: 
sweet and bitter seeds respectively beget sweet and bitter fruits. “Likewise, if one generates pain 
or pleasure in others, those actions respectively bring about painful or pleasurable fruits to 
oneself.”331  
 Saṅghabhadra’s disputation with the Lokāyatas over the karmic status of the act of 
killing bridges the gap between the AKBh 4.85 and the PP syllogism. By explicitly stating that 
the act and karmic consequence of killing are consistent, it anticipates the thesis of the PP 
syllogism. By situating AKBh 4.85 in the polemics against the Lokāyatas, it foreshadows the 
polemical context of the PP syllogism. Moreover, because the whole discussion is occasioned by 
Saṅghabhadra comments on one word “karma-born” (karmaja), general karmic law as 
                                                 
330 See NA 529b15-22. 
331 NA 529c29-530a02, “如是若造苦樂他業, 如次應招自苦樂果.” 
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exemplified in the reason of the PP syllogism can also be said to be prefigured. Saṅghabhadra’s 
section differs from the PP syllogism only in that the subject matter of killing is not confined to 
ritual killing and the example of “giving” is not employed.  
 In the Sāṃkhya tradition, we do not have a document like the Nyāyānusāra, which 
bridges the gap between the YBh 2.34 and the ŚV syllogism. Must we then assume that the near 
identical wording of the PP and the ŚV syllogisms is the result of a Sāṃkhya reproduction of 
Bhāviveka’s syllogism as their own, as they did with the contents of AKBh? It is difficult to 
determine who took whose syllogism first. However, given that the doctrine of karma is not 
indigenous to the Sāṃkhya tradition, it is probable that it was the Sāṃkhyas who copied 
Bhāviveka’s syllogism. In this regard, this is the opposite of the Bhāviveka-Sāṃkhya alliance 
discussed in Chapter Three.  
 However, just as Bhāviveka and the Sāṃkhya commentators had different motives for 
using the same Vedic passages, the difference between the PP and ŚV syllogism should be 
discerned. The Sāṃkhyas’ adoption of Bhāviveka’s syllogism was not an exact duplication. As 
has already been pointed out, the ŚV syllogism introduces two new features to PP syllogism. 
First, they qualified the example of giving as being enjoined by the Veda. As the Sāṃkhyas do 
not oppose the Veda per se but rather oppose Vedic orthopraxy, that is, ritual killing, their 
qualification of “giving” is not incongruous, and an appeal to the authority of the Veda fits well 
in the context of their confrontation with the Mīmāṃsakas. Therefore, the introduction of the 
qualification to the example in the PP syllogism is a reasonable, and, in a sense, necessary 
emendation for the Sāṃkhyas. However, the second change they introduced to the PP syllogism 
is less easy to explain. Why did they employ the PP syllogism, originally formulated against the 
Lokāyatas, against the Mīmāṃsakas? 
 As noted, when Saṅghabhadra discusses the position of the Lokāyatas and the 
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Mīmāṃsakas side by side as he comments on AK 4.1a, he criticizes both parties on the same 
score. To Saṅghabhadra’s perception, they both deny the general law of karma and, for that 
reason, they both are ignorant of the universal law that generates and explains the diversity of the 
mundane world. However, although both groups commit the same error, Saṅghabhadra criticizes 
each of them separately in an unconfused manner. It is against the Lokāyatas that he reiterates 
and develops the contents of AKBh 4.85. Likewise, although the PP syllogism itself is a critique 
of Vedic sacrifice and its wider context is Bhāviveka’s critique of the Mīmāṃsakas, when he 
presents it, Bhāviveka unambiguously specifies that the target is the Lokāyatas who side with the 
Mīmāṃsakas. In sum, if we assume that the PP syllogism is an evolution of AKBh 4.85, then it 
appears that Buddhists after Vasubandhu utilized its content—the three actions involved in one 
instance of killing and the corresponding three karmic retributions—against the Lokāyatas.  
 As no Sāṃkhya text of the same period, fifth and sixth centuries CE, attests to the 
Sāṃkhya use of YBh 2.34, we do not know the polemical context in which the Sāṃkhyas used it. 
However, there is a later document that suggests that the Sāṃkhya use may have been different 
from that of Buddhists.  
  YBh 2.34, like Vasubandhu’s AKBh 4.85, discusses the act of killing in general, 
without reference to ritual killing in Vedic sacrifice. There is no indication that the word “killing” 
(hiṃsā) in the Yogasūtra implies ritual killing. It also does not indicate any underlying polemical 
purpose. YBh 2.34, at least ostensibly, describes the principle of karma in the case of killing 
rather than arguing for it. Vācaspati (ninth or tenth century), however, in his commentary (the 
Tattvavaiśāradī) on YBh, understands the “killing” in YBh 2.34 in the limited context of Vedic 
sacrifice. After having explained the Sūtra and the Bhāṣya on it, he states: 
By tying [the victim] to a sacrificial post (yūpa), one first casts away the vigor, 
that is, exertion, which is the basis of bodily actions from the victim, namely, to 
tame animals and the like. With this [act of binding], the animal becomes 
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impotent. [The meaning of] the rest [of the Bhāṣya passages] is very clear.332 
In this explanation, the very general description of the first act of killing in YBh 2.34 (“one casts 
away the victim’s vigor” (vadhyasya vīryam ākṣipati)) is specifically understood as referring to 
the act of binding an animal to a sacrificial post (yūpaniyojana). Vācaspati concludes his 
commentary on this verse after discussing this act, but it is reasonable to infer that he would have 
interpreted the other two acts of killing in the sacrificial context. 
 Vācaspati’s understanding of this verse may reflect the traditional Sāṃkhya-Yoga 
understanding of Yogasūtra 2.34, which developed after the composition of the Bhāṣya. If so, it 
shows that, unlike the Buddhists, who understood AKBh 4.85 as describing killing in general and 
used it against the Lokāyatas, there was a tendency in Sāṃkhya to view the killing in YBh 2.34 
in the restricted sense of ritual killing, thus interpreting the same doctrine as a critique of 
upholders of Vedic sacrifice, for example, the Mīmāṃsakas. 
 
4.5 The Emergence of the Mīmāṃsaka Defense of Ritual Killing in MHK 9 
We have thus far discussed the oblique relationship between Bhāviveka’s PP and Kumārila’s ŚV. 
Although Kumārila introduces a syllogism almost identical to Bhāviveka’s  in PP, Kumārila’s 
opponent has been identified as the Sāṃkhyas by a traditional commentator as well as modern 
scholars. It has also been demonstrated that Buddhists and the Sāṃkhyas, even before 
Bhāviveka, held the same view of the karmic retribution of killing. Thus, when he invites the 
opponent’s argument, Kumārila is confronting Bhāviveka’s view of ritual killing as held by 
others, the Sāṃkhyas. Furthermore, Bhāviveka did not formulate the PP syllogism directly 
                                                 
332 Tattvavaiśāradī (Āgāśe 1919, 106:29 and 107:15-6), “vadhyasya paśvāder vīryaṃ prayatnaṃ 
kāyavyāpārahetuṃ prathamam ākṣipati yūpaniyojanena. tena hi paśor aprāgalbhyaṃ bhavati. śeṣam 
atisphuṭam.”; cf. Prasāda (1912, 163), Wood (1914, 185). 
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against the Mīmāṃsakas. The obliqueness of the PP-ŚV relationship can be summarized as 
follows: Kumārila indirectly confronts Bhāviveka who criticizes the Lokāyatas via the Sāṃkhyas 
who transferred Bhāviveka’s opinion to their polemics against the Mīmāṃsakas.  
 When we shift our attention from PP’s section on Vedic sacrifice to Bhāviveka’s more 
elaborate critique in MHK 9, we observe that, although Bhāviveka largely reiterates the structure 
and content of PP’s section in MHK 9, he introduces a new argument by the opponent, in the 
form of a syllogism that is essentially a reconfiguration of the PP and ŚV syllogisms, with their 
elements rearranged in such a manner that the whole argument is presented as the Mīmāṃsakas’ 
claim. The differences between this new “reconfigured” syllogism in MHK 9 and the PP/ŚV 
syllogisms reflect Kumārila’s critique of the ŚV syllogism, and, in this sense, the new MHK 9 
syllogism appears to be Kumārila’s opinion. In other words, when we compare the PP/ŚV/MHK 
9 syllogisms together with Kumārila’s reply to ŚV syllogism, it seems that Bhāviveka, after 
having written the PP syllogism, read Kumārila’s response to the ŚV syllogism, and then 
introduced Kumārila’s opinion as the MHK 9 syllogism. In contrast to the oblique relationship 
between PP and ŚV syllogisms, Kumārila’s opinion seems to be directly engaged in MHK 9 
syllogism. 
 Both the PP and MHK 9’s sections on ritual killing, or both versions of the critique of 
Vedic sacrifice, are structurally subordinate to Bhāviveka’s critique of the Veda. In the case of 
MHK 9, Bhāviveka, immediately after arguing for the thesis of the evil authorship of the Veda in 
MHK/TJ 9.31, presents the critique of Vedic sacrifice as a supplementary Q&A session (MHK 
9.32-42). PP’s critique of Vedic sacrifice is likewise subordinate to the critique of the Veda. After 
presenting a syllogism—exactly corresponding to MHK 9.31—on the evil authorship of the Veda 
(PP D215b4-5; PPT 119c15-7) based on the similarity found between the teachings of the Veda 
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and the Maga treatise333 such as killing living beings, Bhāviveka discusses the karmic status of 
ritual killing because the opponent raises the following objection to Bhāviveka’s thesis that the 
Veda is a work of an evil being.  
[thesis:] Ritual killing prescribed by the Veda is not adharma, [reason:] 
because it is completely protected by [accompanying] mantras, [example:] for 
example, just as eating poison [protected by mantra does no harm to the 
eater].334 
What is striking about this objection, which Bhāviveka introduces as a possible objection to his 
thesis of the evil authorship of the Veda, is its banality. As we saw in Chapter One, this is the 
same assertion with which Saṅghabhadra begins his section on the Mīmāṃsakas in his 
commentary on AKBh 4.1a.335 As noted in the same chapter, another predecessor of Bhāviveka, 
Harivarman, also introduces the argument that ritual killing cannot be karmically negative since 
it is accompanied and thereby protected by Vedic mantras.336 Hence, this opponent’s argument 
that ritual killing is karmically safe because of power of Vedic mantras is not being newly made 
to refute Bhāviveka’s thesis. It is a reiteration of older arguments from at least the days of 
Harivarman (ca. 250-350).337 
                                                 
333 Or the “treatises of Persians or the like” (par sig la sogs pa’i bstan bcos; PP D215b5). However, PPT 
further specifies Persians as the Magas (波西目伽論; PPT 119c17).  
334 PP D215b5, “bstan bcos las ’byung ba’i ’tshe ba ni chos ma yin pa ma yin te, gsang sngags kyis yongs 
su gzung ba’i phyir, dper na dug za ba bzhin no.”; cf. PPT “韋陀中說殺生者不是非法. 以咒力禳不畏殺
罪故. 譬如以咒毒不害人.” 
335 See 1.5 Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra: Emergence of the Mīmāṃsakas; here I reproduce the relevant 
passage: “Some assert: In the ritual setting, when Vedic mantras are [recited] before killing sentient 
beings, it brings about favorable results [to the actor of killing]. As it is not a random slaughter, there is no 
previous fault [of bringing a short life to the actor in the future].” (NA 530b14-6) 
336 See 1.4 Harivarman's *Tattvasiddhi: Connecting the Two; here I reproduce the relevant passage: 
“Also, the Veda says, "When one kills, he obtains merit." In other words, when one kills a sheep with 
Vedic mantras, that sheep will be born in heaven. The Veda is what the world believes in.” (T 1646, 
292b19-21) 
337 Attempts to eliminate any negative future consequence for the sacrificer by means of reciting mantras 
are attested in the Veda itself; the opponent’s argument that mantra recitation can counteract such negative 
effects seems to be based on such practices prescribed in the Veda. As Schmidt (1968, 646) states, “the 
whole ritual is pervaded by acts meant for immediately eliminating any killing and injury—the acts of 
appeasing (śānti).” As can be seen in the examples of such acts of appeasing that Schmidt (ibid., 647-8) 
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 By calling the argument “banal,” I do not deny its historicity or suggest that Bhāviveka 
is dealing with an obsolete argument that needs no refutation. As we can see in the following 
quote from Śaṅkara (eighth century CE), there were continuous attempts to defend ritual killing 
by recourse to the efficacy of mantra both before and after Bhāviveka. 
Even if one would accept that it leads to demerit: because it is possible to 
remove this [demerit] by means of mantras—just as poison etc. [is removed by 
mantras]—the Vedic rites need not produce the effect of suffering; just as 
swallowing poison with a mantra [need not produce the effect of suffering].338 
By pointing out that PP’s opening pūrvapakṣa is a repetition of the older argument, I do not 
suggest that Bhāviveka is confronting a straw man. Rather, my point is that such an argument 
does not reflect opinions of the (pūrva-)Mīmāṃsakas. Bhāviveka may be dealing with the 
traditional argument by generic Vedic ritualists that was inherited by some later thinkers such as 
Śaṅkara but not by the mainstream tradition of the Mīmāṃsakas. 
 MHK 9’s section on Vedic sacrifice begins by quoting the same argument, that ritual 
killing is protected by mantras. But, immediately after introducing that argument, Bhāviveka 
appends a new argument that is not found in PP’s section on ritual killing.  
If [you argue that:]  
1. [thesis:] [Ritual] killing is not considered to be something that produces an 
undesirable result,339 [reason:] since it is protected by mantras, [example:] just 
                                                 
collects, they are basically verbal acts; or, to borrow the words of Tull (1996, 224), “these seem to have 
been constituted of little more than verbal subterfuge.” For example, the following is prescribed to 
appease the violence done to the sacrificial victim who is suffocated: “With the words: ‘Whatever of you 
is wounded, whatever of you is stopped (=killed), of that become purified, beautify yourself for the gods,’ 
he has made unwounded whatever they have wounded by making it go (=by killing it), that he appeases.” 
This is part of Schmidt (ibid.)’s translation of the passage from the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā 3.10.1.  
338 Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad 5.10.6, “abhyupagate ’py adharmahetutve mantrair 
viṣādivat tadapanayopapatteḥ na duḥkhakāryārambhaṇaopapattiḥ vaidikānāṃ karamaṇām — 
mantreṇeva viṣabhakṣaṇasyeti.”; Text and Translation are from Houben (1999a, 149). 
339 The Tibetan translation (“gnod sems mi ’dod pa’i ’bras bu mi sbyin, ’dod pa’i 'byin.”) does not 
correspond to the Sanskrit text. Translation according to the Tibetan would be: “If [you argue that:] a 
malicious intention does not bring about an undesirable result; it [rather brings about] a desirable one.” 
The Tibetan is supported by TJ, which speaks of desirable results from Vedic sacrifice.  
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as consumption of (mantra-protected) poison (is helpful for one’s illness).340  
Or, 2. [reason:] because it is prescribed in the Veda, [example:] just like the act 
of giving.341  
In this one verse, Bhāviveka introduces two syllogisms of the opponent to prove the thesis that 
ritual killing does not have negative karmic consequences. The first syllogism adduces the same 
reason and example Bhāviveka already noted in PP. The second syllogism contains an updated 
addition to the opponent’s arguments reminiscent of the Sāṃkhya syllogism in the ŚV, itself a 
variant of Bhāviveka’s syllogism in the PP.  
 Let us take a closer look at the two syllogisms to discern the differences between them. 
It important to note that the holders of these two syllogisms are different: the ŚV syllogism 
belongs to the Sāṃkhyas while the MHK 9 syllogism is the Mīmāṃsakas’.  
 
Thesis- 
[ŚV:] Killing produces for its performer after death a fruit similar to that of its target, 
[MHK 9:] Killing is not considered to be something that produces an undesirable result, 
Reason- 
[ŚV:] because it is a kind of action, 
[MHK 9:] because it is prescribed in the Veda, 
Example- 
[ŚV:] like giving enjoined in the [Vedic] teaching.342 
[MHK 9:] just like the act of giving.  
 
                                                 
340 Insertion based on TJ D284a3, “sngags kyis yongs su bzung ba’i dug zos pa na nad la phan par ’gyur 
ba bzhin no.” 
341 MHK 9.32, “viṣopayuktivad dhiṃsā yadi mantraparigrahāt/ nābhīṣṭāniṣṭaphaladā śāstrokter vāpi 
dānavat//” 
342 As noted above, the translation of ŚV syllogism is from Kataoka (2011, pt. 2, 487). 
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The first noticeable difference between the two syllogisms is that the MHK 9 syllogism moved 
the phrase “enjoined by the Veda” (śāstrokta-) in the example of the ŚV syllogism to the reason 
(śāstrokteḥ) and, by doing so, replaced the reason of the ŚV syllogism with that phrase. In this 
process, the reason of ŚV syllogism is discarded. This replacement indicates that the 
Mīmāṃsakas did not consider ritual killing to be subject to the karmic law that regulates the 
relationship between action and effect. By transforming the qualifying phrase in the Sāṃkhyas’ 
example into the reason of the syllogism, the Mīmāṃsakas imply that the authority of the Veda is 
not something to be established by citing its injunctions on positive acts such as giving. In other 
words, the act of giving brings a positive fruit not because of karmic law; rather it begets such a 
result because, like ritual killing, the act of giving is sanctioned by the Veda. The Veda for the 
Mīmāṃsakas is an absolute authority, even overriding the presumably universal law of karma. 
Therefore, the reason section of any syllogism used to prove the relationship between an action 
enjoined by the Veda and its corresponding fruit can only be the Veda itself. Unlike other actions, 
ritual actions and their fruits are regulated by Vedic—not karmic—law.  
 With this change of the reason, the MHK 9 syllogism presents a thesis different from 
that of ŚV. In the latter, karmic law is a universal law. Thus, karmic law is the binding principle 
of all actions, including rituals. In the case of ritual killing, the agent should therefore receive 
what he imposes on others. Simply put, according to the Sāṃkhyas, the killer will be killed just 
as animals are killed by him. The Mīmāṃsakas’ thesis is quite different. They do not concede 
that karmic law is applicable to the case of ritual killing. Therefore, they do not acknowledge the 
analogy between ritual killing and its fruit. What they argue in the MHK 9 syllogism is that ritual 
killing does not bring an undesirable consequence to the agent. However, according to the 
paraphrase of the thesis in the commentary (TJ 9.32), the Mīmāṃsakas’ argument is more than a 
passive denial of the accusation. They correlate all scripturally enjoined acts with beneficial 
   181 
consequences.  
Whatever [acts] prescribed in the śāstra (=the Veda) bring about desirable 
results. Just as giving and morality [which are enjoined in the Veda], for 
example, [do bring about desirable results], [those scripturally enjoined acts 
including ritual killing] bring about [desirable results such as] pleasurable 
enjoyment and rebirth in heaven [to the agent].343 
Thus, when compared to the ŚV syllogism, MHK 9, by using the phrase of the ŚV syllogism—
“enjoined by the Veda” (śāstrokta)—as the reason, argues for a different thesis, yet with the same 
example of “giving.” It argues that ritual killing, rather than incurring negative karma for the 
killer, begets a desirable fruit because that is prescribed in the Veda. In the process, the example 
of “giving,” although common to both syllogisms, assumes a different function in the MHK 9 
syllogism. While in ŚV the act of giving is employed to exemplify the analogy between an action 
and its fruit, the same act of giving in the MHK 9 syllogism is but one of the acts whose 
performance and fruit are prescribed in the Veda.  
 The fact that the MHK 9 syllogism argues for the opposite thesis to that of the ŚV 
syllogism and that its reason and example are composed of the words of the ŚV syllogism 
suggests that the two syllogisms are in dialogue. The MHK 9 syllogism may be a Mīmāṃsaka 
answer to the Sāṃkhyas’ ŚV syllogism. It is noteworthy here that Kumārila’s criticism of the ŚV 
syllogism includes all the characteristics of the MHK 9 syllogism that make it different from the 
ŚV syllogism. 
 After having quoted the ŚV syllogism as the opponent’s argument, Kumārila criticizes it 
in seven verses (ŚV co. 236cd-243ab). In his reply, though not in the form of syllogism, we find 
all the elements that constitute the MHK 9 syllogism. First, in ŚV co. 237cd-239ab, Kumārila 
                                                 
343 TJ D284a3-4, “gang dang gang bstan bcos las ’byung ba de ni ’dod pa’i ’bras bu ster ba yin te, dper 
na sbyin pa dang tshul khrims la sogs pa bzhin te, longs spyod dang mtho ris la sogs pa ’thob par byed pa 
yin no.” 
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makes four statements that can be rearranged in the following sequence for the sake of 
comparing it to MHK 9 syllogism:  
 
1. By putting a Vedic injunction into an action, one gains the fruit prescribed in the Veda.344  
2. And no such fruit is negative; that is, all the fruits of ritually enjoined actions are not related to 
the experience of suffering.345  
3. Even in the case of “giving,” the subsequent positive fruit is not according to the principle of 
the similarity between an action and its fruit; by giving, one gets a fruit that is prescribed in the 
Veda.346  
4. Ritual killing, by statements 1 and 2 and as exemplified in 3, begets a positive fruit.347  
 
Statement 1 corresponds to the reason of the MHK 9 syllogism. For ritual actions, the regulating 
principle for an action and its fruit is Vedic prescription rather than karmic law. Statement 2, like 
TJ 9.32’s paraphrase of the thesis of MHK 9 syllogism, is a universal proposition that correlates 
Vedic actions exclusively with positive consequences. Statements 3 and 4 are applications of 
statements (or rules) 1 and 2 to the cases of giving and ritual killing. In the former, Kumārila 
corrects the role of the example of giving—not to exemplify karmic law but to provide an 
example of an act enjoined by the Veda. Lastly, statement 4 directly matches the thesis of the 
                                                 
344 ŚV co. 238a, “One should attain the fruit that is understood from the injunction.” 
(vidhigamyaphalāvāptiḥ.); translation is from Kataoka (2011, pt. 2, 489). 
345 ŚV co. 238b, “And [the fruit understood from the injunction] is not by nature pain.” (aduḥkhātmakatā 
tathā.); translation is from ibid.  
346 ŚV co. 238cd-239a, “And it is not heard [in the Veda] that the giver should have a fruit similar to the 
delight of the receiver.” (na ca yā saṃpradānasya prītis tādṛk phalaṃ śrutam dātus.); translation is from 
ibid.   
347 ŚV co. 237cd, “[He has the fault of] contradiction, too. For [in the case of a Vedic killing] there should 
be a [good] fruit similar to that [which arises] in the case of giving.” (viruddhatā ca, yādṛg ghi dāne tādṛk 
phalaṃ bhavet.); translation is from ibid.  
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MHK 9 syllogism: ritual killing does not produce an unfavorable result.  
 These four statements, taken as a whole, make the same argument as the MHK 9 
syllogism: ritual killing brings a beneficial result since it is enjoined in the Veda just as another 
enjoined act, giving. From this Mīmāṃsaka viewpoint, the most problematic element of the 
Sāṃkhyas’ ŚV syllogism is its reason: that ritual killing as just another kind of action 
(kriyāviśeṣa). Ritual killing, for the Mīmāṃsakas, is not just another kind of action but an action 
enjoined by the Veda, and for this reason, its fruit is also under the jurisdiction of the Veda. That 
the fruit of ritual killing is to be determined by the verdict of the Veda is somewhat confused by 
the Sāṃkhyas’ use of the example of giving. Acts of giving and killing differ sharply in their 
results for the recipients of those acts, causing the Sāṃkhyas to misunderstand the inner 
mechanism of action and its fruit. They think that the act of giving produces a beneficial result 
because it produces a beneficial effect for the receiver of the gift. They fail to understand that 
retribution is governed by the Veda. To dispel their confusion, Kumārila considers other acts that, 
although also enjoined by the Veda, cannot be approached from the perspective of their impact 
on others.  
[Your reason (“because it is another kind of action”)] is [rather] necessarily 
connected with the contradictory proposition [to your own]. It is because of 
other examples such as the acts of muttering prayers (japa), pouring ghee into 
fire (homa), and the like which do not make others suffer [or be pleased, but 
should be considered beneficial] because they are enjoined by the Veda.348  
In this verse, Kumārila suggests that the Sāṃkhyas should consider other ritual acts such as 
muttering prayers and pouring ghee into a fire. If such acts are used as the example in the ŚV 
syllogism, one cannot argue that ritual killing brings a painful consequence because it causes 
pain for the victim. No one is visibly helped or harmed when ghee is poured into a fire. As 
                                                 
348 ŚV co. 241cd-242ab, “japahomādidṛṣṭāntāt parapīḍādivarjanāt/ coditatvasya hetutvād 
viruddhāvyabhicāritā//”; cf. Kataoka (2011, pt. 2, 492). 
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Sucarita comments, “If the object of the act of muttering prayers is [the prayer] being muttered, 
what is being done to it [when one mutters a prayer]? We see that no other thing suffers or is 
favored [by such acts].”349 Moreover, the Sāṃkhyas, as orthodox Indian intellectuals, must 
accept that muttering prayers is a beneficial practice, but not because it pleases others; the object 
of this act, the prayer being muttered, cannot be pleased by it. The practice of muttering prayers 
is accepted as beneficial by both the Sāṃkhyas and the Mīmāṃsakas solely because it is an act 
enjoined by the Veda. Ritual killing must therefore also be accepted as a beneficial act.350  
 Thus, although the Sāṃkhyas’ ŚV syllogism presents the reason, “because it is a kind of 
action,” assuming a universal similarity between an action and its fruit, a consideration of 
prayers and oblations leads to the opposite thesis. Just as muttering prayers brings a beneficial 
effect to its agent—which the Sāṃkhyas, as orthodox Brahmins, must acknowledge—solely 
because it is enjoined by the Veda, ritual killing also begets a beneficial fruit to the killer. As the 
commentators on this verse formulate it, the ŚV syllogism implies a counter-syllogism that 
refutes itself. 
[thesis:] Killing animals in the Agnīṣomīya sacrifice is a beneficial action 
(artha)351, [reason:] because it is enjoined by the Veda, [example:] just as the 
acts of muttering prayers and the like [are beneficial acts].352 
This syllogism by Sucarita presents the Mīmāṃsakas’ reaction to the Sāṃkhyas’ ŚV syllogism in 
the briefest terms. The Mīmāṃsakas, unlike the Sāṃkhyas, think that ritual killing is 
                                                 
349 ŚVK 185:17-8, “japasya yadi tāvaj japyamānaṃ viṣayaḥ, kiṃ tasya phalam? anyasya tu na kasyacit 
pīḍānugrahau dṛśyete.” 
350 cf. ŚVK 185:14-6, “But they [i.e., acts such as japa and homa] are understood to be beneficial solely 
because they are enjoined by the Veda. Therefore, with those examples, it is possible to establish that 
ritual killing enjoined by the Veda is a beneficial act.” (coditatvamātreṇaiva tu te ’rthatayāvagatāḥ. atas 
taddṛṣṭāntenaiva coditā hiṃsā artha iti śakyate sādhayitum.)  
351 The most representative text in which the word “artha” is used in the sense of “beneficial act” is MS 
1.1.2 (codanālakṣaṇo ’tho dharmaḥ) under which the whole discussion on ritual killing is occasioned.  
352 ŚVK 185:21, “daikṣapaśuhiṃsā arthaḥ, vihitatvāj, japādivat.” Parthasārathi also formulates a similar 
syllogism. NRĀ (Śāstrī 1978) 88:8, “agnīṣomīyahiṃsā sukhakarī, coditatvāj, japādivat.”  
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beneficial—or, as Parthasārathi puts it, it “brings about happiness” (sukhakarī); all acts done 
according to Vedic injunctions are, by their nature, irrelevant to the experience of suffering 
(aduḥkhātmakatā). It is important to note that the thesis and reason of this syllogism are basically 
identical to the MHK 9 syllogism. The two different examples should not cause us to doubt that 
the MHK 9 syllogism is Mīmāṃsaka; Kumārila’s commentators use of the examples of prayers 
and pouring ghee to contrast the Mīmāṃsaka with that of the Sāṃkhyas, not because the 
Sāṃkhyas’ example of giving is inadequate.  
 Let us recall that Bhāviveka had a syllogism in PP almost identical to the Sāṃkhyas’ ŚV 
syllogism. The PP syllogism is not reiterated in MHK 9. Rather, in the opening verse of MHK 
9’s section on ritual killing, he adds a syllogism that reflects the Mīmāṃsakas’ critique of the ŚV 
syllogism. In short, the major difference between the PP’s and MHK 9’s sections on ritual killing 
is that, in the latter, Bhāviveka omits the PP syllogism and lists, as a new Mīmāṃsaka position 
on the matter, the MHK 9 syllogism, which contains the contents of Kumārila’s critique of the 
ŚV syllogism. Does this mean that Bhāviveka included the revised version of PP’s section after 
having read Kumārila’s critique of the Sāṃkhyas? This is a possibility. However, what prevents 
us from conclusively affirming that Bhāviveka and Kumārila were contemporaries, or more 
precisely, that MHK 9 and ŚV are based on the materials discussed here is Bhāviveka’s uneven 
presentation of Kumārila’s views. This will be discussed in the next section.  
  Regardless of whether Bhāviveka knew about Kumārila’s critique of the Sāṃkhyas’ 
syllogism, there is one significant fact about the MHK 9 syllogism that we can confirm. The 
MHK 9 syllogism is the first Buddhist record of a documentable Mīmāṃsaka view on ritual 
killing. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, Kumārila’s text is the first Mīmāṃsaka 
document that contains a defense of ritual killing. We do not know how pre-Kumārila 
Mīmāṃsakas responded to criticism of ritual sacrifice or if they had such a strategy. Buddhist 
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literature before MHK 9 is unaware of any defense of ritual killing peculiar to the Mīmāṃsakas. 
Although other Mīmāṃsaka doctrines such as the authorlessness of the Veda and the eternity of 
Vedic sounds are discussed for the first time in Saṅghabhadra’s NA, there, the opponent was still 
speaking in the language of the generic Vedic ritualist on the topic of ritual killing . Those 
traditional arguments of Vedic ritualists, as we shall see, are also repeated as the opponent’s 
assertions (pūrvapakṣa) in Bhāviveka’s PP and even in MHK 9, which is specifically devoted to 
the Mīmāṃsakas. However, among those old arguments, one new syllogism is introduced in 
MHK 9 and its view is genuinely Mīmāṃsaka, attested in Kumārila’s defense of ritual killing. 
The MHK 9 syllogism is the first Buddhist reference to the Mīmāṃsakas’ stance on ritual killing. 
It is the point at which the Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice first engages with the 
Mīmāṃsakas’ objection. 
 
4.6 A Hypothesis on the Decline of the Critique of Vedic Sacrifice 
The MHK 9 syllogism, although reflecting a genuine Mīmāṃsaka voice on the topic of ritual 
killing, is not the only opinion that Bhāviveka introduces as the opponent’s arguments. His 
discussion of Vedic sacrifice is appended as a Q&A session to his discussion of the Veda at MHK 
9.31; it consists of eleven verses (MHK 9.32-42). The last two (41 and 42) are about drinking 
liquor (madyapāna) during the sacrifice, and thus, do not belong to the critique of Vedic sacrifice 
proper. In the first nine verses (32-40), Bhāviveka introduces four arguments of the opponent; the 
MHK 9 syllogism is one. Except for the MHK 9 syllogism, the other three arguments in support 
of ritual killing are not typically Mīmāṃsaka. 
As we have seen, the first argument, listed along with the MHK 9 syllogism at MHK 
9.32, that the negative effect of ritual killing can be counteracted by Vedic mantras, has been 
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appearing in Buddhist literature since Harivarman. The second argument is the MHK 9 
syllogism; it shares the same thesis with the first but attempts to prove it based on the 
Mīmāṃsaka view of the role of the Veda in determining ritual action and its fruit.  
 In the third argument (MHK 9.36),353 the opponent again argues that ritual killing does 
not bring an undesirable fruit but, here, because the raison d’etre of animals is to be killed in 
Vedic sacrifice.  
If you think - [thesis:] Killing animals in Vedic sacrifice does not bring about 
an undesirable fruit [to the killer], [reason:] because [they are] for the sake of 
that [that is, the sacrifice], [example:] just as the act of cooking for the sake of 
Brahmins is [regarded to be] desirable [that is, a beneficial act].354 
As he interprets this verse, Kataoka (2012, 359) takes the reason of the syllogism as meaning that 
ritual killing—not animals—is for the sake of Vedic sacrifice. He speculates that this idea 
represents a Mīmāṃsaka view that would later develop into Prabhākara’s position on the issue of 
ritual killing. He states: “Similarly, the action of killing can be regarded as a beneficial cause that 
will bring about a desirable fruit for a slayer in the future, because it is for the sake of ritual and 
not for the sake of the slayer. Ritual killing is ‘for the sake of that” (tādarthya).’” Later (360), 
after having observed “Prabhākara holds the same view that ritual killing can be justified because 
it is ‘for the sake of ritual,’” Kataoka proposes that “the view mentioned by Bhāviveka might 
also be attributed to Bhavadāsa, or possibly other forerunners of Prabhākara.” (ibid.)  
 Kataoka’s suggestion that this view represents another line of the Mīmāṃsā tradition, 
that is, Prabhākara’s (not Kumārila’s), is stimulating. However, the view presented in that 
syllogism is not that ritual killing is “for the sake of ritual and not for the sake of the slayer.” 
Rather, when we consider the context in which the syllogism is introduced, Bhāviveka’s 
                                                 
353 The corresponding discussion of this argument in PP is found at PP D216a3-7. 
354 MHK 9.36, “yajñe paśūnāṃ hiṃsā cen nāniṣṭaphaladāyinī/ tādarthyād brāhmaṇārthā hi yatheṣṭā 
pacanakriyā//” 
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opponent is vindicating ritual killing on the grounds that animals are created for Vedic sacrifice. 
This is clear from the verse that Bhāviveka cites in TJ, right before MHK 9.36, as the 
background of the opponent’s syllogism. 
The Self-arisen one (Svayambhū?) by himself created animals for the sake of 
Vedic sacrifice. Therefore, as they have the purpose [of being used] in it, Vedic 
sacrifice is dharma. It is like in the case of this example. That is, it is just as 
killing [a living being] for the sake of [serving] a Brahmin is not adharma.355 
It is in reference to this verse that Bhāviveka writes in MHK 9.36, “because [they are] for the 
sake of that” (tādarthyāt). In other words, what is expressed in that phrase is that “animals,” 
rather than “ritual killing,” are for the sake of Vedic sacrifice. This view does not correspond to 
Prabhākara’s view that considers the purpose of the “act” rather than the “object” of ritual 
killing. Bhāviveka also clearly states in his own objection to MHK 9.36, “animals are not created 
for Vedic sacrifice.”356 The issue of the debate in MHK 9.36-7 is the raison d’etre of the 
sacrificial victim, not whether ritual killing is for the sake of sacrifice or performer, as Kataoka 
(2012) assumes.   
 The idea that animals are created to be sacrificed is attested in a classic work on 
Brahmin orthopraxy. As Schmidt (1968, 630-1) notes, in the Manusmṛti 5.39, we encounter the 
same idea in a slightly different fashion: “In [5.]39 it is stated that killing (vadha) on ritual 
occasions is to be considered as non-killing (avadha) since animals were created for the sake of 
sacrifice by Svayambhū, and since the sacrifice is meant for the welfare of the whole world.”357 
Since the first line of the above verse of Bhāviveka’s opponent (rang nyid rang byung gyur pa 
yis/ mchod sbyin don du byol song bskyed/) is the exact Tibetan translation of the first line of 
                                                 
355 TJ D285a4-5, “rang nyid rang byung gyur pa yis/ mchod sbyin don du byol song bskyed/ des na de la 
dgos pa’i phyir/ mchod sbyin chos yin ’di ltar dper/ bram ze’i don du ’tshe byed pa/ ’di ltar chos min min 
pa bzhin//”; cf. Kawasaki (1992, 133-4).  
356 TJ D285a7, “byol song rnams ni mchod sbyin gyi phyir bskyed pa ma yin.” 
357 See also Alsdorf (2010 [1962], 20). 
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Manu 5.39 (“The Self-existent One himself created domestic animals for sacrifice”; yajñārthaṃ 
paśavaḥ sṛṣṭāḥ svayam eva svayaṃbhuvā/)358, they are likely different versions from a common 
source. That source belongs to all Brahmin ritualists, not just to the Mīmāṃsakas.  
 The Brahmin belief that animals are created for Vedic sacrifice is attested in pre-
Bhāviveka Buddhist literature. In a short treatise attributed to Āryadeva on the Hīnayanists’ and 
heretics’ notions of “liberation” (涅槃; nirvāṇa) in the Laṅkāvatarasūtra,359 this view is ascribed 
to “the masters of the Veda” (圍陀論師; Vedavādin?). 
Question: Which class of heretics teaches that the God Brahmā is the cause of 
nirvāṇa? 
Answer: The fourth class of heretics, the Vedavādins, teach as follows. From 
the navel of the god Nārāyaṇa is born the great lotus flower. From the lotus 
flower is born Brahmā, the forefather of creatures. This Brahmā creates all 
things, the living and the lifeless. ... All earth is a sacrificial place for the 
performance of deeds which bring merit. Brahmā produces all flowers and 
plants, which a man shall offer to him. He creates mountains and fields, birds 
and animals, such as domestic pigs, sheep, asses, horses and so on. If one kills 
these in the sacrificial place and offers them to the God Brahmā, one thereby 
attains the world of Brahmā. This is called nirvāṇa.360  
Although the idea that animals are created for sacrifice is not explicitly stated as a proposition as 
it was in MHK 9 and the Manusmṛti 5.39, this passage concisely expresses the same idea. 
According to the masters of the Veda, Brahmā created the earth and its residents, and defined the 
former as the sacrificial field and the latter as the sacrificial agents and objects. Vedic sacrifice is 
sole site where all of Brahmā’s creatures can have meaningful relationships for the ultimate 
                                                 
358 Text and Translation are from Olivelle (2005, 565 and 140). 
359 The title of this work (T 1640; 提婆菩薩釋楞伽經中外道小乘涅槃論) is translated by Nakamura 
(1955, 93) as the “Śāstra by the Bodhisattva [Ārya-]Deva on the Explanation of Nirvāṇa by [Twenty] 
Heretical and Hīnayāna [Teachers] Mentioned in the Laṅkā[-vatāra]-sūtra.” 
360 T 1640, 157a11-8, “問曰. 何等外道說梵天是涅槃因? 答曰. 第四外道圍陀論師說. 從那羅延天
臍中生大蓮華, 從蓮華生梵天祖公. 彼梵天作一切命無命物. ...... 一切大地是修福德戒場. 生一切
華草以爲供養. 化作山野禽獸人中豬羊驢馬等. 於界場中殺害供養梵天, 得生彼處名涅槃.”; 
translation is from Nakamura (1955, 94).  
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purpose of man’s liberation. In this world of sacrifice, men are born to sacrifice and animals are 
born to be sacrificed. The upholders of this worldview are named the masters of the Veda, a 
generic word for Brahmins. 
 The last opinion that Bhāviveka considers in MHK 9’s section on ritual killing is again 
an argument typical of generic Vedic ritualists. In MHK 9.38, Bhāviveka, by asserting that “this 
killing committed inside the sacrificial ground (vedī) brings about an undesirable fruit to the 
agent in the future” (antarvedyāṃ ca hiṃseyaṃ ... aniṣṭaphaladā kartur āyatyām), refers to the 
opponent’s argument, according to the introductory remark of TJ, that “if one kills [animals] 
inside the central sacrificial ground, an undesirable result will not arise.”361 As Bhāviveka 
refutes it, he rephrases it in a significant fashion: “Killing (bsad pa) in the central sacrificial 
ground is non-killing (ma bsad pa)”362  
 This view is expressed in the last quarter (pāda d) of the Manusmṛti 5.39 above: “Within 
the sacrifice, therefore, killing is not killing.” (tasmād yajñe vadho ’vadhaḥ)363 The Manusmṛti 
repeats this view, “the categorical contention that killing for sacrifice is not killing” (Alsdorf 
2010, 20), again in 5.44: “When a killing is sanctioned by the Veda and well-established in this 
mobile and immobile creation, it should be regarded definitely as a non-killing; for it is from the 
Veda that the Law has shined forth.”364  
 Furthermore, the Manusmṛti’s contention is an expression of the Brahmin attitude 
toward ritual killing comes from a much older period of Vedic ritualism. Even in the Ṛg Veda, 
there is a verse that denies the sacrificial victim’s death (or the priests’ killing of the victim). In 
the Horse Sacrifice (Aśvamedha), Ṛg Veda 1.162.21 “is employed in the ritual sūtras at the 
                                                 
361 TJ D285b2-3, “dbus kyi mchod sbyin gyi gnas su bsad na mi ’dod pa’i ’bras bu mi ’byung ngo.” 
362 TJ D285b4, “dbus kyi mchod sbyin gyi gnas su gang bsad pa de ma bsad pa yin no.” 
363 Text and translation are from Olivelle (2005, 565 and 140). 
364 Manusmṛti 5.44, “yā vedavihitā hiṃsā niyatāsmiṃś carācare/ ahiṃsām eva tāṃ vidyād vedād dharmo 
hi nirbabhau//” Text and translation are from Olivelle (ibid.). 
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moment when the horse is put to death” (Jamison 1996, 78): “Truly in this way you do not die 
nor are you harmed; you go to the gods by paths easy to travel.” (Jamison and Brereton 2014, 
346) This denial of ritual killing as killing, or the equation of ritual killing and non-killing, 
continued in later Vedic texts such as the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa365 and the Śatapatha 
Brāhmaṇa.366 Apart from this, there is also a passage in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (8.15) which, 
although not denying that ritual killing is an act of killing, makes killing in the context of Vedic 
sacrifice an exceptional case that helps one attain the final goal of reaching the world of 
Brahmā.367 Therefore, the fourth argument of Bhāviveka’s opponent does not represent a 
uniquely Mīmāṃsaka view of ritual killing. 
 Among the four arguments that Bhāviveka introduces as the opponent’s defense of ritual 
killing, apart from the second MHK 9 syllogism, the other three are found in the sources 
common to Vedic ritualists and they are recorded as such in pre-Bhāviveka Buddhist texts. It is 
noteworthy that the Mīmāṃsakas do not inherit this strategy of vindicating animal sacrifice. 
While the pre-Kumārila Mīmāṃsā authors show no interest in discussing the topic, Kumārila, as 
Halbfass (1991, 112-3) remarks, “does not try to explain away the ritual slaughter of animals 
(paśuhiṃsā), or to justify it by reconciling it with the ideal of ahiṃsā.” For Kumārila, “to defend 
the Vedic dharma, including its animal sacrifices,” just as the Manusmṛti does, “would amount to 
abandoning it.” Halbfass continues to comment on Kumārila’s stance as follows: “It has to be 
accepted in its own right, without relying on external, merely human and potentially relative 
standards. Only the Veda itself can uphold the authority and identity of its dharma.” (ibid., 111) 
This evaluation of Kumārila’s section on ritual killing by Halbfass well expresses the 
fundamental difference between the MHK 9 syllogism and the other three arguments that 
                                                 
365 See Houben (1999a, 118).  
366 See Tull (1996, 225-6). 
367 See Schmidt (1968, 631) and Houben (1999a, 115) 
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Bhāviveka considers. The former, unshamed by the accusation of killing, merely states that ritual 
killing, as enjoined by the Veda, is indissolubly linked to non-suffering, while the latter attempt 
to excuse ritual killing by explaining how the generally negative consequence of killing does not 
accrue to the killer in the sacrificial context. The Mīmāṃsakas, despite being staunch 
traditionalists in advocating ancient ritual values, renounce the traditional strategy to defend 
them. 
 Despite this difference between the ritualists and the Mīmāṃsakas, Bhāviveka’s mixture 
of their opinions in his Mīmāṃsaka opponent shows that he saw the Mīmāṃsakas as the 
successors of Vedic ritualists. For this reason, he transfers the older Buddhist critique of Vedic 
sacrifice to his section on the Mīmāṃsakas in PP and to MHK 9, as if that traditional critique 
was still valid against a newly emerging opponent. Yet Bhāviveka updates the opponent’s 
arguments in MHK 9; PP’s section does not include a Mīmāṃsaka voice on ritual killing. Rather, 
the PP syllogism seems to serve as a pūrvapakṣa of Kumārila after being adopted by the 
Sāṃkhyas. As we have seen, the PP syllogism is discarded in MHK 9 and, in the latter work, 
Bhāviveka introduces a genuine Mīmāṃsaka argument on ritual killing (MHK 9 syllogism), one 
that reflects Kumārila’s critique of the Sāṃkhyas’ ŚV syllogism. Bhāviveka thus newly 
incorporates the Mīmāṃsaka position in MHK 9. Nevertheless, it remains surrounded by other 
arguments that cannot be attributed to the Mīmāṃsakas. By presenting the Mīmāṃsakas among 
Vedic ritualists, Bhāviveka shows that he sees the Mīmāṃsakas as traditional Vedic ritualists.  
 Given the fundamental difference between these two responses to the critique of ritual 
killing, the traditional ritualist arguments seemed doomed to obscurity, unworthy of Buddhist 
attack. The Buddhists would take the Mīmāṃsakas as their major opponents. Śāntarakṣita, for 
example, who unquestionably postdates Kumārila, does not consider arguments that do not 
belong to the Mīmāṃsakas, such as those found in MHK 9. In fact, Śāntarakṣita does not even 
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broach the topic of ritual killing; the critique of Vedic sacrifice is not present in his 
Tattvasaṃgraha. Śāntarakṣita does not even take issue with the position on ritual killing that can 
be ascribed to the Mīmāṃsakas. This may be because the Mīmāṃsakas’ position on ritual killing, 
such as Kumārila’s, is less a defense of ritual killing than a confirmation of the Mīmāṃsaka 
doctrine that the Veda is the sole and absolute authority that, within its monopolized domain of 
dharma, overrides human reasoning. Although Kumārila responds to critiques of ritual killing, 
his responses are not apologies but restatements of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine epitomized in MS 
1.1.2 (codanālakṣaṇo ’rtho dharma) that Vedic injunctions enjoin beneficial actions and they are 
to be implemented. To such a Mīmāṃsaka response, Buddhists cannot simply criticize ritual 
killing. The Mīmāṃsakas fully acknowledge that it is a kind of killing, but that killing in Vedic 
sacrifice is scripturally sanctioned. To reply, the Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice must be 
transformed into a critique of the Veda.  
 This is clearly seen in Bhāviveka’s answers to the MHK 9 syllogism (MHK 9.32cd) 
which claims that ritual killing does not bring about an undesirable fruit since it is prescribed in 
the Veda (śāstra) like the act of giving. In his rejoinder to this claim, Bhāviveka focuses his 
critique on the reason section of the syllogism, specifically on the Mīmāṃsaka use of the word 
“śāstra.”  
If [the word “śāstra” in your reason] is just employed in the sense of your own 
scripture[, that is, the Veda, even the tenets of] the Saṃsāramocakas would be 
justified. But, if the reason is employed in the general sense [of “prescribed in 
scripture”], that is not valid to others.368  
Bhāviveka discerns two possible meanings of the word “śāstra” and shows that neither can make 
the syllogism valid. When one takes the word to mean the Veda, the scripture for the 
                                                 
368 MHK 9.35, “svaśāstra eva ced ukte siddhaḥ saṃsāramocakaḥ/ sāmānyena ca hetūktau syād 
anyatarāsiddhatā//” 
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Mīmāṃsakas, and thereby refers to the authority of the Veda for the purpose of justifying ritual 
killing, it would result in granting an authority to anyone who rationalizes the act of killing with 
absurd reasons. The Saṃsāramocakas claim that they are liberating small beings from saṃsāra 
by killing insects.369 Should the Vedic injunctions on ritual killing be granted authority, the 
Saṃsāramocakas’ tenet (grub pa'i mtha') of killing small beings must be regarded as 
authoritative by the Mīmāṃsakas. On the other hand, when the word is taken in the general sense 
of “scripture,” the reason of the syllogism is merely false because Buddhist scriptures, for 
example, do not teach that killing brings a favorable fruit.370   
 What we observe in Bhāviveka’s answer to MHK 9 syllogism is that the topic of 
discussion is diverted from ritual killing to the authority of the Veda. This change is not 
unexpected, since the Mīmāṃsakas make no effort to deny that ritual killing is an act of killing 
or to resort to other forces, such as that of mantras, to counteract the negative effect caused by 
killing. Ritual killing is only indirectly defended via the authority of the scripture that enjoins it. 
The prime Mīmāṃsaka project is to safeguard the authority of the Veda not Vedic sacrifice. Once 
the authority of the Veda is secured, Vedic sacrifice, as its implementation, needs no justification. 
For this reason, the Mīmāṃsaka defense of ritual killing must be a reconfirmation of the absolute 
trustworthiness and authority of the Veda. And, against such an argument, the target of the 
Buddhist critique must be changed to the Veda.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The absence of post-Bhāviveka material on Vedic sacrifice suggests that the older Buddhist 
attacks on ritual killing were neglected and discarded, although there is no positive evidence to 
                                                 
369 See TJ D284b5-6. 
370 See TJ D284b6-285a1. 
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prove that they stopped after Bhāviveka. I have assumed that MHK 9 is the last document to 
contain a Buddhist critique of Brahmin ritual killing. 
 As noted in passing, in the entire section of MHK 9 on the ethical problems of Vedic 
sacrifice (MHK 9.32-42), the majority of verses (32-40) devoted to ritual killing are appended as 
a Q&A session after MHK 9.31, the culmination of Bhāviveka’s critique of the Mīmāṃsaka 
doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda. As an appendix to MHK 9.31, the section does not 
have a corresponding Mīmāṃsaka argument in the “official” opponent’s section (MHK 9.1-17). 
The absence of a Mīmāṃsaka defense of ritual killing in those first seventeen verses is 
significant, since the rest of MHK 9 is, as a whole, formatted as Bhāviveka’s refutation of 
Mīmāṃsaka positions presented in that initial section. Therefore, the critique of Vedic sacrifice is 
structurally marginalized in MHK 9, lacking a corresponding Mīmāṃsaka defense in the 
“official” pūrvapakṣa and by being subordinate to MHK 9.31, that is, the critique of the Veda.  
 Yet Bhāviveka places his critique of Vedic sacrifice right after MHK 9.31. The 
corresponding section in PP has the same structure: Bhāviveka first posits his thesis on the evil 
authorship of the Veda and then adds the discussion on ritual killing. A more curious fact about 
those sections in PP and MHK 9 is that the opponent’s arguments there are not those of the 
Mīmāṃsakas (with the exception of MHK 9 syllogism). This is not to say that those arguments 
are imaginary. As we have seen, those arguments were made in representative Vedic texts. 
However, they do not belong to the Mīmāṃsakas. It is probable that there were Mīmāṃsakas 
during Bhāviveka’s days who actually defended their practice of ritual killing with arguments 
from widely accepted works such as the Manusmṛti. However, we must remember that the first 
two Mīmāṃsaka authors of surviving works of the school were silent on the topic and Kumārila, 
the first to offer comments on ritual killing, advocated arguments qualitatively different from 
those of the older Vedic ritualists.  
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 Bhāviveka might have seen a chance to criticize Vedic ritualists’ claims while refuting 
the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda. To prove the evil authorship of the 
Veda, Bhāviveka adduces the Vedic injunctions on killing beings and drinking liquor. Thus, he 
might have expected that Vedic ritualists would respond by resorting to the typical rhetoric of 
defending ritual killing. However, it is noteworthy that the defense of ritual killing had been 
superseded by the ideal of ahiṃsā as early as the Manusmṛti. Alsdorf (2010), in his examination 
of the rules on meat-eating in the Manusmṛti, discerned three historical layers and interpreted the 
latter two as “successive stages of historical development.” (ibid., 17)371 Two of the three 
arguments of Vedic ritualists in MHK 9 are found in the second layer (5.27-44) which, while 
acknowledging the value of ahiṃsā in general, nevertheless attempt to justify ritual killing by 
equating the practice with non-killing and arguing that the raison d’etre of animals is to be killed 
in Vedic sacrifice. This effort to reconcile Vedic ritualism with the ideal of ahiṃsā is altogether 
abandoned in the third layer of the Manusmṛti (5.45-55) “which explicitly appeals to the rule of 
ahiṃsā, and unconditionally brands any partaking of meat as immoral, and praises the merit of a 
total commitment to vegetarianism in the highest terms.” (ibid., 21; emphasis in the original)  
 This transition, in which the value of ahiṃsā overpowers and finally supersedes Vedic 
ritualism observed in the passage of the Manusmṛti, cannot be taken to mean that the large 
groups of Brahmins stopped the practice of animal sacrifice. As Houben (1999a) shows, later 
Vedānta intellectuals such as Śaṃkara (8th c.), Rāmānuja (11th c.) and Madhva (13th c.) defend 
animal killing in Vedic sacrifice with age-old arguments. However, the final victory of ahiṃsā 
over ritual killing attested in the Manusmṛti indicates that Brahmins, or at least a certain group of 
them, began to problematize animals sacrifice. And this fact makes it less probable that 
                                                 
371 See also comments on Alsdorf’s differentiation of three layers by Schmidt (1968, 626ff.) and 
Heesterman (1984, 120ff.). 
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Bhāviveka, while arguing against the Mīmāṃsakas, saw an occasion to criticize the opinions that 
had been abandoned by the advocates themselves.  
  Bhāviveka’s inclusion of non-Mīmāṃsaka opinions on ritual killing in his sections on 
the Mīmāṃsakas may say more about Bhāviveka than about his opponent. By quoting the 
objections of generic Vedic ritualists as the Mīmāṃsaka rejoinder to his thesis of the evil 
authorship of the Veda, Bhāviveka reveals his perception, or misperception of the opponent. 
Bhāviveka sees the Mīmāṃsakas as the successors of those Vedic ritualists who represent the 
second layer of the Manusmṛti’s codes on meat-eating, called “Masters of the Veda” (as in 
Āryadeva’s work cited above) in previous Buddhist literature. Thus, the entire section on ritual 
killing in PP might be an inheritance from and repetition of arguments in older sources that did 
not deal with the Mīmāṃsakas. Bhāviveka nevertheless updates the opponent in MHK 9 by 
including one genuine Mīmāṃsaka position on ritual killing.  
 What seems crucial in Bhāviveka’s update is Kumārila’s critique of the Sāṃkhyas in his 
ŚV. We have discussed how Bhāviveka’s own syllogism (PP syllogism) resembles the Sāṃkhyas’ 
in ŚV (ŚV syllogism) and how Kumārila’s critique of the latter is reflected in the Mīmāṃsaka 
position in MHK 9 (MHK 9 syllogism). I do not argue that Bhāviveka actually read Kumārila 
and revised his section of PP in MHK 9 accordingly. Bhāviveka’s revision may be motivated by 
the argument of a certain Mīmāṃsaka before Kumārila who criticized the Sāṃkhyas. However, 
the fact that Bhāviveka does not continue the PP syllogism in MHK 9 suggests that Bhāviveka 
discarded the syllogism for some reason. The fact that Bhāviveka newly introduces the MHK 
syllogism as the opponent’s argument strongly suggests that the reason is the Mīmāṃsakas’ 
critique of that syllogism. Although Kumārila’s section on ritual killing in ŚV appears to explain 
the difference between PP’s and MHK 9’s section on ritual killing, what I would like suggest is 
not that the change was made in reaction to Kumārila but that Bhāviveka began to notice the 
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Mīmāṃsaka position on the matter of ritual killing.  
 Still, the first appearance of the Mīmāṃsaka position is mixed with the older Vedic 
ritualists’ defenses of ritual killing in MHK 9. This again testifies that Bhāviveka does not 
distinguish the two groups: the Mīmāṃsakas to him must have been a particular group among 
ritualist Brahmins, whom Buddhists have long condemned for killing animals. Although 
Bhāviveka corrected one of his arguments in PP as he confronts this newly emergent group of 
ritualists, he did not correct the genealogical framework in which he locates the Mīmāṃsakas. 
They are, to Bhāviveka, still Brahmins who recorded their temporal ascendency in the second 
layer of the Manusmṛti’s section on meat-eating. But, when Buddhists after Bhāviveka finally 
came to notice the fundamental difference between the Mīmāṃsakas’ position on ritual killing 
and that of ritualist Brahmins, they may have thought that the defenses of ritual killing listed in 
MHK 9 should not be ascribed to the Mīmāṃsakas. They thus may have felt no need to discuss 
arguments already abandoned by the upholders of the Veda themselves. And, considering that a 
critique of the Mīmāṃsakas’ defense of ritual killing must eventually be directed at the authority 
of the Veda itself, as we have seen with Bhāviveka’s case, the issue of killing in Vedic sacrifice 
may have not been deemed by post-Bhāviveka Buddhists a proper line of attack against the 
Mīmāṃsakas. In this process of understanding the Mīmāṃsakas, who were later perceived as the 
major Hindu opponents by Buddhists after Bhāviveka, Buddhists no longer addressed the issue 
of killing in Vedic sacrifice, and thereby, their critique of Vedic sacrifice came to an end. 
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Conclusion 
 
Indian Buddhism was never an isolated phenomenon; Indian Buddhists were in constant contact 
with practitioners of other religions. This single fact makes it imperative to view every aspect of 
Indian Buddhism as a product of historical conflicts and negotiations between Buddhists and 
non-Buddhists. Explaining the doctrine of no self (anātman) or non-killing (ahiṃsā) as essential 
features of Buddhism without proper references to the Upaniṣadic notion of self (ātman) or Vedic 
cult of animal killing (yajñe hiṃsā) is inadequate. Sensitivity to inter-religious and inter-sectarian 
dynamics is a prerequisite for any historical understanding of Indian Buddhism. The tasks of 
mapping Buddhists’ relationships with other religious practitioners and of tracing changes in 
these relationships throughout the course of their histories in the homeland must be priorities for 
modern scholarship on Indian Buddhism. However, such research is rarely undertaken and, even 
when such attempts are made, they are often governed by holistic perspectives on Indian 
religious diversity, imagining that there are certain natures intrinsic to “Indian” and “religious” 
encounters with others. 
 This dissertation has studied the histories of two Buddhist critiques developed to cope 
with Vedic ritualists. In tracing their histories, special attention has been paid to Buddhists’ 
relationships with two specific groups of Vedic Brahmins, viz. the Mīmāṃsakas and the 
Sāṃkhyas, highlighting their respective roles as immediate adversaries and distant collaborators 
in two Buddhist anti-Vedic critiques. The findings of this dissertation bear on the general frames 
through which we view the nature of interrelationships between religiously heterogeneous 
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groups of ancient and medieval India.  
Here, in conclusion, I would like to consider whether the two most prevalent models—
viz. inclusivism and exclusivism—apply to Bhāviveka.372 In reflecting on the applicability of 
these two models to describe Bhāviveka’s attitude toward outsiders, I would suggest that a 
certain flexibility is needed as we approach Indian polemical scholarly texts (śāstra). 
 Although Bhāviveka’s attitude toward outsiders has never been subjected to a serious 
and extensive inquiry, it is often characterized in terms of inclusivism. Building upon the concept 
of inclusivism as propounded by its initial exponent, Paul Hacker, Wilhelm Halbfass unfolded 
the explanatory potential of the concept by demonstrating its applicability not only to 
Brahmanical and Hindu but also to Buddhist and Jaina intellectuals’ manners of handling the 
religious plurality of their times. As he discusses Buddhist inclusivistic tendency, Halbfass 
mentions Bhāviveka as one of the Buddhist authors who manifested an inclusivistic attitude 
toward outsiders.373 To corroborate Bhāviveka’s inclusivism, Halbfass refers to a passage from 
the third chapter of MHK (tattvajñānaiṣaṇā) where Bhāviveka equates the Buddha with the 
Vedāntin notion of brahman and declares the latter as the equivalent of the Buddhist term 
                                                 
372 Classical formulations and elaborations of the concept of inclusivism to describe the typical Indian 
trait of approaching religious others are found in Hacker (1995, Chapter 11) and Halbfass (1988, Chapters 
19 and 22). Recently, there have been critiques of inclusivistic understanding of Indian religious plurality 
and arguments that the exclusivistic model should be adopted. Verardi (2011, 11) well expresses the gist 
of the criticism: “I do not share the inclusive paradigm that assumes that in ancient India, for all the 
recognized differences, there was—we speak here of the structured systems—a single development 
model, broadly shared by all the forces in the field. I see India as the only civilization of the ancient world 
that generated two opposing models of social and economic relations that coexisted for a long time in 
conflict, whatever the attempts to reduce or mask the incompatibilities.” See also the following remark by 
Sanderson (2015, 159) who explains Indian religious diversity without recourse to inclusivism: “The 
long-entrenched contrary view, that the Indian religions were essentially tolerant, cannot reasonably be 
maintained in the face of the carefully formulated views of the adherents of these Indian traditions and 
evidence of sporadic outbreaks of intolerance and persecution. … this must be explained not through an 
argument from essence, …, but in terms of a balance of influence in which no one religious tradition was 
in a position of such strength that it could rid society of its rivals, a balance of power sustained by the 
policy of governments.” 
373 See Halbfass (1988, 357) and (1991, 66). 
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“nirvāṇa.” Referring to the same text,374 Eckel (2008, 7-8), although with closer attention to the 
irony of Bhāviveka’s arguments, affirms Bhāviveka’s inclusivism when he identifies the Buddha 
with brahman. Appropriating the central term, brahman, of the Vedāntins, and making it one’s 
own by infusing the term with the new meaning of nirvāṇa is indeed an inclusivistic way of 
understanding religious others and implying one’s own superiority over them.  
 We also observe Bhāviveka’s inclusivistic attitude toward the Vedāntins in other chapters 
of MHK. As he confronts the Śrāvakas’ attempt to exclude Mahāyāna from the Buddha’s 
teaching (buddhokti) by likening it to the system of Vedānta (vedāntadarśana), Bhāviveka 
surprisingly acknowledges the similarity between (Mahāyāna) Buddhist and Vedāntic teachings, 
but only in an inclusivistic way: “Everything that is well spoken in the Vedānta is taught by the 
Buddha.”375 Criticizing previous interpretations of this half-verse of Bhāviveka, Qvarnström 
(1989, 103) states: “Gokhale, Nakamura and others take this to mean that Bhavya had a 
favorable attitude towards the Vedāndadarśana, but in the light of MHK/TJ 8.86 the intention is 
quite the reverse.” MHK/TJ 8.86 on the basis of which Qvarnström is critical of the other 
interpretation, however, merely draws out what is implied in MHK 4.56. While the latter only 
alludes to the Buddhist origin of “well spoken” (sūkta) Vedāntic teachings, the former explicitly 
states that the Vedāntins longed for the impeccable Buddhist teachings and made it their own.376 
Both passages show that Bhāviveka acknowledged certain good points in the tenets of Vedānta 
and then asserted their Buddhist origin. 
 Although Bhāviveka’s approach to Vedānta, as Qvarntröm points out, does not simply 
                                                 
374 The text under discussion is MHK/TJ 3.289-290. The entire passage is translated in Eckel (1992, 169). 
See also Gokhale (1961-2). 
375 MHK 4.56ab, “vedānte ca hi yat sūktaṃ tat sarvaṃ buddhabhāṣitam/”; translation is from Eckel 
(2008, 199). 
376 MHK 8.86, “tāthāgatīm avitathāṃ matvā nītim imāṃ śubhām/ tasmāj jātaspṛhais tīrthyaiḥ kṛtaṃ 
tatra mamāpi tat//”; see Qvarnström (1989, 102-3). 
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entail his favorable reception of the opponents’ views, it does not imply “the reverse,” that is, an 
unfavorable attitude toward or total rejection of Vedānta. Rather, it fulfills the classical definition 
of inclusivism by Hacker (1995, 244-5): “It consists in claiming for, and thus including in, one’s 
own religion what really belongs to an alien sect.” Thus, Bhāviveka observes that “the ātman 
theory of the Vedānta school and the non-self theory of Buddhism are identical in content” 
(Nakamura 1965, 295) and further argues that as long as the Vedāntins regard “non-origination” 
(ajātitva) as the general characteristic of ātman, such understanding of ātman is well founded 
and without fault (nirdoṣaḥ sopapattikaḥ).377 Bhāviveka first claims the resemblance, if not 
complete identity, between the Mādhyamika and Vedāntin concepts and he includes the Vedāntic 
idea in Buddhism by declaring that every well-spoken Vedāntic doctrine originates from the 
Buddha’s teaching. This is an unmistakably inclusivistic approach toward the religious and 
philosophical other, the Vedāntins.  
 Nevertheless, inclusivism is not the only interreligious strategy of Bhāviveka. Regarding 
the Mīmāṃsaka doctrines, Bhāviveka shows no willingness to observe any “well spoken” points 
and has no intention of arguing that they had a Buddhist origin. As we have seen in the 
dissertation, against the Mīmāṃsaka idea of the authorlessness of the Veda, Bhāviveka posits the 
evil authorship of the Veda. He also emphasizes the universal applicability of karmic law against 
the Mīmāṃsaka legitimization of ritual killing. When Bhāviveka formulates the thesis “the Veda 
is not a means of knowing dharma”378 against the Mīmāṃsā thesis “dharma is beneficial acts 
defined by the Vedic injunction,”379 he is excluding the Veda from the realm of dharma. Yet, 
Bhāviveka also exhibits an inclusivistic stance to the Veda toward the end of MHK 9. He 
                                                 
377 See Qvarnström 1989, 104. Cf. MHK 8.95, “īdṛśo yady abhipreta ātmā hi bhavatām api/ 
nāmādibahusādharmyān nirdoṣaḥ sopapattikaḥ//” 
378 TJ D284b5, “rig byed ni chos rtogs pa la tshad mar gyur pa ma yin te.” 
379 MS 1.1.2, “codanālakṣaṇo artho dharma.” 
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recognizes “some well-spoken statements” (legs bshad ’ga’ zhig) in the Veda and likens them to 
“some jewels inside a pile of shit” (mi gtsang phung po rin chen ’ga’ zhig). Moreover, a possible 
Buddhist origin of those “jewels” is also hinted at in the commentary.380 Such an inclusivistic 
approach to the Veda, however, is not an act of acknowledging certain goodness either in the 
Mīmāṃsaka doctrines or in the “action-oriented” portion of the Veda (kriyākāṇḍa) prioritized by 
the Mīmāṃsakas.381 Exclusivism dominates MHK 9.  
 On the other hand, Bhāviveka’s attitude toward the Sāṃkhyas cannot be reduced either 
to inclusivism or to exclusivism. His critical reviews of the Sāṃkhya doctrines forms a separate 
                                                 
380 TJ D317a4-5, “Nevertheless, to those who are like jewelry specialists, the following thought occurs: 
‘The precious dharma like this did not originate from here. On the contrary, someone [must] have 
collected it from Buddhist scriptures and others and mixed that into it [=the Veda]. It is just like a jewel 
such as lapis lazuli (vaidūrya) does not originate from a pile of shit on the street of a village inhabited by 
ordinary people.’” (rin po che brtag pa la mkhas pa 'dra ba rnams la 'di lta bu'i shes pa 'byung ste: “'di 
las ni chos rin po che 'di lta bu 'byung ba ma yin gyi; gzhan du na sangs rgyas pa la sogs pa'i gzhung las 
btus nas de'i nang du bsres pa yin te. skye bo tha mal pa rnams kyis nye bar spyad pa'i grong bar gyi 
srang na mi gtsang ba'i phung po yod pa las bai dzurya la sogs pa'i rin po che 'byung ba ma yin pa bzhin 
no.”) 
381 Although it is not explicit in the text of MHK itself, it seems that Bhāviveka holds different—that is, 
opposite—opinions with respect to the “action-part” (kriyākāṇḍa) and “knowledge-part” (jñānakāṇḍa) of 
the Veda. MHK 9.20-22 seem to allude to this division of the Veda and express Bhāviveka’s varying 
assessments of them. In MHK 9.20, Bhāviveka states that the rational part of a scripture should be 
examined first: “If it is argued that [only] those words that survive the inquiry of rationality are [qualified 
to be called] a scripture, first of all, such words must be examined. Then [other insignificant] sayings of it 
[are to be examined] later.” (yat parīkṣākṣamaṃ yuktyā vacanaṃ cet tad āgamaḥ/ tad eva tāvan 
mīmānsyaṃ paścāt tenoditaṃ hi yat//) After having suggested examining a scripture by focusing on a part 
of it, in the subsequent two verses, Bhāviveka emphasizes that it is knowledge (jñāna) rather than ritual 
actions (kriyā) that is regarded as the means to the ultimate goal of liberation (mukti) by everyone (kun la 
rab tu grags pa’i phyogs). Cf. MHK 9.21-2, “Let it be asserted in it [=the Veda] that liberation is from 
knowledge because that (i.e., knowledge) is the antidote to it (i.e., ignorance). It is similar to the case 
where one recovers from illness due to medicine since the latter is the antidote to sickness. Ritual actions 
cannot be considered to be [a means of] attaining liberation since they are [just] actions, like an act of 
ploughing. Or, it is because they, being non-cognitive acts, are verbally expressible. Or, it is because they 
last [only for] a limited time.” (tatra tatpratipakṣatvāj jñānān muktir itīṣyatām/ āmayapratipakṣatvād 
auṣadhād vyādhimuktivat// kriyātvān na kriyābhīṣṭā kṛṣivan muktyavāptaye/ adhītve sati vācyatvān 
mitakālatvato ’pi vā//) (MHK 9.22c “adhītve sati vācyatvān” is hard to translate; the Tibetan text differs 
from it: “blo ma yin phyir brjod bya’i phyir” (It is because they are non-cognitive acts and because they 
are verbally expressible.) No explanation of this part of the verse is found in TJ.) Such divergent 
evaluations of the Brāhmaṇas (kriyākāṇḍa) and the Upaniṣads (jñānakāṇḍa) of the Veda partly explains 
Bhāviveka’s different approaches to the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins, who respectively prioritize the 
former and latter portions over the other.  
   204 
chapter of MHK, and therefore, it is not necessary to point out that the Sāṃkhyas were one of the 
major opponents to Bhāviveka.382 However, we have seen that Bhāviveka emulated the 
Sāṃkhya trait of collecting immoral teachings of the Veda and used an almost identical 
syllogism to denounce Vedic sacrifice. In short, Bhāviveka, albeit implicitly, collaborated with 
the Sāṃkhyas against their common enemy, Vedic ritualists. Furthermore, there is a curious 
record on Bhāviveka’s identity in Xuanzang’s travelogue that may indicate his more intimate 
relationship with the Sāṃkhyas.  
Not far to the south of the city is a great mountain cliff, which was the place 
where the Śāstra-master Bhāviveka stayed at the Asura Palace to wait for the 
advent of Maitreya Bodhisattva as a Buddha. The Śāstra-master was a man of 
magnanimous disposition with deep and sublime virtues. He was outwardly 
clad in the garb of the Sāṃkhyas and inwardly glorified the learning of 
Nāgārjuna.383  
In this passage, Bhāviveka is portrayed as having two discrete identities that seem to 
constitute his social and personal identities. Bhāviveka expressed himself as a Sāṃkhya in his 
clothing (僧佉之服) but his inner aspiration was directed toward Madhyamaka philosophy (龍猛
之學). This composite identity does not conform to an inclusivistic or exclusivistic framework. 
Nor does it indicate that Bhāviveka was syncretic; each identity forms a different aspect. The 
reason why he wanted to socially present himself as a Sāṃkhya is not clear from Xuanzang’s 
short record. Unless Bhāviveka’s intention in wearing the Sāṃkhya clothing was ironic, a certain 
feature of the Sāṃkhya must have been appealing to Bhāviveka as a mode of presenting himself 
to the public. Given the analysis of this dissertation, that feature may have been the Sāṃkhyas as 
                                                 
382 For studies on the sixth “Sāṃkhya” chapter of MHK (sāṃkhyatattvāvatāra), see Honda (1967), 
Qvarnström (2012), and He (2013, vol.1, 44-139). He (2013, vol.2, 404-533) contains the critical edition 
of the text and modern Chinese translation.  
383 T 2087, 930c25-8, “城南不遠有大山巖, 婆毘吠伽(唐言淸辯)論師, 住阿素洛宮, 待見慈氏菩薩成
佛之處. 論師雅量弘遠, 至德深邃. 外示僧佉之服, 內弘龍猛之學.” I slightly modified Li (1996, 
316)’s translation. 
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Brahmanical ascetics who opposed Vedic sacrifice. This adoption of a feature of the opponent 
does not include the other school within oneself in order to claim one’s superiority over it. It is 
more plausible to consider the possibility that Bhāviveka wanted to gain certain social capital by 
maintaining two disparate identities. 
 Inclusivism and exclusivism alone do not explain Bhāviveka’s strategies of confronting 
others, nor do they explain the general interreligious attitude of Indian intellectuals throughout 
history. This is not to say that they play no role. Bhāviveka’s case indicates that one could 
simultaneously deploy both strategies toward different opponents. Nor were these the only 
options for Indian intellectuals.  
From Bhāviveka’s case, one can conclude that it is legitimate to analyze the sixth-
century religious situation in units of separate schools or traditions. However, individual schools’ 
attitudes toward others were not predetermined; they were the products of dialogical encounters 
between intellectuals of different traditions. In other words, ancient and medieval authors were 
not employing a predetermined policy—such as inclusivism and exclusivism—to outsiders. 
Indeed, separate identities between schools, depending on the topic of debate, may be blurred.  
The portion of MHK 9 under the heading of “the Veda is not moral” and studied in this 
dissertation (MHK 9.1-4 and 18-42) demonstrates a Buddhist author’s management of the 
resources available to him in order to confront a newly emerged opponent, the Mīmāṃsakas. In 
the course of refuting the Mīmāṃsaka claims, Bhāviveka draws upon information and strategies 
accumulated in sources that do not belong to his own Madhyamaka school. He thereby crosses 
the boundaries, or rather, transcends the boundaries between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna and 
between Buddhism and Sāṃkhya to form a larger community of anti-Vedics against Vedic 
ritualists. Thus, in the portion of MHK 9 considered here, the confrontation is not merely 
Buddhists versus Mīmāṃsakas, but, more properly, the Ascetics versus the Householders. Such a 
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confrontation was possible because Bhāviveka, the last upholder of the two traditional Buddhist 
critiques against Vedic ritualists, actively incorporated the Sāṃkhya challenges to Vedic 
authority, indirectly supporting the Sāṃkhya cause of ahiṃsā.  
This dissertation does not exhaust the valuable information on sixth-century Buddhists’ 
relationship with other Hindu groups, not only in MHK 9, but in the “Mīmāṃsā proper” sections 
of MHK 9. There is still much to excavate with the aid of texts that were directly involved in 
Bhāviveka’s composition. In Chapter Two, I laid out the basic contents of MHK 9, proposed 
sections that can be investigated separately, and considered the identity of the opponents in each 
section. I also suggested a perspective for conceiving MHK 9 as a unitary chapter, despite its 
various opponents of incompatible identities. According to my analysis, MHK 9 has a greater 
purpose than merely refuting the Mīmāṃsakas. It is designed to counteract the movements that 
arose under the symbol of the Veda, both the Veda proper and scriptures elevated to the status of 
the Veda by its advocates.  
MHK 9 is an anti-Vedic discourse, a nāstika manifesto. It is a systematic expression of 
the Buddhist identity as nāstika that was maintained throughout the history of Buddhism in 
India. When a detailed analysis of the entire chapter has been made (continuing the work begun 
here), we will be able to write a history of the Buddhist confrontation with Vedic Brahmins. It 
will be a history of Buddhist struggles for legitimacy against the Veda, the symbol for Indian 
dharma. 
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